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Abstract
This thesis presents the design and verification of a fault-tolerant sensor fusion system to
provide robust height estimates for commercial airliners. Current commercial aircraft sys-
tems obtain a height estimate by taking the median of redundant radio altimeter measure-
ments. However, this approach is not robust to a failure that affects all radio altimeters.
The proposed system uses technology redundancy by combining the measurements from
the available aircraft sensors that provide either height or altitude measurements: the
radio altimeter, the GPS, the inertial sensors, and the instrument landing system (ILS).
An onboard terrain map is used to convert altitude measurements to height measurements.
The robust height estimation problem is divided into two major sub-problems: fault
detection and isolation and sensor fusion. To address the fault detection and isolation
sub-problem, a variety of data-driven and model-based techniques were investigated. Two
general approaches were considered: fault diagnosis using sensor measurements from a
single time instant, and fault diagnosis using sensor measurements from a window of con-
secutive time instants. For the single time instant approach, only data-driven techniques
were applied, including outlier detectors, binary classifiers, and multi-class classifiers. For
the multiple time instant approach, both model-based and data-driven techniques were
applied. The model-based techniques included the Bank of Kalman filters and the Ro-
bust Kalman filter, while the data-driven techniques include Model Consensus, Dynamic
Principal Component Analysis, and Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes with time as an additional
variable. Finally, to address the sensor fusion sub-problem, three methods were investi-
gated: using the median of the sensor measurements, using the weighted average of the
sensor measurements, and using a Kalman filter to perform optimal sensor fusion.
A simulation model was used to generate synthetic training and testing data for the
data-driven techniques. Mathematical models were established for the aircraft motion,
the sensors, and the terrain. The structure and nominal parameters for the sensor models
were based on information sourced from literature, and then the sensor parameters were
tuned to fit a real dataset provided by Airbus. Fault models for six types of sensor faults
were also created. The simulation model was used to generate a large dataset of repre-
sentative sensor measurements containing both “no-fault” and “fault” conditions.
The fault detection and isolation, and the sensor fusion were tested using both simulated
data and real datasets of actual flight data with synthetic sensor failures injected. The
single time instant approach achieved fault diagnosis accuracies from 85 % (Support Vec-
tor Machine) to 94 % (k-Nearest Neighbors). The multiple time instant approach achieved
fault diagnosis accuracies from 93 % (Model Consensus) to 99 % (Robust Kalman filter).
The three sensor fusion approaches produced height estimates with average accuracies
from 5.1 m to 7.4 m.
ii
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Uittreksel
Hierdie tesis beskryf die ontwerp en verifikasie aan van ’n fouttolerante sensorfusie-stelsel
om betroubare hoogte afskattings vir kommersie¨le vliegtuie te verskaf. Huidige kom-
mersie¨le vliegtuigstelsels verkry ’n hoogte afskatting deur die mediaan van veelvuldige
radio-hoogtemeter metings te neem. Hierdie benadering is egter nie betroubaar vir ’n
fout wat alle radio-hoogtemeters gelyktydig be¨ınvloed nie. Die voorgestelde stelsel ge-
bruik tegnologie oorbodigheid deur die metings te kombineer van die beskikbare vliegtuig
sensors wat hoogte bo grond of hoogte bo seevlak meet: die radio-hoogtemeter, die GPS,
die inersie¨le sensors, en die instrumentlandingstelsel (ILS).
Die robuuste hoogte afskatting probleem word verdeel in twee subprobleme: foutopsporing
en isolasie, en sensorfusie. Om die foutopsporing en isolasie subprobleem aan te spreek, is
’n verskeidenheid data-gedrewe en modelgebaseerde tegnieke ondersoek. Twee algemene
benaderings is oorweeg: foutdiagnose met behulp van sensormetings vanaf ’n enkele tyd-
stip, en foutdiagnose met behulp van sensormetings vanaf ’n venster van opeenvolgende
tydstippe. Vir die enkel tydstip benadering is verskeie data-gedrewe tegnieke toegepas,
insluitende uitskieter opspoorders, bineˆre klassifiseerdes en multi-klas klassifiseerders. Vir
die meervoudige tydstip benadering is beide modelgebaseerde en data-gedrewe tegnieke
toegepas. Die modelgebaseerde tegnieke het die Bank van Kalman filters en die Robuuste
Kalman filter ingesluit, terwyl die data-gedrewe tegnieke Model Konsensus en Dinamiese
Hoofkomponent Analise. Laastens, om die sensorfusie subprobleem aan te spreek is drie
metodes ondersoek: gebruik van die mediaan van die sensormetings, gebruik van die ge-
weegde gemiddelde van die sensormetings, en gebruik van ’n Kalman filter vir optimaal
sensorfusie.
’n Simulasiemodel is ontwikkel om sintetiese opleiding en toetsingdata te skep vir die
data-gedrewe tegnieke. Wiskundige modelle is afgelei vir die vliegtuig beweging, die sen-
sors, en die terrein. Die struktuur en nominale parameters vir die sensormodelle is gegrond
op inligting wat uit literatuur verkry is, waarna die sensorparameters ingestel is om ’n
werklike datastel, wat deur Airbus verskaf is, te pas. Foutmodelle vir ses tipes sensorfoute
is ook geskep. Die simulasiemodel is gebruik om ’n groot datastel van verteenwoordigende
sensormetings te genereer wat beide “geen fout” en “fout” toestande bevat.
Die foutopsporing en isolasie en die sensorfusie is getoets met behulp van beide ges-
imuleerde data en datastelle van werklike vlugdata met byvoeging van sintetiese sensor-
foute. Die enkel tydstip benadering foutdiagnose akkuraathede behaal van 85 % (“Sup-
port Vector Machine”) tot 94 % (k-Naaste Bure). Die meervoudige tydstip benadering
het foutdiagnose akkuraathede behaal van 93 % (Model Konsensus) tot 99 % (Robuuste
Kalman filter). Die drie sensor-fusie benaderings het hoogte afskattings met gemiddelde
akkuraatheid van 5.1 m tot 7.4 m gelewer.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
This thesis presents the design and verification of a fault-tolerant sensor fusion system
that provides robust height estimates for commercial airliners. The proposed system com-
bines the measurements from all the aircraft sensors that provide either height or altitude
measurements: the radio altimeter, the GPS, the inertial sensors, and the instrument
landing system (ILS). An onboard terrain map is used to convert altitude measurements
to height measurements. The system performs fault detection and isolation on the sensor
measurements before combining them to produce an estimate of the aircraft height that
is robust to sensor failure in at most one technology.
A reliable and accurate measurement of the aircraft height above the ground is required
because it is used by the autopilot during automated landings. Currently, commercial
aircraft systems use multiple redundant radio altimeter sensors and take the median of
their height measurements. However, this approach is not robust to a failure that affects
all radio altimeters. A malfunction of the radio altimeter system may cause erroneous
autopilot behaviour during the landing phase that may potentially result in an aircraft
crash. In 2009, Turkish Airlines flight TK1951 crashed during landing at Amsterdam
Schipol airport due to a faulty radio altimeter reading. The autopilot reduced the engine
thrust during approach, causing the aircraft to stall and crash. This incident prompted
research into using other aircraft sensors to validate the radio altimeter measurement and
provide a robust height estimate in the event of a radio altimeter system malfunction.
This project addresses the need to validate the radio altimeter measurement using the
other aircraft sensors. The scope is expanded to incorporate fault detection and isolation
on all of the sensors (not only the radio altimeter), before using sensor fusion to combine
all the sensor measurements and produce an aircraft height estimate that is robust to a
malfunction in any one sensor technology.
The robust height estimation problem presents two main challenges: Firstly, the ra-
dio altimeter provides a height measurement while all the other aircraft sensors provide
altitude measurements. The sensor measurements must therefore be transformed to the
same domain so that homogeneous variables are used for the fault diagnosis and sensor
fusion. Secondly, the sensor characteristics are not stationary and change as a function
of height, altitude, and time as the aircraft descends for landing.
2
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1.2 Altitude versus Height
When considering the robust height estimation problem, it is important to distinguish
between the following three terms: altitude, relative altitude, and height, as explained in
figure 1.1. The altitude of the aircraft is its elevation above Mean Sea Level (MSL). The
relative altitude of the aircraft is its elevation above the runway threshold. The height of
the aircraft is its elevation above the terrain directly below it.
MSL MSL
true altitude
height
relative altitude
runwayterrain
ocean
runway elevation
Figure 1.1: Terminology used when referring to the elevation of an aircraft.
The radio altimeter provides a measurement of the height above the terrain, the GPS
sensor provides measurements of the altitude above Mean Sea Level, the inertial sensors
propagate the altitude from a fixed reference (runway aircraft took off from), and the
Instrument Landing System (ILS) provides sensor measurements of the aircraft’s altitude
relative to the runway threshold it is approaching.
1.3 Non-Stationary Sensor Characteristics
The sensor characteristics of the different aircraft sensors (radio altimeter, GPS sensor,
inertial sensors, and ILS) are not stationary and change as a function of height, altitude,
and time as the aircraft descends for landing, as illustrated in figure 1.2.
t1
t2
t3
tn
KEY:
ZGPS
ZIRS
ZILS
HRA
max alllowable
estimation error
Figure 1.2: The maximum allowable estimation error decreases the closer an aircraft
gets to landing. The sensor characteristics vary as a function of time, altitude and height.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
The GPS sensor characteristics are independent of height, altitude or time, and do not
change significantly over the course of the landing as illustrated in figure 1.3. The in-
ertial sensor measurements become less accurate as time passes (due to sensor drift) as
illustrated in figure 1.4. The ILS sensor measurements become more accurate as the air-
craft descends (relative altitude decreases) as illustrated in figure 1.5. In figure 1.6 the
radio altimeter measurements become more accurate as the aircraft descends (as height
decreases).
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Figure 1.3: GPS sensor characteristics
as a function of altitude.
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Figure 1.4: Inertial sensor characteris-
tics as a function of altitude.
0 200 400 600 800
True Altitude (m)
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
IL
S
M
ea
su
re
d
A
lt
it
u
d
e
(m
)
Figure 1.5: ILS sensor characteristics as
a function of altitude.
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Figure 1.6: Radio altimeter sensor char-
acteristics as a function of height.
1.4 Literature Review
Only a single application of aircraft height verification was found in literature. However,
many applications were found that relate to sensor fusion and fault detection and isola-
tion. This section provides an overview of the most applicable literature.
Thomas et al. [2] investigated the topic of robust sensor fusion for relative altimetry
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with the aim of improving the height estimate of a commercial passenger aircraft by re-
moving any undesired events relating to the misbehavior of the radio altimeters. Their
approach establishes a Bank of Kalman filters for each sensor and its possible modes of
operation, and uses probabilistic decision logic in the form of a likelihood function to
determine the current operating mode.
Another application of robust sensor fusion was proposed by Szanfranski et al. [1] who
developed a sensor fusion architecture for vertical take-offs and landings that fuses mea-
surements from an ultrasonic range finder and a pressure altimeter for unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) applications. Their solution is an alternative to hardware redundancy that
is deemed unfavorable due to space and weight constraints [1]. Many of the sensor tech-
nologies used on UAVs are designed or selected for minimum size and cost, and therefore
sacrifice some quality and reliability. The combination of two dissimilar sensors ensures
that there are measurements available at both lower and higher heights. Their fusion
methodology employs an initial filtering stage before sensor measurements are combined
using weights that vary as a function of height as shown in figure 1.7. The initial filter-
ing stage is responsible for fault isolation by addressing the known shortcomings of the
two sensors. The pressure altimeter measurements are prone to fluctuations with sudden
pressure changes due to wind gusts, while the ultrasonic sensor will occasionally register
no measurement. Their architecture was demonstrated on measurement data from the
two sensors as illustrated in figure 1.8.
Figure 1.7: The sensor fusion architec-
ture for relative altitude estimation of a
UAV [1].
Figure 1.8: The raw measurements and
estimated relative altitude versus time.
The results for ultrasonic sensor is shown
above and the pressure altimeter below [1].
The use of sensor fusion to accurately estimate aircraft states was proposed by Schet-
tini et al. [6] who use a Kalman filter to fuse measurements from the global positioning
system (GPS) receivers, the inertial sensors, and the air data system. The assumption is
made that all critical sensors required are redundant and that fault detection and isolation
is performed at a sensor level [6]. Their sensor fusion architecture uses an extended and
adaptive Kalman filter that firstly linearises around the current operating point before
adapting the sensor measurement noise based on flight conditions.
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The implementation of an aerodynamic upset detection system that uses machine learn-
ing algorithms to classify dissimilar sensor measurements is investigated by Malan [7].
His system identified different types of aerodynamic upsets through the use of separate
classifiers that were each trained to identify a specific upset. The techniques used for
upset detection can also be used for fault detection and isolation.
1.5 Related Research
Thomas et al. [2] investigated the topic of sensor fusion for relative altimetry with the
goal of improving the height estimate of a commercial passenger aircraft. Their primary
objective was to remove the undesired events relating to misbehavior of the radio al-
timeters. Classical solutions for fusion of radio altimeter measurements employ hardware
redundancy, and thresholding or voting logic to determine the validity of a sensor [2].
Unfortunately these approaches cannot handle multiple failures.
The approach proposed by Thomas et al. establishes a hybrid model for each individual
sensor that consists of two separate states, namely a discrete and continuous state. The
discrete state reflects the current operating mode of the sensor, for example “nominal”,
“biased”, “frozen” or “non computed data”. The continuous state is estimated by a Bank
of Kalman filters, where the design of an individual Kalman filter is based on a different
operating mode. In other words, the model of the system dynamics for the individual
Kalman filters will vary based on the fault or hypothesis being modelled. A probabilistic
approach is taken to the decision making process, where a likelihood function is estab-
lished that uses the measurement residual and its covariance matrix to determine the
probability associated with each operating mode. The discrete state is updated to reflect
the operating mode that maximises the likelihood function. A Hybrid Gaussian Mixture
Filter (HGMF) is used to estimate the most likely aircraft height and respective operating
modes for each sensor involved, as seen in figure 1.9.
The performance of the hybrid models was demonstrated on a simulation setup con-
sisting of two radio altimeters. Table 1.1 enumerates the sensor operating modes that
were defined.
n Mode Remark
1 Nominal No-fault
2 Biased Bright spot
3 Fixed at 7.5 m Locked on landing gear
4 Fixed at −1.8 m Coupling between antennas
5 Frozen on last value Damage to altimetry system
Table 1.1: Possible operating modes for radio altimeter.
The “coupling” fault occurs when there is water that covers the fuselage and “bright
spot” when there is a mountain face or building that returns a stronger reflection than the
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:
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Figure 1.9: The interpreted sensor fusion relative altimetry architecture of Thomas
et al. [2], where separate Banks of Kalman filters are established for each sensor. The
Hybrid Gaussian Mixture Filter outputs the estimated aircraft height (hˆ) and the discrete
status (si) for each sensor reflecting its operating mode.
terrain directly below the aircraft. Different simulation runs were used, where faults were
injected onto one of the radio altimeter measurements. The estimated and true height
were plotted as a function of time to demonstrate the system performance. The results
showed that the proposed sensor fusion architecture is capable of detecting a “biased”
fault, “fixed at −1.8 m” fault and “frozen on last value” fault. The sensor measurements
and results for a “biased fault” are shown in figure 1.10 and figure 1.11 respectively.
Figure 1.10: The true and measured
height versus time for the sensors with a
bias error on RA 1 [2].
false alarms
Figure 1.11: The true and estimated
HGMF height versus time above. The
estimated operating mode versus time is
shown below [2].
A problem with the architecture proposed by Thomas et al, is the frequency of false
alarms, as illustrated in Figure 1.7. (A value of 1 indicates the “Nominal” mode, while
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a value of 2 indicates a “Biased” fault.) Their research is also limited in that they did
not perform a quantitative analysis of their system’s height estimate error, and the fact
that their approach was not validated on actual sensor data. Also, their approach is only
applied to multiple hardware-redundant radio altimeters, and will therefore not be robust
to a failure that affects the entire radio altimetry system. (However, they do suggest
incorporating additional independent sensor technologies.)
1.6 Research Goal
The purpose of this project is to develop a fault-tolerant sensor fusion system that provides
robust height estimates for commercial airliners. It should deliver an aircraft height
estimate that is robust to the failure of at most one of the height or altitude sensors: the
radio altimeter, the GPS, the inertial sensors, and the instrument landing system (ILS).
1.7 Project Approach
The robust height estimation problem is divided into two major sub-problems: fault de-
tection and isolation and sensor fusion. To address the fault detection and isolation
sub-problem, a variety of analytical redundancy approaches were investigated. These in-
cluded data-driven and model-based techniques as illustrated in figure 1.12. Two general
approaches were considered: fault diagnosis using sensor measurements from a single time
instant, and fault diagnosis using sensor measurements from a window of consecutive time
instants.
Fault Detection
and Isolation
Hardware
redundancy
Analytical
redundancy
Model based
methods
Data driven
methods
Figure 1.12: Overview of the approaches to fault detection and isolation.
For the single time instant approach, several data-driven techniques were applied, includ-
ing outlier detectors, binary classifiers, and multi-class classifiers. The outlier detectors
that were used include Elliptic Envelope, Local Outlier Factor and Isolation Forest. The
binary and multi-class classifiers investigated include Logistic Regression, Na¨ıve Bayes,
k-Nearest Neighbors, Decision Tree and Support Vector Machine. Data preprocessing was
used with the aim of improving class separability and classifier performance. Different
data preprocessing techniques were investigated, including no preprocessing, the orthog-
onal transform, and the kernel transform. A custom preprocessing technique (called the
residual transform) was also proposed, prompted by the height verification problem. The
classifiers were trained on equal percentages of each possible operating mode to ensure
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unbiased classification. All fault detection and isolation approaches were evaluated and
compared according to the percentage of faults that were correctly detected and operat-
ing modes that were correctly identified. The locations of all incorrect operating mode
classifications were analysed. The approach was validated on actual measurement data
and the reported versus actual operating mode was plotted as a function of time.
Both model-based and data-driven techniques were applied for consecutive time instant
fault detection and isolation. The model-based techniques include the Bank of Kalman
filters and the Robust Kalman filter, while the data-driven techniques include Model Con-
sensus (a variant of random sample consensus), Dynamic Principal Component Analysis,
and the best performing single time instant classifier with time as an additional variable.
Similar to the single time instant approach, the consecutive time instant techniques listed
above were evaluated and compared according to fault detection and isolation accuracy,
and the locations of all incorrect classifications were analysed. After considering a wide
variety of approaches and techniques, the best performing fault detection and isolation
techniques were identified.
Finally, to address the sensor fusion sub-problem, three methods were investigated: using
the median of the sensor measurements, using the weighted average of the sensor mea-
surements, and using a Kalman filter to perform optimal, fault-tolerant sensor fusion.
The sensor fusion methods were compared by analysing the height estimation error.
A simulation model was used to generate synthetic training and testing data. Math-
ematical models were established for the aircraft motion, the sensors, and the terrain.
The structure and nominal parameters for the sensor models were based on information
sourced from literature, and then the sensor parameters were tuned to fit a real dataset
provided by Airbus. Fault models for six types of sensor faults were also created. The sim-
ulation model was used to generate a large dataset of representative sensor measurements
containing both “no fault” and “fault” conditions. The fault detection and isolation, and
the sensor fusion were tested using both simulated data and real datasets of actual flight
data with synthetic sensor failures injected.
1.8 Project Objectives
The research objectives for this project were formulated as follows:
• Establish a simulation model that can be used to generate representative relative
altitude and height data with the aid of the on-board terrain database and detailed
terrain map. This includes the following secondary objectives:
– Establish a model for the aircraft motion.
– Derive realistic sensor models from a combination of literature and actual data
for the following aircraft sensors: global positioning system (GPS) receiver,
inertial reference system (IRS) sensors, instrument landing system (ILS), and
radio altimeter (RA).
– Generate faulty sensor measurement data by injecting any of the following fault
profiles onto sensor measurements: bias, jamming, oscillation, Non-Return-to-
Zero, increased noise, or runaway.
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• Investigate and apply fault detection and isolation algorithms. This includes the
following secondary objectives:
– Perform a literature review of a wide variety of approaches to fault detection
and isolation. Fields explored should be inclusive of outlier detection methods,
supervised machine learning techniques and classical model-based approaches.
– Evaluate and compare the performance of the most promising fault detection
and isolation approaches with respect to fault detection and isolation accuracy
as well as analyzing the location of the incorrect fault predictions. There should
be no false alarms from no-fault sensor measurements as these decrease system
reliability and would result in additional stress for the pilot.
– Design a fault detection and isolation system for robust height estimation using
the best performing model-based or data-driven technique.
• Investigate and apply sensor fusion algorithms that estimate the height of a com-
mercial aircraft. This includes the following secondary objectives:
– Investigate and establish methods by which the altitude sensors can be used
to validate the height measurement.
– Investigate a variety of techniques to ensure that the estimated height of a
commercial aircraft is robust to sensor failure.
• Validate and demonstrate the performance of robust height estimation architectures
on actual measurement data.
1.9 Thesis Overview
Chapter 1 introduced and motivated the research problem of robust height estimation for
commercial airliners, reviewed the relevant literature, formulated the research goal, iden-
tified the project objectives, and provided an overview of the project approach. Chapter
2 conceptualises the problem of fault-tolerant sensor fusion for robust height estimation,
and presents the mathematical modelling of the aircraft motion, the terrain, the height
and altitude sensors, and the sensor faults. Chapter 3 presents background theory on
fault detection and isolation, and provides an overview of various model-based and data-
driven techniques that are used for fault detection and isolation. Chapter 4 presents the
design of a fault detection and isolation architecture that serves as the framework for the
model-based and data-driven techniques. Two general approaches were considered for
fault diagnosis, namely using sensor measurements from a single time instant, and using
measurements from a window of consecutive time instants. Chapter 5 details the design
and evaluation of fault detection and isolation techniques that use measurements from a
single time instant. Similarly Chapter 6 details the design and evaluation of fault detec-
tion and isolation techniques that use a window of measurements from consecutive time
instants. Chapter 7 investigates the application and evaluation of different sensor fusion
techniques. Chapter 8 presents a summary of the work done, discusses the conclusions,
and gives recommendations for future research in robust height estimation.
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Conceptualisation and Modelling
In this chapter, the robust height estimation problem is conceptualised, and mathematical
models are established for the aircraft motion, the sensors, and the terrain. Fault models
for six types of sensor faults are also defined. The mathematical models serve as the basis
for the simulation model that is used to generate synthetic training and testing data for
the robust height estimation techniques.
This chapter will initially conceptualise the simulation set-up, and problem of robust
height estimation. An overview of the simulation model is then presented and explained.
The aircraft and terrain models that are used to establish true relative altitude and height
data are presented first. Thereafter the structure and nominal parameters for the sensor
models are sourced from literature. The parameter values are tuned to fit actual data.
Lastly the simulation model is expanded to account for sensor faults.
2.1 Conceptualisation
This section introduces the frame of reference, terminology and notation that will be
used to differentiate between the respective height and relative altitude sensors. This is
necessary information for the reader to better conceptualise the problem of fault-tolerant
sensor fusion for aircraft height estimation.
ZR
XR
γ
(ZGPS, ZIRS, ZILS)
(XGPS, XIRS)
runway threshold
YR
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the standard
notation and conceptualisation for the rel-
ative altitude sensors
ZR
XR
HRA
ZT1
ZT2
(HGPS, HIRS, HILS)
YR
Figure 2.2: Illustration of the stan-
dard notation and conceptualisation for
the height sensor
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The runway axis system (XR, YR, ZR) serves as the reference frame for the position and
velocity of the aircraft as illustrated in figure 2.1 and figure 2.2. The runway axis sys-
tem assumes a flat earth approximation. The XR axis is in the horizontal plane, and is
aligned along the centre of the runway such that the heading of an approaching plane
is in the positive XR direction. The ZR axis is perpendicular to XR axis and is defined
as pointing in a positive upward direction when using the flat earth approximation. The
zero reference point for the runway axis system is the runway threshold which is defined
as the start of the runway for an aircraft on approach to land. Lastly the YR axis is
perpendicular to both the XR and ZR axes, but is not considered in this project.
Relative altitude is defined as the elevation of an aircraft above the runway it is moving
towards upon final approach to land. The relative altitude sensors include the global
positioning system (GPS), inertial reference system (IRS) and instrument landing system
(ILS) as shown in figure 2.1. The GPS sensor makes use of satellite navigation to de-
termine the aircraft location. The IRS sensor propagates the aircraft position using the
measurements from the accelerometers and gyroscopes strapped to the aircraft body axes.
The ILS sensor employs trigonometry to determine the relative altitude of the aircraft
using the glide slope measurement (γ) and aircraft location along the XR axis, given by
XGPS or XIRS.
Height is defined as the elevation of the aircraft above the ground directly below it. The
aircraft height is a function of the aircraft motion and the terrain below it as illustrated
in figure 2.2. The only height sensor is the radio altimeter (RA). The radio altimeter is a
radar that measures the height of an aircraft above the surrounding terrain. The terrain
height is given by database ZT2 that gives the maximum height of the terrain within 100 m
segments along the XR axes. The relative altitude sensor measurements can be converted
to the height domain through the use of the terrain database ZT1. This database is stored
in the onboard flight computer and gives the maximum height of the terrain within 500 m
segments along the XR axes.
The necessary notation that will be used to refer to databases, height and altitude sensors
is summarised as follows:
X<>,Z<> The co-ordinates of the aircraft in the runway axis sys-
tem as returned by sensor <>
H<> The height of the aircraft as returned by sensor <>
X˙<>,Z˙<> The velocity of the aircraft in runway axis system as
returned by sensor <>
ZT1 The relative altitude of the terrain directly below the
aircraft as returned by the onboard terrain map in run-
way axes
ZT2 The true relative altitude of the terrain directly below
the aircraft in runway axes
γ Glide slope angle followed by an aircraft on approach
to landing
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2.2 Overview of Simulation Model
This project required the development of simulation models for the aircraft height and
altitude sensors. These are necessary to generate representative measurement data for
comprehensive training and testing purposes.
Three essential components were necessary to achieve this, namely a model of the air-
craft dynamics, a model of the terrain below the aircraft, and lastly mathematical models
for the respective sensors. The aircraft model is used to generate true relative altitude
and height data. The true aircraft height is given by the difference between the terrain
model and true relative altitude of the aircraft. The mathematical models for the four
different sensor technology types use the true height and relative altitude data to gener-
ate representative sensor measurements based on known sensors accuracies. Each sensor
has small measurement errors that contribute towards the effective accuracy associated
with that sensor. The terrain height and sensor measurements will be used by the fault
tolerant sensor fusion methods to provide a robust height estimate hˆ. An overview of the
simulation model is illustrated in figure 2.3.
Terrain Database
Aircraft Model
Terrain Model
Sensor Models
x˙, z˙, x, z
−
x
z
ZT2(x) ZT1(XGPS), ZT1(XIRS)
ZGPS[k], Z˙IRS[k], ZIRS[k]
h
ZILS[k], HRA[k]
XGPS, XIRS
Fault Tolerant
Sensor Fusion
+
hˆ
Figure 2.3: Overview of the simulation model used to generate sensor data
The aircraft simulations were initialised at the point of intersection with the γ = 3◦
glide slope that the aircraft follows along its final approach until touch down when the
simulation ends. The true XR location of the aircraft, x, is used by the accurate terrain
database, ZT2, to determine the true aircraft height, h. The input data required by the
sensor models consists of the x and z position of the aircraft, the x˙ and z˙ velocity of the
aircraft, and lastly the height of the aircraft, h.
2.3 Aircraft Model
The deterministic forces and moments that act on an aircraft can be divided into three
groups, namely aerodynamic, gravitational and propulsion [8]. The aerodynamic forces
and moments are attributed to the flow of air around the aircraft fuselage. The gravita-
tional force acts on the aircraft in a down direction, while the location and engine type
will determine the resulting propulsion forces and moments. The individual components
from each of these groups are combined to give the total forces and moments acting along
the aircrafts body axes. The mathematical model for an aircraft assumes a six degree of
freedom rigid body with non-linear translational and rotational forces acting on it as illus-
trated in figure 2.4. The control inputs allow for commands that adjust the level of thrust
for propulsion systems as well as setting the aileron, elevator and rudder deflections.
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Aerodynamic
Model
Thrust
Model
Gravitational
Model
Force and Moment Model
Control Inputs
Kinemattic
Equations
Six Degree of Freedom Motion Equations
Kinetic
Equations
Forces
Moments
Aircraft States
Figure 2.4: Block diagram of Aircraft Model [9]
While the model above allows for accurate representation of aircraft dynamics it was
deemed unnecessary for the simulation of height and altitude data. Instead, a reduced-
order model of the aircraft’s point mass translational kinematics was used to generate
simulated position and velocity profiles for an aircraft on approach. This reduce-order
model reduces the computational burden and allows for the simulation of large quantities
of realistic height and altitude measurement data, where the effects of pilot manual con-
trol and environmental disturbances such as wind gusts are more easily exaggerated.
The model assumes that the longitudinal and lateral motion of the aircraft are decoupled.
The lateral movements are not considered as they are assumed to have a negligible effect
on the height and relative altitude measurements. The initialization boundaries used for
the simulation model are a maximum relative altitude of zmax = 1194 m and horizontal
position of xmax = −22 500 m in the runway axis system. This corresponds to the max-
imum possible relative altitude for a glide slope of γ = 3◦ and terrain database that is
22 500 m long. The relative altitude motion of the aircraft is modelled with the following
equations:
z˙(t) = ηz(t) + z˙(0) (2.3.1)
z(t) =
∫ t
0
z˙(t)dt+ z(0) (2.3.2)
where z˙(0) is the initial climb rate, z(0) is the initial relative altitude of the aircraft and
ηz(t) is Gaussian noise that imposes a random walk on the initial climb rate to simulate
the effect of wind gusts and pilot manual control.
The horizontal translational motion of the aircraft relative to the runway threshold is
modelled with the following equations:
x˙(t) = ηx(t) + x˙(0) (2.3.3)
x(t) =
∫ t
0
x˙(t)dt+ x(0) (2.3.4)
where x(0) is initial XR aircraft position, x˙(0) is the XR aircraft velocity and ηx(t) is
Gaussian white noise to simulate the effect of wind gusts and pilot manual control.
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The velocity vector of the aircraft model was initialised such that the aircraft approaches
the runway along the glide slope γ = 3◦ as illustrated in figure 2.5. The random noise
components ηz and ηx result in small variations of the aircraft position around the glide
slope. Note that the horizontal position (x) of the aircraft will have a negative value on
the XR runway axis at the start of the approach, and will travel with a positive horizontal
velocity towards the runway threshold (x=0).
ZR
XR
γ
x˙
z˙
~v
Figure 2.5: The breakdown of the velocity vector ~v along the XR and ZR runway axis
system to ensure that the aircraft approaches the runway along the glide slope γ
2.4 Terrain Model and Terrain Database
The terrain model gives the relative altitude in the runway axis system of a bare earth
surface for 22.5 km leading up to the runway threshold. Airbus provided two terrain
databases for a specific runway at Toulouse Airport in France. The first database ZT1
is more coarse with a resolution in the XR axis of 500 m. The database functions as a
lookup table, where the value for a 500 m segment corresponds to the highest point of
terrain within that segment. The second database ZT2 is a more accurate database with
a resolution in the XR axis of 100 m. This database was used as the terrain model and
functions as the ground truth. The true height of the aircraft h is difference between rel-
ative altitude and the lookup value from ZT2. Figure 2.6 plots the two terrain databases
as a function of the aircraft’s XR position.
An aircraft will not land at the runway threshold as this is the start of the runway,
therefore consideration needs to be made for the terrain map beyond the runway thresh-
old. The assumption was made that the runway at the airport is flat and therefore the
terrain model is zero for all x > 0. The lookup value for the relative altitude of the terrain
ZT1(x) is given by:
ZT1(x)←
{
0 for x > 0
ZT1(x) for x ≤ 0
(2.4.1)
where x is the aircraft location along the XR axis.
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Figure 2.6: The terrain databases supplied by Airbus. The blue database has a resolu-
tion of 100 m, while the red database has a resolution of 500 m
The terrain database accuracy characteristics were derived from the difference between
ZT2(x) and ZT1(x). The mean error and corresponding standard deviation are given by:
µterr = 10.22 m (2.4.2)
σterr = 9.16 m (2.4.3)
where µterr and σterr are the mean and standard deviation terrain database error respec-
tively.
2.5 Sensor Models
2.5.1 Introduction to Sensor Modeling
The height and altitude sensors use different technologies and methods whose perfor-
mance are subject to a variety of factors such atmospheric conditions, equipment age,
and topography. These factors result in errors between the actual and measured aircraft
position. There are many different sources of error that affect a sensor, including bias,
noise, quantization, drift, bandwidth, misalignment, and scale factor. Some of these error
sources are illustrated in figures 2.7-2.10. The true signal is represented by the black line,
while the error has been exaggerated in blue.
time (s)
X
(t
)
(m
)
Figure 2.7: Example bias error imposes
a constant offset error
time (s)
X
(t
)
(m
)
Figure 2.8: Example noise error results
in additive white noise
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Figure 2.9: Example drift error that in-
creases with time
time (s)
X
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)
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)
Figure 2.10: Example bandwidth er-
ror that results in a delayed response to
change
A combination of stochastic variables and processes were used to model the different
error components. The discrete-time equation below shows how a realistic measurement
(Xmeas) is modelled given the truth (Xtrue):
Xmeas[k] = Xtrue[k] + b+ η[k] + ∆drift · kTs +W [k] (2.5.1)
where b is magnitude of the bias, η[k] is zero mean discrete-time white noise, Ts is the
sampling period, ∆drift is the rate of drift and W [k] is a stochastic process.
Two different stochastic processes were also considered for modelling, namely random
walk and a first-order Gauss Markov process. A random walk model integrates white
noise to produce an output that will slowly “walk” or vary around some initial value. A
Gauss-Markov model is an extension of random walk that allows for the modelling of the
signals that are a mixture of random walk and noise.
Random Walk
Random walk is a simple and effective sensor error model, where the varying noise signal is
obtained by integrating discrete-time samples. The discrete-time model for a continuous
random walk process is given by:
W [k] = W [k − 1] + η[k] (2.5.2)
The noise component is usually modelled by a zero mean Gaussian white noise signal.
The variance of a random walk process is non-stationary as it increases over time. The
relation between the variance of the random process noise (σwk) and the discrete-time
white noise (σηk) is given by σ
2
wk = σ
2
ηk · kTs [4]. An example of a random walk signal is
illustrated in figure 2.11. An extension of random walk is to add a drift component that
results in the expected value of the process increasing at a fixed rate. The random walk
with drift model is given by:
W [k] = W [k − 1] + ∆drift + η[k] (2.5.3)
The resultant continuous noise signal will follow a deterministic trend given by (kTs ·∆drift
+ W [0]) with a stochastic trend superimposed on the drift component as illustrated in
figure 2.12.
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Figure 2.11: Example random walk
stochastic process
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Figure 2.12: Example random walk
with drift stochastic process
First Order Gauss-Markov
The first-order Gauss-Markov (GM) process is a flexible random error model as it can
represent a large number of systems with relatively simple mathematical equations. The
equation for a discrete-time first-order GM system is given by:
W [k] = e−Ts/TcW [k − 1] + η[k] (2.5.4)
where W [k] is a discrete-time stochastic process with correlation time Tc [4].
A first-order GM model is advantageous as it can model a variety of stochastic pro-
cesses that vary between random walk and Gaussian white noise. As e−Ts/Tc → 1 the
stochastic process becomes more representative of random walk and likewise as e−Ts/Tc
→ 0 it becomes more representative of white noise as illustrated in figure 2.13-2.14. The
time constant determines the amount of correlation in the resulting noise. A larger time
constant, Tc >> Ts, results in a stochastic process that is more correlated and less noisy.
The discrete-time noise variance is given by:
σ2η = σ
2
w(1− e−2Ts/Tc) (2.5.5)
where σ2w is the variance of the GM process and σ
2
η in the variance of the white noise
component.
Both these example stochastic processes started at an initial value of X(t = 0 s) = 5.
The effect of e−Ts/Tc being a fraction in the range of zero to one is that the first-order GM
stochastic process will be centered around zero as seen in figures 2.13-2.14.
Sensor Accuracy
Now that the error models used to establish realistic measurements have been discussed
it is necessary to define what is meant by sensor accuracy. It is important that sensor
accuracy is well defined as it determines the boundary between what will be considered
a faulty and no-fault measurement. Each sensor has an expected accuracy defined as
the maximum acceptable difference between an actual and measured value. Differences
beyond this range are considered to be faults. This definition is clear when sensor accu-
racy is stated as the absolute maximum error bounds, but obscure for sensor accuracies
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Figure 2.13: Example first-order GM
stochastic process where e−Ts/Tc = 0.1
that resembles white noise
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Figure 2.14: Example first-order GM
stochastic process where e−Ts/Tc = 0.9
that resembles random walk
quantified as a standard deviation value. The need therefore exists to define a boundary
or threshold between what will be considered a fault and no-fault measurement for a
sensor accuracy stated as a standard deviation. The John Tukey fence is a method from
literature that provides a quantifiable definition for an outlier. Faults can be viewed as
outliers as they are dissimilar to other sensor measurements. The following lower and
upper bounds for classifying measurements as inliers or outliers are proposed by Adil et
al. [10]:
lower bound = Q1 − k · IQR (2.5.6)
upper bound = Q3 + k · IQR (2.5.7)
where Q1 is the first quartile, k is a non-negative constant, Q3 the third quartile and IQR
the interquartile range (Q3-Q1).
Measurements that fall between the boundaries are classified as inliers and are considered
no-fault measurements. Measurements that fall outside the boundaries are classified as
outliers and are considered faulty measurements. The Tukey fence defines a threshold for
both mild (k=1.5) and extreme outliers (k=3) [10]. The first quartile for a zero mean
normal distribution is equal to -0.6745σ and the third quartile to 0.6745σ. The IQR is
given by their difference Q3 −Q1. The threshold for a mild sensor fault was used and is
given by:
lower bound = −2.6985σ AND upper bound = +2.6985σ (2.5.8)
where σ is the standard deviation.
According to this definition for sensor accuracy, 99.65 % of actual no-fault sensor mea-
surements would be classified as no-fault when using a normal distribution.
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2.5.2 Overview of Sensor Models
An overview of each sensor’s inputs and outputs are illustrated in the figure below.
GPS Model
ILS Model
RA Model
x
z
x˙
z˙
XGPS[k]
ZGPS[k]
ZILS[k]
XIRS[k]
Z˙IRS[k]
HRA[k]
XGPS[k]
XGPS(t = 0 s)
ZGPS(t = 0 s)
ZIRS[k]
z − ZT2(x)
IRS Model
Figure 2.15: An overview of the inputs and outputs for each sensor model.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to the modelling of the sensors listed in
figure 2.15 above. Firstly, the necessary knowledge and theory to understand the sensor
operation is presented. Thereafter, a literature survey of existing sensor error models
is conducted, before fine tuning model parameter values to fit a real dataset provided
by Airbus. Next, the theoretical accuracy associated with a specific sensor is derived.
This is used to differentiate between fault and no-fault measurement data. Lastly, the
sensor model is validated by plotting the theoretical accuracy that is a function of relative
altitude against the actual measurement data. The sensor measurements supplied by
Airbus should all be situated within the no-fault region. This allows for an objective
comparison of how well the sensor model characteristics fit the actual measurement data.
2.5.3 GPS Sensor Model
2.5.3.1 Introduction
The Global Positioning System (GPS) was developed by the United States Department
of Defense as an all-weather, space-based navigation system that could accurately deter-
mine the position, velocity and time from a fixed reference system anywhere on or near
earth [11]. It should be noted that GPS is not the only satellite based navigation system.
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) is the umbrella term used when referring to
a group of space-based navigation systems that includes GPS, GLONASS, Galileo and
BeiDou. These independent systems are all backed by different governments or world
powers. Galileo is supported by the European Union, while GLONASS is operated by
the Ministry of Defence Force of the Russia, and BeiDou by the Chinese National Space
Administration. All these systems work on similar principles and for all intents and pur-
poses the satellite navigation system that will be investigated is GPS.
GPS comprises three separate components, namely a space, control and user segment
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[3]. The space segment refers to the satellites orbiting the earth that transmit radio sig-
nals from space. The control segment is the network of tracking stations located around
the world that track and monitor the satellite’s health and status. These tracking stations
provide the master control station with information on the satellite’s orbit and atomic
drift, so that corrections to positional data can be relayed to the satellites. The user
segment is the product or interface that is fitted with the GPS receiver. In an aircraft the
GPS receiver uses the time data of the satellite’s atomic clocks that it received to calcu-
late the distance the aircraft is located from the satellite at that instant. Triangulation
between 4 or more satellites can be used to accurately determine the three-dimensional
coordinates of the aircraft.
The GPS receiver provides the aircraft’s position as a latitude, longitude, and altitude,
where the altitude is given with respect to mean sea level.
2.5.3.2 Literature on GPS Sensor Models
The GPS model described by Beard and McLain [3] incorporates the main sources of er-
ror into a single stochastic model. Beard and McLain consider two different categories of
GPS error that have a significant effect on the accuracy of GPS measurements. The first
category involves errors relating to the estimation of the pseudorange, while the second
category addresses the quality of the geometric constellation of the satellites.
The time of flight of the radio waves is used to calculate the distance between a satellite
and the GPS receiver. Due to synchronization errors between the satellite and receiver
clocks the perceived distance differs from the actual geometric distance. For example a
timing error as small as 10 ns results in a position error of 3 m [3]. The perceived distance
is called the pseudorange. There are a few sources of error that arise for the pseudor-
ange estimation, namely ephemeris data, satellite clock accuracy, atmospheric conditions,
multipath signals and receiver measurement errors. Their collective effect is known as
the User Equivalent Range Error (UERE). Ephemeris data is orbital information that is
used to determine the location of the satellite. Uncertainties in the satellite’s position will
lead to errors in the pseudorange calculation. The satellite clock has drift in its atomic
clocks that produce a deviation from the true time of flight used to calculate the pseu-
dorange. The largest source of error is due to the role that the earth’s atmosphere plays
in the propagation of the GPS signals, particularly in the Ionosphere and Troposphere.
The Ionosphere is characterised by the presence of free electrons that result in a delay
in signal propagation. The Troposphere is the lowest layer of the earth’s atmosphere,
where temperature, humidity and pressure affect the time of flight, leading to errors in
the pseudorange calculation. Multipath errors are those that arise from the reflection of
signals off large surfaces located near the receiver that could mask the intended signal.
The last error source considered is receiver measurement error due to the limitations with
which the timing of the satellite can be resolved.
Table 2.1 gives typical standard deviation values for the respective error sources. Consid-
ering both the bias and the random noise components as independent random variables
that are modelled by zero mean normal distributions, the total error is given by the sum of
the two. The theoretical sum of two independent normally distributed random variables
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is given by:
X ∼ N (µx, σx2) and Y ∼ N (µy, σy2) (2.5.9)
Z = X + Y = N (µx + µy, σx2 + σy2) (2.5.10)
Therefore the standard deviation of the total error, σT , is give by:
σT =
√
σ2b + σ
2
η (2.5.11)
where σb is the standard deviation of the bias, and ση is the standard deviation of the
random noise.
The bias error, random noise error, and total error for each error source are combined to
produce the User Equivalent Range Error.
Error Source Bias (σb) Random Noise (ση) Total Error (σT )
Ephemeris 2.1 0 2.1
Satellite clock 2.0 0.7 2.1
Ionosphere 4.0 0.5 4.0
Troposphere 0.5 0.5 0.7
Multipath 1 1 1.4
Receiver Measurement 0.5 0.2 0.5
UERE(rms) 5.1 1.4 5.3
Table 2.1: Typical pseudorange standard deviation values in metres [3].
The second category of errors affecting the accuracy of a GPS sensor is the quality of
the geometric constellation. This resultant error is represented by a numeric value called
Dilution of Precision (DOP) and is a measure of the quality of the satellite constellation
that determines the GPS position. A large DOP is an indication of a poor constellation,
where direct line of sight with one or more satellites could be blocked by obstructions.
This will result in larger errors for the pseudorange estimate. A low DOP is an indication
of a desirable constellation. There are two types of DOP, namely VDOP (vertical DOP)
and HDOP (horizontal DOP). VDOP and HDOP differentiate between GPS accuracy in
the vertical and horizontal plane respectively. The nominal VDOP value is given by 1.8 m
and HDOP by 1.3 m [3]. The total vertical and horizontal RMS error is given by [12]:
Vetical error (RMS) = V DOP · σUERE (2.5.12)
= (1.8)(5.1)m (2.5.13)
= 9.2 m (2.5.14)
Horizontal error (RMS) = HDOP · σUERE (2.5.15)
= (1.3)(5.1)m (2.5.16)
= 6.6 m (2.5.17)
where σUERE is the standard deviation of the User Equivalent Range Error.
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A first-order Gauss-Markov process is used to model the GPS error. The parameter
values given in table 2.2 are used in conjunction with equation 2.5.4. The Gauss Markov
process is initialised by drawing a random bias, W (t = 0 s), from a Gaussian distribution
N (0, σb)m, where σb is either the vertical or horizontal RMS error. The resultant error
model is a predominant bias error that varies slowly with time.
Direction σb (m) σw (m) ση (m) Tc (s) Ts (s)
Altitude (Z) 9.2 0.7 0.4 1100 1.0
Horizontal (X) 4.7 0.4 0.21 1100 1.0
Table 2.2: Gauss Markov model parameters for GPS model [3].
An identical GPS model was used by Maier et al. [12] who attempted to improve GPS
accuracy in urban areas where the effect of the multipath signal reflections are significantly
greater. Rankin [13] derived a more detailed model than Beard and McLain by modelling
individual pseudorange error sources with separate Gauss-Markov models. The time
constant Ts/Tc for each error source is different to increase the accuracy around the
model of each component. This model however is outdated as it dates back to 1994 when
the effects of selective availability were still relevant. It also neglects the effects of the
geometric constellation.
2.5.3.3 GPS Sensor Model
The model from literature was adapted to fit the theoretical sensor characteristics and
measurement data supplied by Airbus and is illustrated in figure 2.16.
ZOH
ZOH
fs
fs
x
z z[k]
+
bZgps
x[k]
+
bXgps
XGPS[k]
ZGPS[k]
Figure 2.16: Stochastic GPS sensor model.
The GPS error model for a x and z measurement is modelled by a quasi-static random
bias drawn from a uniform distribution. The term quasi-static describes an error that
changes so slowly with time that it appears to be practically static over the time frame
that it is observed. The motivation behind this decision was two-fold. Firstly, the ran-
dom noise of the GPS error model was significantly smaller than that of the random bias,
σb >> ση. Secondly, the random walk effect is negligible due to the fact that the aircraft
landing is executed over a relatively short period of time. Also, the correlation time Tc
is significantly larger than the sampling period Ts. The resultant error model is therefore
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reduced to W [k] = W (t = 0 s), which is a random bias drawn from a uniform distribution
U(−δgps, δgps). A uniform distribution is used because the GPS sensor error parameters
supplied by Airbus were given in terms of error bounds. The XGPS and ZGPS measure-
ments are expressed in runway axes. The mathematical model for GPS measurements is
therefore given by:
ZGPS[k] = z[k] + bZgps (2.5.18)
XGPS[k] = x[k] + bXgps (2.5.19)
where bZgps and bXgps are the random quasi-static GPS biases along the ZR and XR axis
respectively, z[k] and x[k] are the discrete-time aircraft position measurements sampled
at frequency fs.
The continuous aircraft position is sampled at a fs =8 Hz to give the discrete-time air-
craft position xk and zk. The quasi-static altitude bias is drawn from a uniform distri-
bution with characteristics bZgps ∼ U(−δZgps, δZgps) at simulation time t = 0 s. Similarly,
the horizontal position bias is drawn from an uniform distribution with characteristics
bZgps ∼ U(−δXgps, δXgps).
2.5.3.4 GPS Accuracy
The GPS accuracy remains constant as a function of altitude with parameter values:
∆Zgps = δZgps = 1.6764 m (2.5.20)
∆Xgps = δXgps = 15 m (2.5.21)
2.5.3.5 Validation of GPS Model
The theoretical GPS sensor accuracy was validated against actual data as shown in figure
2.17.
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Figure 2.17: The GPS accuracy is shown as a function of the estimated relative altitude
of an aircraft for actual measurement data. The blue line shows the theoretical accuracy
limits for the GPS data and the black data points is a scatter plot of actual GPS measure-
ment data. Figure (a) on the left shows a greater variance as there is more measurement
data at a lower relative altitude, while figure (b) is at a higher relative altitude.
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Figure 2.17 (a) shows the GPS sensor accuracy at lower relative altitudes, namely leading
up to touch down, while figure 2.17 (b) shows the GPS sensor accuracy at higher relative
altitudes, namely upon interception with the glide slope. There were no sensor faults in
the dataset, and therefore it is expected that all of the GPS data will fall within the blue
lines defined as the boundary for normal GPS sensor measurements. Any data points
beyond the accuracy threshold are considered to be faulty. Given that there were only
26 landing runs in the dataset supplied by Airbus and that the true relative altitude of
the aircraft is not known, it is very difficult to prove the statistical properties established
above. Engineering judgment was used to ensure that the GPS measurement data all
remained within the boundary of theoretical accuracy. The measurement data was a
good fit of the theoretical accuracy at lower relative altitudes as seen in figure 2.17 (a).
At higher relative altitudes there is less measurement data as many of the landing runs
start at lower relative altitudes and therefore the boundaries appear to be a poor fit of
the data as seen in figure 2.17 (b). However without more data this claim cannot be
verified. If the boundaries were made any tighter, not all the data points would lie within
the normal or no-fault region.
2.5.4 Inertial Sensor
2.5.4.1 Introduction
The inertial sensor gives the angular rates and accelerations with respect to the body
axes of an aircraft as the accelerometers and gyroscopes are strapped along the body
axis of the aircraft. The Euler 3-2-1 attitude parameterization is used to convert these
measurements from the body axis system to the inertial axis system. These rates and
accelerations propagate the aircraft’s position forward in time. The inertial navigation
system used in an aircraft is reset by the pilot when stationed on the runway before
take-off. All displacement measurements will therefore be with reference to the departure
airport.
2.5.4.2 Literature on Inertial Sensor Models
There are many different stochastic inertial sensor models found in literature. The ma-
jority of these models are for micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS), where recent
advancements have paved the way for large scale fabrication of small and inexpensive
sensors used in unmanned aerial vehicles. Beard et al. [3] established a model of a MEMS
accelerometer that takes the true aircraft acceleration as input and incorporates the main
sources of expected error before outputting a voltage measurement, Υaccel.
Υaccel = kaccel · A+ βaccel + ηaccel (2.5.22)
where kaccel is the gain, A is the true acceleration , βaccel is the bias and ηaccel is zero mean
Gaussian noise.
While this model is theoretically correct, it fails to quantify the error sources and link
them with the eventual relative altitude measurement. Quinchia et al. [4] investigated and
compared the stochastic errors experienced by a MEMS inertial sensor using a single-axis
accelerometer model developed by Skog et al. [14] shown in figure 2.18.
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z¨true[k] +
η[k]
misalignment scale factor (k) + z¨meas[k]
bias (b)
Figure 2.18: The IRS sensor model derived by Skog et al [14] for an accelerometer
measurement along a single dimension.
(Note that Skog’s single-axis model can be expanded to a three-axis model.) Quinchia et
al. simplified the model of Skog et al. by grouping the error sources into two different
categories, namely stochastic and deterministic. The deterministic errors are modelled
with a bias, and are usually associated with manufacturing defects or alignment issues.
The second category of error are random in nature and modelled by stochastic processes
such as random walk or Gauss-Markov models.
The four different types of errors associated with an inertial sensor can be summarised as
follows:
• misalignment - the non-orthogonality of the sensor axes or misalignment with the
body axes. These are modelled by a deterministic error.
• scale factor - represents the sensitivity of the sensor. Errors are the result of manu-
facturing tolerances and aging. Ideally there should be a linear relationship between
sensor input and output. Scale factor is modelled as having both a deterministic
component and a stochastic component.
• bias - a constant or slowly varying additive error. A constant bias is a deterministic
error, while a slowly-varying bias is a stochastic error.
• random error - system and sensor noise resulting from interference. The random
error is stochastic in nature.
Deterministic error types such as misalignment and scale factor are negated by calibration
and can therefore be ignored [4]. The stochastic error models and their coefficients are
derived by examining the accelerometer measurement noise when at rest. Time domain
and frequency analysis techniques are used to achieve this [15]. The slopes of a one-sided
power spectral density are used to identify the stochastic noise models. Thereafter Allan
variance is used to compute the coefficients for the respective error models. The resultant
stochastic error model for a single-axis accelerometer used in an inertial sensor has two
components, namely a slow-varying bias and measurement noise [15]:
z¨meas[k] = z¨true[k] + η[k] +W [k] (2.5.23)
z˙meas[k] = z˙meas[k − 1] + z¨meas[k] (2.5.24)
zmeas[k] = zmeas[k − 1] + z˙meas[k] (2.5.25)
where W [k] is a first-order Gauss Markov model for a slow-varying bias.
An analysis was carried out by Quinchia et al. on a variety of accelerometers along
each inertial axis. An example of the results obtained is given in table 2.3.
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Direction σw (m s
−2) Tc (s) Ts (s)
Altitude (Z) 0.0068 20.74 0.02
Horizontal (X) 0.0063 4.56 0.02
Table 2.3: Example of Gauss Markov model parameters for slow-varying bias of a 3DM-
GX3 IMU inertial sensor [4].
An identical approach was used by Naranjo et al. [16] who considered each axis separately.
The same error types as discussed earlier are used, except that their model accounts
for a scale factor error, K. The impact of the different error types on the positional
measurement is given by Naranjo [16]:
zerror =
∫∫
(K · z¨true + b)dtdt = 1
2
(K · z¨true + b)t2 (2.5.26)
where b is the bias error.
The double integration results in a quadratic increase in error as a function of time.
2.5.4.3 Inertial Sensor Model
The model of the inertial sensor found in literature was adapted to fit the data and sensor
characteristics supplied by Airbus. The inertial sensor measurements provided by Airbus
only contained velocity measurements in the XR and ZR axes, and did not contain the
acceleration measurements themselves. The inertial sensor model will therefore only con-
sist of two stages, namely velocity and displacement. The model proposed in this section
incorporates some of the error types found in literature, and is based on a combination of
the sensor characteristics supplied by Airbus and observations from the actual flight data
that was provided.
The first modelling decision that had to be made, was how to initialise the inertial sen-
sor’s estimate of the aircraft position at the beginning of a simulation, from which future
XIRS and ZIRS position measurements would be propagated by integrating the velocity
measurements X˙IRS and Z˙IRS. In reality there is no way of knowing the initial offset as-
sociated with the inertial sensor when the aircraft starts its final approach along the glide
slope of 3◦. Knowing that the inertial sensor was last zeroed just before take-off suggests
that the effects of drift would be significant over an extended period of time. The design
decision was taken to propagate future states from the GPS sensor measurement at time
t = 0 s such that ZIRS(t = 0) = ZGPS(t = 0 and XIRS(t = 0) = XGPS(t = 0). The second
modelling decision made was that misalignment and scale errors do not have to be mod-
elled as they are accounted for during calibration as discussed in the model from literature.
The inertial sensor model architecture and parameter values were based on a combi-
nation of inertial sensor accuracy specifications provided by Airbus, and actual inertial
sensor measurements recorded during several flights, also provided by Airbus. The in-
ertial sensor accuracy specifications supplied by Airbus only specified the accuracies in
the horizontal plane, and did not specify the accuracy of the relative altitude measure-
ments. The accuracy of the relative altitude measurements was therefore identified by
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analysing the flight data supplied by Airbus. The recorded IRS sensor measurements were
compared with the recorded GPS sensor measurements. Since the GPS sensor bias and
random noise remain practically constant over the duration of a landing, the GPS rela-
tive altitude measurements were used as the reference against which to compare the IRS
relative altitude measurements. The IRS relative altitude measurements were obtained
by initialising IRS sensor with the GPS relative altitude at the start of the simulation,
and then propagating the IRS relative altitude by integrating the IRS vertical velocity
measurements over time. The IRS and GPS relative altitude measurements are plotted
against the GPS horizontal position in figure 2.19, and the difference between the IRS
and GPS altitude measurements are plotted in figure 2.20.
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Figure 2.19: The ZIRS and ZGPS mea-
surements versus XGPS for the dataset
supplied by Airbus.
-2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5
XGPS (m) 10
4
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
R
el
at
iv
e
A
lt
it
u
d
e
D
iff
er
en
ce
(m
)
Figure 2.20: The difference between
ZIRS and ZGPS measurements versus
XGPS.
A few notable observations can be made. Firstly, each simulation run has a drift error
that results in a positive offset. Secondly, the individual gradients of the difference plots
in figure 2.20 are all similar. The main component of the stochastic error model is a
slow-varying bias on the velocity measurement that results in a displacement error that
randomly walks around a deterministic gradient. This is modelled using the combination
of a constant bias and a Gaussian white noise signal. The proposed model for the inertial
sensor is given in figure 2.21.
The discrete-time equations that describe the inertial sensor relative altitude model shown
in figure 2.21 are given by:
Z˙IRS[k] = z˙[k] + bZ˙irs + ηZirs[k] (2.5.27)
ZIRS[k] = Z˙IRS[k] · Ts + ZIRS[k-1] (2.5.28)
where bZ˙irs is the random IRS climb rate measurement bias and ηZirs[k] is Gaussian white
noise.
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Figure 2.21: The stochastic IRS sensor model used to generate realistic climb rate and
relative altitude measurements.
Similarly, the discrete-time equations that describe the inertial sensor measurement along
the XR axis are given by:
X˙IRS[k] = x˙[k] + bX˙irs + ηXirs[k] (2.5.29)
XIRS[k] = X˙IRS[k] · Ts +XIRS[k-1] (2.5.30)
where bX˙irs is the random IRS horizontal displacement bias and ηXirs[k] is Gaussian white
noise.
The inertial sensor model will output both the aircraft position and climb rate mea-
surement. The random climb rate bias is drawn from a uniform distribution with charac-
teristics bZirs ∼ U(-δZ˙irs,δZ˙irs) at simulation time t = 0 s. The random climb rate bias will
result in a constant IRS drift error where the rate of drift varies between simulation runs.
ηZirs is a Gaussian white noise component that will result in a random walk around the
bias component. Similarly, the XIRS measurement has a drift error that is the result of a
bias and random component. The horizontal displacement bias is drawn from a uniform
distribution with characteristics bXirs ∼ U(-δX˙irs,δX˙irs) at simulation time t = 0 s and
ηXirs is Gaussian white noise component.
The results from figure 2.19 and figure 2.20 were used to quantify the model parame-
ter values for the ZIRS sensor using reverse engineering. The decision was made not to
include the effect of the random noise component, ηZirs, as its effect is negligible in com-
parison with that of the bias, bZirs. The ZIRS drift error resulting from the bias error in
the velocity measurement was approximated as a linear function of time. An IRS sensor
with no bias error should therefore yield similar or identical measurements to that of
the GPS sensor. Table 2.4 shows a summary of the measurement data in the DataSUN
database supplied by Airbus that was used to derive error model parameter values. The
average bias as a function of time was calculated in equation 2.5.31.
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bZirs (per sample) =
ZIRS[N ]− ZGPS[N ]
N
(2.5.31)
where N is the number of samples, ZIRS[N ] and ZGPS[N ] are the relative altitude mea-
surement from the inertial and GPS sensor at touch down.
DataSUN
Number
Number
Samples
(N)
ZGPS[0]
(m)
ZIRS[N ] −
ZGPS[N ]
(m)
Average
bZirs
(m/sample)
Average
bZirs (m/m)
1 1757 770 7 0.004 0.0091
2 994 463 5 0.005 0.011
: : : : : :
26 447 4 190 0.0089 0.021
Table 2.4: IRS deviation values for the aircraft landings.
The average, standard deviation, and maximum values for the bZirs per sample across the
landing runs is given by:
µ = 0.01273 m/sample
σ = 0.00475 m/sample
max = 0.021m/sample
The IRS drift errors across all the landing runs had a positive value. Due to the limited
number of flight landings available the conservative decision was taken to assume that IRS
drift could be both positive or negative. A zero-mean uniform distribution was therefore
chosen to model the drift error between maximum negative and positive drift rates.
2.5.4.4 IRS Accuracy
Initially the IRS sensor accuracy is equivalent to that of the GPS as the IRS position is
initialised with the GPS position at t = 0 s. Due to the sensor drift, the accuracy of the
IRS changes with time. The average theoretical sensor accuracy for the IRS as a function
of time can be summarised as follows:
∆Zirs(t) = ∆Zgps + k · δZ˙irs (2.5.32)
∆Xirs(t) = ∆Xgps + k · δX˙irs (2.5.33)
where k is the sample number, ∆Zgps = 1.67 m, ∆Xgps = 15 m, δZ˙irs = 0.0127 m/sample
and δX˙irs = 0.107 m/sample.
More information on the model parameter values is given in Appendix A. It was also
deemed necessary to develop a time-independent function for IRS sensor accuracy. Equa-
tion 2.5.32-2.5.33 are time-dependent functions which will result in the decision boundary
being different for each landing run depending on the aircraft velocity and initial position.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUALISATION AND MODELLING 31
Therefore it was decided to rather derive the IRS accuracy as a function of relative alti-
tude that will remain objective and achieve uniformity irrespective of the relative altitude
at which an aircraft intersects the glide path. The decision was made to specify the ZIRS
accuracy based on the worst-case scenario that would result in the maximum altitude
drift over a landing. This coincides with the maximum possible aircraft position (zmax)
and the largest velocity measurement bias bZirs. The average rate of drift, δdrift, as a
function of relative altitude was determined using a similar approach to the manner in
which the average bias was derived as a function of time.
δdrift =
ZIRS[N ]− ZGPS[N ]
ZGPS[0]
(2.5.34)
where ZIRS[N ]−ZGPS[N ] will be the drift error over the landing, and ZGPS[0] the initial
relative altitude of the aircraft when it intercepts the glide slope.
The average, standard deviation and max values for the δdrift across the landing runs
in table 2.4 is given by:
µ = 0.031 m/m
σ = 0.011 m/m
max = 0.051m/m
δdrift was therefore chosen to be equal to 0.051m/m. The theoretical IRS sensor accuracy
as a function of relative altitude is therefore given by:
∆Zirs(z) = ∆Zgps + (zmax − z) · δdrift (2.5.35)
where ∆Zgps = 1.67 m, zmax = 1194 m, z is the instantaneous true relative altitude of the
aircraft and δdrift = 0.051m/m.
2.5.4.5 Validation of IRS Model
The theoretical IRS sensor accuracy was validated against actual data as shown in figure
2.22. Figure 2.22 (a) plots the accuracy bounds for all the sensor data, while figure 2.22
(b) focuses on the accuracy bounds when approaching touch down.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.22: The IRS accuracy is shown as a function of the estimated relative altitude
of an aircraft for actual measurement data.
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The blue line shows the theoretical accuracy limits for the IRS data, and the black data
points are a scatter plot of actual IRS measurement data. It is clear from figure 2.22 that
the IRS drifts are only positive and that the theoretical accuracy appears to be a poor fit
of the actual data. This is explained by the derivation of IRS accuracy that assumes the
worst-case scenario and that the drift is equally likely to be positive or negative. If all
aircraft intercepted the glide slope at zmax then the decision boundary would be a much
tighter fit.
2.5.5 Instrument Landing System
2.5.5.1 Introduction
The Instrument Landing System (ILS) is an approach aid that assists pilots to control
the aircraft along a predetermined glide path when landing. It is manipulated to give
the relative altitude of the aircraft with knowledge of the aircraft’s x position and the
location of the Glide Slope Station for a particular runway as illustrated by figure 2.23.
The ILS uses two radio beams and high intensity lights to provide pilots with lateral and
vertical guidance as an aircraft is on final approach.
ZR
XR
γ
ZILS)
∆X
runway thresholdxst
zst
Figure 2.23: A visual explanation of the set-up used to manipulate the Instrument
Landing System into a relative altitude sensor.
There are three different elements that make up the ground system of an ILS, namely
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marker beacons, localiser and glide path radio beams. The localiser provides the pilot
with lateral guidance to the runway. It consists of two separate antennas that create
radiative patterns. One lies slightly to the right of the runway centerline, the other to
the left. Where the two radiative patterns intersect is known as “on LOC” and indicates
to the pilot that his aircraft is aligned with the runway. An identical approach is used to
provide a pilot with vertical information known as the glide slope indication. The glide
path is the designated approach angle for a runway and is usually about 3◦ [17]. This
may differ from runway to runway as it depends on the configuration of the Glide Slope
Station antennas. The third element of a ILS system is the marker beacons. These pro-
vide indications of the distance to the runway and may have up to three different beacons,
namely outer, middle and inner marker [18]. The outer marker is usually located between
6.5 km and 11.5 km from the runway threshold. The middle marker is located roughly
1.3 km from the runway threshold and indicates to the pilot that aircraft is 65 m above
ground level. The inner marker designates the decision point where the pilot must decide
whether or not to continue the approach.
The glide slope is the vertical assistance portion of the ILS. A radiation pattern is gener-
ated in space. A glide slope measurement is proportional to the vertical deviation between
the aircraft position and the glide path. Two antennas are used to develop a spatial glide
path pattern as seen depicted in figure 2.24. The relative positions of the antennas and
their positions relative to the ground determine the spatial properties of the radiation
pattern. The one antenna produces a radiative pattern predominantly above the glide
path that is modulated at 90 Hz, whilst the other antenna produces a radiative pattern
predominantly below the glide path that is modulated at 150 Hz. The difference in depth
of modulation (DDM) between the two sinusoidally modulated signals can be transformed
into an angular deviation and provides guidance information to the pilot [19]. The air-
craft contains a detector circuit that will amplify and filter the received signal to isolate
the 90 and 150 Hz components. A bridge rectifier is then used to give a DC voltage that
is proportional to the depth of modulation for the 90 and 150 Hz components. When
the aircraft is flying along the predefined glide path the DDM is zero. An offset from
the glide path is proportional to the DDM. A positve DDM indicates that the aircraft is
above the reference glide path, while a negative DDM indicates that the aircraft is below
the reference glide path.
90 Hz predominant
150 Hz predominant
Glide Path
runway
Glide Slope
Station
Figure 2.24: An exaggerated view of the spatial glide pattern to determine the glide
slope angle of an aircraft.
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2.5.5.2 Literature on ILS Measurement Models
No literature was found on measurement error models for the ILS glide slope angle. The
closest model that was found in literature was by Jarama et al. [20] who investigated an
error model for secondary surveillance radar systematic errors used in air traffic control
networks. While there are obvious differences between ILS and radar systems, there is a
link between the azimuth and the glide slope angle. The azimuth is the angle between
the antenna boresight and target altitude [20]. The model proposed by Jarana et al. for
the azimuth combined and grouped errors into deterministic and stochastic categories.
θmeas[k] = θtrue[k] + b+ ηk (2.5.36)
where θ is the azimuth angle.
The deterministic errors are attributed to the misalignment of the antennas, the non-
orthogonality between axes and the calibration error of the azimuth decoder [20]. The
stochastic measurement noise is due to quantization errors and erroneous reflections.
The literature survey did however uncover the maximum allowable deviation in the glide
slope angle measurement at the three marker beacons as given by Maybeck [5], and sum-
marised in table 2.5 below.
Beacon Location Glide-slope deviation
Middle to runway threshold 0.06◦
Between Outer and Middle 0.1◦ decreasing to 0.06◦
Beyond Outer 0.1◦
Table 2.5: The maximum allowable measurement error for the glide slope sensor [5].
2.5.5.3 ILS Relative Altitude Sensor Model
Three important pieces of information are necessary for the ILS to give an aircraft’s
relative altitude. Firstly, knowledge of the exact location of the runway’s glide slope
measurement station (xst, zst) is required. This location is actually beyond the runway
threshold to ensure that an aircraft does not touch down short of the runway. Secondly,
information on the aircraft’s location along the XR axis is obtained from the GPS or IRS
measurement. This is used to determine the horizontal displacement ∆x. Lastly a glide
slope angle is required to determine the relative altitude of the aircraft using trigonometry.
Airbus supplied the XR location of the glide slope measurement station, but the ZR
position was unknown and therefore had to be derived from actual landing data supplied
by Airbus. The ZR location was chosen as the value that minimised a cost function de-
fined as the sum of square residuals between the ZGPS and ZILS over the entire dataset
as illustrated in figure 2.25. For the purpose of determining the relative vertical altitude
of the glide slope measurement station, the GPS altitude measurement ZGPS was treated
as the reference altitude, since it was considered to be the most accurate relative altitude
sensor. Using this approach, the relative altitude of the glide slope measurement station
was calculated to be zst = −8 m.
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Figure 2.25: The results for the experiment performed to determine the optimal zst
location.
Although a relative vertical altitude of −8 m seems like an improbable location for the
glide slope measurement station, it fits the actual flight data the best, and will therefore
be treated as correct. Given that the location of the glide slope measurement station
has been established, we can proceed to establish an ILS sensor model. The ILS model
consists of two separate parts as shown in figure 2.26.
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′
x′ )
−x
+
xst
zst
+
z −
γ′[k]
+
zst
Figure 2.26: The stochastic ILS sensor model for a relative altitude measurement.
The first part establishes a realistic measurement for the glide slope angle using the true
location from the aircraft model. The second part establishes a realistic glide slope angle
measurement. The true angle is sampled at fs Hz and is represented by γ
′[k]. Due to
the lack of literature and information on glide slope measurement errors, the assumption
was made that any fixed errors are negated through calibration and that the remaining
unknown stochastic components are additive and modelled by Gaussian white noise to
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give a realistic glide slope measurement γ[k].
γ′ = arctan(
z − zst
xst − x) (2.5.37)
γ[k] = γ′[k] + ηγ[k] (2.5.38)
where ηγ[k] is discrete-time Gaussian white noise.
The Gaussian white noise is drawn from a Normal distribution where ηZils[k] ∼ N (0,σγ2).
The effect of ηγ[k] on the aircraft altitude is more apparent for larger ∆X values. The
∆X[k] is not directly available, but can be determined from either the GPS or IRS sensor
measurement.
∆X[k] = xst −XGPS[k] OR xst −XIRS[k] (2.5.39)
It must be noted that the negative of the XGPS and XIRS is taken as the aircraft ap-
proaches the runway along the negative XR axis. The ZILS[k] measurement can be cal-
culated via trigonometry and adjusted to account for the altitude difference between the
XR axis and glide slope station.
ZILS[k] = ∆X[k] · tan(γ[k]) + zst (2.5.40)
ZILS[k] = (xst −XGPS[k]) · tan(γ[k]) + zst (2.5.41)
2.5.5.4 ILS Accuracy
From equation 2.5.41 it is apparent that the theoretical accuracy of the ILS sensor is
dependent on both the noise associated with the glide slope angle and the accuracy of
the XGPS measurement. The theoretical standard deviation was obtained by linearizing
around a nominal x and γ. For notation sake it is assumed that in the continuous domain
the relative altitude of the aircraft is reduced to:
z = x · tan(γ) + zst (2.5.42)
where x is equivalent to ∆X.
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to x and γ yields:
δz
δx
= tan(γ) (2.5.43)
δz
δγ
= x sec2(γ) (2.5.44)
The partial derivatives are combined to give the standard deviation of the ILS relative
altitude measurement error as follows:
∆z =
δz
δx
∆x+
δz
δγ
∆γ (2.5.45)
⇒ σZils = tan(γ)σx + x sec2(γ)σγ (2.5.46)
where σx is the standard deviation of the GPS horizontal position measurement error and
σγ is the standard deviation of the ILS glide slope angle measurement.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUALISATION AND MODELLING 37
A parameter value for σγ was supplied by Airbus, but was a poor fit of the actual data
and was significantly smaller than the values from table 2.5 that were found in litera-
ture. A reverse engineering approach was therefore used to derive the parameter value
for the standard deviation of the ILS glide slope angle measurement. The noise charac-
teristics were derived by regarding the GPS sensor measurements as the truth and using
trigonometry to calculate the true glide slope angle measurement as follows:
γtrue[k] = arctan
(
ZGPS[k]− zst
xst −XGPS[k]
)
(2.5.47)
The flight data for all the aircraft approaches were analyzed for ZGPS[k] > 200. This
would minimise the effect of the XGPS error in accuracy that has a notable influence
for smaller (xst − XGPS[k]) values. What remains after subtracting γtrue[k] − γ[k] is a
zero-mean random noise signal. The standard deviation was extracted from this random
noise signal for individual runs and was then averaged across all aircraft approaches.
σγ =
1
J
J∑
j=1
(
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(γtrue[k]− γ[k])
)
(2.5.48)
where j is the index of the flight data for a single aircraft approach, J is the total number
of approaches and N is the number of data points from the jth approach for which ZGPS >
200.
An additional observation and concern when using the ILS sensor is that its measure-
ment becomes distorted closer to the glide slope measurement station. In reality it is not
located in the XR and ZR plane, but rather off to the side of the runway. An analysis
of the example sensor data showed that ILS measurement becomes distorted beyond the
runway threshold and should therefore not be used for XGPS > 0. The theoretical accu-
racy for the ILS sensor is dependent on the aircraft location. The definition for accuracy
used in this thesis is a boundary that should include all or 99.65 % of no-fault normally
distributed measurements. This corresponds to a boundary of 2.695 standard deviations
for normally distributed data.
∆Zils = 2.695 · σZils (2.5.49)
2.5.5.5 Validation of ILS Model
The theoretical ILS sensor accuracy was validated on actual data as shown in figure 2.27.
Figure 2.27 (a) plots the accuracy bounds for all the sensor data, while figure 2.27 (b)
focuses on the accuracy bounds as the aircraft approaches touch down. It is observed from
figure 2.27 that the majority of the data points are closely distributed around the glide
path. However there are two obvious non-linearities in the data as indicated by the regions
within the red circles in figure 2.27 (a). At these points the ILS measurement data comes
very close to exceeding the ILS accuracy bounds. Other than these two locations the ILS
sensor data appears to be a poor fit of the measurement data, but is left unchanged to
account for the worst case scenario. The ILS sensor model parameters and assumptions
should be verified against a larger set of measurement data.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.27: The ILS accuracy as a function of the estimated relative altitude for actual
aircraft measurement data. The blue line shows the theoretical accuracy limits for the
ILS data and the black data points is a scatter plot of actual ILS measurement data.
2.5.6 Radio Altimeter
2.5.6.1 Introduction
A radio altimeter operates on similar principles to radar except that microwaves are used
instead of radio waves. The radio altimeter is the only sensor that directly measures
the aircraft height. Commercial aircrafts use Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave
(FMCW) altimeters as these measure both the height and its instantaneous rate of change.
A radio altimeter measures the height of the aircraft above the earth’s surface with refer-
ence to the lowest point of an aircraft’s landing gear. In other words the radio altimeter
measurement will be zero when the landing gear makes contact with the runway. Typically
radio altimeters are installed on the fuselage between the wings of commercial aircraft
and the height difference between the fuselage and the lowest wheel is compensated for
electronically [21]. Height information is displayed to the pilot and used by the Automatic
Flight Control System (AFCS) during controlled approaches and landings. The radio al-
timeter serves as a sensory input to the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) that
raises an alarm when the aircraft is flying too close to the ground or is descending too
rapidly. Radio altimeters work on the same principle as radar, where distance is measured
based on the time of flight. There are two categories of waveforms used in radio altime-
try, namely continuous and pulsed waves. Pulsed wave altimeters are usually employed at
higher altitudes above 5000ft, while continuous wave are preferred for lower altitudes [22].
The 4.2-4.4 GHz band has been internationally reserved for the use of radio altimeters
installed on commercial aircraft [23].
Doppler
A brief review of the Doppler effect is necessary to understand the inner workings of
a FMCW radio altimeter. Austrian scientist Christian Doppler coined the term Doppler
effect after observing the audible change in sound waves with relative motion [24]. It has
since been discovered that the Doppler effect is applicable to the full spectrum of electro-
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magnetic radiation, where the formula for the frequency of a reflected signal observed at
the radar is given by:
fr =
c+ vr
c− vr ft (2.5.50)
where fr is the frequency of the received signal, c is the speed of light, ft is the frequency
of the transmitted signal and vr is the relative velocity between the target and radar.
The Doppler shift is the change in frequency given by the difference between the received
and transmitted frequencies [21]:
fd = fr − ft = ft( 2vr
c− vr ) (2.5.51)
Under the assumption that c >> vr, the change in frequency can be simplified as follows:
fd u
2vr
c
ft (2.5.52)
Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave
Traditional radar technologies determine distance based on the time difference between
an emitted pulse and its returning echo.
∆t =
2h
c
(2.5.53)
Frequency modulated continuous wave altimeters have the additional capability of mea-
suring the rate of change in height. This is extracted from the Doppler shift in the
reflected signal. Modulating the frequency of the emitted signal gives it a distinct mark
or “time stamp” that reflects the range to the ground as the frequency difference known
as the “beat frequency”. FMCW altimeters therefore extract both the Doppler shift and
“time stamp” from the reflected signal. The signal depicted in figure 2.28 is known as a
chirp and depicts the effects of a linear change in frequency.
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Figure 2.28: Chirp signal whose frequency varies linearly with time.
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Mathematically, a chirp signal is described with the following equations:
Fchirp(t) = A cos(Ψ(t) · t) (2.5.54)
Ψ(t) = fo · t (2.5.55)
where A is the amplitude and fo is the carrier frequency.
Frequency modulation is achieved in a variety of different ways. Figure 2.29 shows pop-
ular techniques like saw-tooth, triangular and sinusoidal modulation.
Ψ(t)
t
Ψ(t)
t
Ψ(t)
t
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.29: Commonly used modulation techniques: (a) saw-tooth (b) triangular (c)
sinusoidal modulation.
Due to the delay between the transmitted and received signal there will be a difference in
their respective frequencies. The height of the aircraft is proportional to this frequency
difference denoted by fh [25]. The mixing of the received and transmitted signals results
in the difference or beat frequency, Ψb [26]. A triangular waveform is used for the expla-
nation of how a FMCW radio altimeter works. For this explanation it is assumed that
the rate of change in height of the aircraft is zero. Figure 2.30 shows how the frequency
is linearly varied over a single modulation period, T , by bandwidth ∆f . The signal is
modulated at a frequency, fm, which is also known as the pulse repetition frequency.
fh ∆f
Ψ
(t
)
∆t = 2h
c
t
T = 1
fm
t
Ψ
b
(t
)
fh
(a) (b)
fc
t1 t2
t1 t2 t3 t4
t3 t4
Figure 2.30: The solid line represents the transmitted signal and the dashed line the
reflection from ground. (a) triangular modulation (b) the resultant beat signal associated
with the triangular modulation [22].
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The rate of change in frequency over a linear up-sweep is given by [25]:
df
dt
=
∆f
T/2
= 2fm∆f (2.5.56)
From figure 2.30 the difference in frequency is given by:
fh = ∆t · df
dt
(2.5.57)
Substituting in equation 2.5.53 and 2.5.56 into the expression above yields:
fh =
2h
c
· 2fm∆f (2.5.58)
⇒ h = fhc
4fm∆f
(2.5.59)
The height of the aircraft is extracted from the beat frequency Ψb(t) given in figure 2.30
(b). This signal is a constant fh, except at the turnaround region. The case is now con-
sidered where relative motion between the aircraft and the ground below it is introduced
as illustrated in figure 2.31. This results in a Doppler shift due to the introduction of a
rate of change in height.
Ψ
(t
)
t
fc
t
Ψ
b
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)
fh − fd
t1 t2 t3 t4
t1 t2 t3 t4
fh + fd
(a) (b)
Figure 2.31: The corresponding beat frequency for a triangular modulation with a
Doppler shift [22].
The resultant beat signal is fh + fd and fh − fd for equal periods. The beat signal
is a function of two components. The first is a function of height, denoted fh, while
the second is a function of Doppler shift, denoted fd. The average beat signal over a
modulation period is equal to 1
2
(fh + fd + fh − fd) = fh [25].
2.5.6.2 Literature on Radio Altimeter Models
There was very limited literature available on mathematical models that can be used for
a radio altimeter. Thomas et al. [2] state that all uncertainties associated with the radio
altimeter measurement are modelled by assuming normally distributed random variables.
No mention is made of the sensor model that is used to simulate realistic measurements,
although it would appear that a first-order Gauss-Markov model was used to simulate
measurements that are a mixture between random noise and random walk. The only
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radio altimeter model that was found in literature was proposed by Hajiyev et al. [27].
Their height measurement error model for a radio altimeter is given by:
∆Herror[k] = ∆Herror[k − 1]− β∆Herror[k − 1] + η[k] (2.5.60)
where ∆Herror is the height error and β is the correlation time constant.
This error model has two components, namely a time-correlated and a random error.
The time-correlated component decreases the radio altimeter error to model sensor mea-
surements that become more accurate with time. The rate of increase in accuracy is
dependent on the β value. This is not technically correct as the radio altimeter accuracy
is a function of height rather than time as suggested by the theoretical accuracy values
supplied by Airbus. The random error is modelled by discrete-time Gaussian white noise.
Hajiyev et al. did not disclose the motivation for this error model or the parameter values.
There was however other literature that discussed the sources of error and the theoretical
accuracy of the radio altimeter. James Powell discusses the sources of error associated
with radio altimetry in his book Aircraft Radio Systems [25]. These error sources include
timing errors, fluctuations in signal strength, aircraft installation delay, leakage between
the transmitter and receiver, reflections off the landing gear, multipath signals, and the
effect of the aircraft orientation.
FMCW altimeters use a counter to determine the number of cycles or half-cycles in
one period of modulation. This is achieved by counting the number of positive zero going
crossing points. This varies between N and N+1 depending on the phase shift. The
height equation 2.5.59 can be rewritten as a function of N :
h =
fbc
4fm∆f
=
cN
4∆f
(2.5.61)
where N = fb/fm rounded down to the nearest integer.
Since N is an integer, the resultant height could be out by a factor of c/(4∆f) [25].
This results in a quantization error called the step or fixed error that is roughly equal
to 0.75 m with a ∆f = 100 MHz. The step error can be mitigated by using a frequency
discriminator since the measurements are continuous rather than discrete.
The second source of error is the received signal strength that varies as a function of
aircraft height. The radar equation gives the received signal strength as a fourth power
of range, while for radio altimeters it is a square function of the range [25] as a greater
target area is illuminated with an increase in height, resulting in a stronger reflection.
Part of the two way travel time is due to the electronics and the height of the anten-
nas above the ground. The antennas are mounted on the fuselage, while the reference
point for height is given from the lowest point of the landing gear. This inherent delay
is built into the radio altimeter functioning that accounts for signal propagation along
cables and antenna height. A residual height error forms part of the Aircraft Installation
Delay (AID) and is accounted for during calibration such that the altimeter reads a height
of zero at touch down.
Transmitter-receiver leakage is a common source of error that affects the receiver sen-
sitivity and could lead to erroneous readings [25]. Separate transmitter and receiver
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antennas will reduce leakage and should provide space attenuation in the region of 75 dB
[25].
Multipath signals are another common error source. These arise from objects within
the illuminated target area returning stronger signals than the area directly below the
aircraft, or reflections of the first-time-around signal off the airframe that return to the
ground and register as a second-time-around echo. The return echo should be significantly
weaker than the required signal strength and should therefore be ignored.
The aircraft’s orientation with respect to the inertial axis could possibly also effect the
radio altimeter measurement. The effect of pitch and roll depends on the beam width of
the radio altimeter set up. A wider beam width covers a larger surface area and therefore
mitigates the effects of small pitch and roll perturbations as the shortest route will always
be registered by the receiver.
The accuracy of a radio altimeter as given by Nebylov et al. [22]:
0-500 ft ± 2 ft or 2 % of height depending on which is greater
> 500 ft 5 % of height
2.5.6.3 Radio Altimeter Sensor Models
A simplified radio altimeter model is proposed that is based on the combination of in-
formation obtained from literature and the theoretical sensor characteristics supplied by
Airbus. The majority of the error sources from literature can be neglected under normal
operating conditions, but will form part of the fault profiles defined later in this chapter.
The assumption is made that the effect of the aircraft’s orientation is negligible as this
thesis deals with a landing scenario. The aircraft’s pitch is assumed to be a small enough
such that it has no significant effect on the correct functioning of the radio altimeter. The
assumption is also made that any roll perturbations are small, and insignificant as the
aircraft’s heading does not change significantly as it approaches the runway.
Without the true height of the aircraft and accurate terrain information it is very difficult
to derive error statistics. A simplified model is therefore proposed in figure 2.32 that
is based on the theoretical accuracy of the radio altimeter as a function of height. The
mathematical model to describe the aircraft height is given by:
HRA[k] = h[k] + bHra(h) (2.5.62)
where h is the true height and bHra is a bias drawn from a uniform distribution that is
scaled as a function of aircraft height.
The bias is drawn from a uniform distribution described by U(−δHra, δHra). δHra is given
by the theoretical limits of radio altimeter accuracy. This value is scaled according to the
change in the theoretical accuracy of the sensor as a function of height. The resultant
sensor model is illustrated in figure 2.32.
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Figure 2.32: The stochastic radio altimeter model.
2.5.6.4 Radio Altimeter Accuracy
The theoretical accuracy of the radio altimeter is given by a piece-wise function that
varies with height.
∆Hra =

0.9144 m for h < 30.5 m
0.03× h m for 30.5 m ≤ h < 152 m
0.05× h m for 152 m ≤ h < 1676 m
(2.5.63)
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Figure 2.33: Piece-wise function showing the radio altimeter accuracy versus height.
2.5.6.5 Validation of Radio Altimeter Model
The validation of the radio altimeter accuracy in the height domain proved to be challeng-
ing as there were many uncertainties surrounding the accuracy of the terrain databases
that made it difficult to accurately estimate the aircraft height. The decision was therefore
taken to convert the height measurements to the relative altitude domain. The aircraft
height can also be converted to relative altitude using the terrain database ZT1 that is
loaded on the flight computer and with knowledge of the aircraft’s XR position.
ZRA[k] = HRA[k] + ZT1(x) (2.5.64)
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This complicates matters as the accuracy function in the relative altitude domain is de-
pendent on both the accuracy of the radio altimeter and the terrain database. To simplify
matters the naive assumption is made that the accuracy for the radio altimeter and ter-
rain database can be combined by assuming that they are each modelled by independent
Gaussian random variables. As presented earlier in equations 2.5.9-2.5.10 the sum of two
normally distributed random variables (X + Y ) is also a normally distributed random
variable (Z), that is given by:
Z = X + Y ∼ N (µx + µy, σx2 + σy2) (2.5.65)
The terrain database accuracy can be approximated by the normal distribution X ∼
N (µx, σx2) = N (µterr, σterr2). The radio altimeter accuracy in height however needs to
be transformed from a uniform distribution to a normal distribution. The variance of a
zero mean uniform distribution, U ∼ (−δ, δ), is given by σ2 = 1
3
δ2. Therefore, the radio
altimeter accuracy in height is approximated by Y ∼ N (µy, σy2) = N (0, 13∆2Hra). These
two distributions are now combined as follows:
⇒ Z ∼ N (µterr, 1
3
∆2Hra + σ
2
terr) (2.5.66)
The definition for accuracy used in this thesis is a boundary that should incorporate
99.65 % of no-fault measurements. This corresponds to a boundary of 2.695 standard
deviations for normally distributed data. The theoretical function for the radio altimeter
accuracy in relative altitude is given by:
∆Zra =
2.695 ·
√
1
3
δ2Hra + σ
2
terr + µterr for XGPS < 0 m
2.695 · 1√
3
δHra for XGPS ≥ 0 m
(2.5.67)
For XGPS ≥ 0 m the terrain database accuracy is no longer valid as the aircraft is flying
over the runway and therefore the height and relative altitude measurement are identical.
The theoretical radio altimeter sensor accuracy was validated on actual data as shown in
figure 2.34.
(a) (b)
step in
accuracy
Figure 2.34: The radio altimeter accuracy is shown as a function of the estimated
relative altitude of an aircraft for actual measurement data. The blue line shows the
theoretical accuracy limits for the radio altimeter data and the black data points are a
scatter plot of actual radio altimeter measurement data.
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There are a few notable observations that can be made from figure 2.34. Firstly, the
radio altimeter accuracy bounds in 2.34 (a) are a tight fit on the bottom bounds of
the data, but appear to poorly fit the upper bounds. This is attributed to the offset
introduced by the average terrain database error, µterr, and the conservative assumptions
made when modelling. The second observation is that the radio altimeter data is densely
distributed around the estimated relative altitude of the aircraft, except for the occasional
non-linearity as indicated in figure 2.34 by the red circles and oval. These non-linearities
are consistent across all simulation runs, therefore suggesting that they are linked to the
non-linearities of the terrain database. This suggests that the radio altimeter is in fact
much more accurate than the theoretical characteristics suggest. It should be noted that
the theoretical accuracy supplied by Airbus is most likely the absolute maximum deviation
that accounts for adverse weather conditions, different types of terrain etc. Should a larger
and more diverse dataset be used, then the data might be a better fit. The last notable
observation is the sharp increase in accuracy at a relative altitude of less than 15 m in
figure 2.34 (b). This point coincides with the location of runway threshold, in other words
XGPS = 0 m, and therefore beyond this point the terrain database errors can be ignored
as the relative altitude and height are both with reference to the runway. Along a glide
slope of 3◦ the aircraft would be at a true relative altitude of 14.98 m when XGPS = 0 m.
2.6 Sensor fault profiles
Airbus supplied a list of six recommended fault profiles:
• Oscillation : Sensor measurement oscillates sinusoidally around the relative altitude
at which the fault occurred
zi(t) = A · sin(2piω∆t) + zfault (2.6.1)
where zi is the sensor measurement associated with the i
th sensor, ∆t is the time
difference since fault occurred, zfault is relative altitude at which fault occurs, A and
ω are a random variables that vary per simulation.
• Jamming : sensor measurement remains at relative altitude at which fault occurred.
Examples of real life failures that result in a jamming error are damage to the radio
altimeter installation or water covering the fuselage around its antennas
zi(t) = zfault (2.6.2)
• Bias : A fixed offset is imposed on a sensor measurement. A bias error on a radio
altimeter, also known as bright spot, occurs when there is a stronger reflection from
an object that is not necessarily directly below the aircraft. For example: vegetation
below the aircraft returns a weak echo signal due to the diffused reflection. A house
that is not directly below an aircraft, but still within the radio altimeter’s area of
illumination might return a much stronger reflection and therefore the distance to
the house would register as the perceived height by the sensor
zi(t) = ztrue(t) + b (2.6.3)
where b is a random variable that varies per simulation.
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• Runaway : Sensor measurement increases exponentially after the fault has occurred
zi(t) = ztrue(t) + e
c∆t (2.6.4)
where c is constant that determines the gradient of runaway.
• Non-Return-to-Zero : Sensor measurement will oscillate between some fixed positive
and negative value after the fault has occurred. An example of a NRZ fault is an
encoding error in the sensor electronics that results in a square wave oscillation
zi(t) = A · sgn(sin(2piω∆t) + zfault) (2.6.5)
where sgn() equals +1 or -1 based on the sign.
• Increased Noise : Sensor measurement gets an additive white noise component that
noticeably increases the noise variance associated with a sensor. This could be due
to extreme weather conditions such as hail or sensor failure that results in erroneous
readings
zi(t) = ztrue(t) + η(t) (2.6.6)
where η is N (o,σ2).
Each sensor technology type can experience any of the faults profiles defined above. While
certain fault profiles are more prevalent than others, it is possible that any of these fault
profiles could occur and therefore need to be simulated.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, the robust height estimation problem was conceptualised, and mathe-
matical models were established for the aircraft motion, the sensors, and the terrain.
The structure and nominal parameters for the sensor models were based on information
sourced from literature, and the sensor parameters were then identified to fit a real dataset
provided by Airbus. Fault models for six types of sensor faults were also defined. A sim-
ulation model based on the mathematical models established in this chapter will be used
to generate a large dataset of representative sensor measurements containing both “no
fault” and “fault” conditions. The next chapter will proceed to discuss the fault detection
and isolation theory.
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Fault Detection and Isolation Theory
The necessary theory and literature on fault detection and isolation techniques is pre-
sented in this chapter. It is important that the reader understands all the necessary
background information on fault diagnostic systems before these techniques can be ap-
plied to the problem of robust height estimation.
This chapter starts off with an introduction to the concept of fault diagnostics. An
overview of the approaches to fault detection and isolation is presented with the focus be-
ing on investigating a variety of model-based and data-driven methods. A fault detection
and isolation system automates the decision making process surrounding whether a fault
has occurred and, if so, then identifies the source. Decision theory is presented next and
discusses how to make optimal choices when it comes to identifying faults. The remainder
and bulk of this chapter is dedicated to presenting the theory and literature behind the
operation of model-based and data-driven methods.
3.1 Fault Diagnosis
Faults are defined as any undesired change that degrades the performance of a system
[28]. These undesired changes are addressed by incorporating fault diagnostic algorithms
in the system design that are capable of dealing with sensor, actuator or plant faults using
a two staged process known as fault detection and isolation. Fault detection involves mon-
itoring the system variables to determine whether there is a fault or the system is running
normally [29]. When a sensor fault is detected, fault isolation is executed to identify the
fault type and location. The approaches to fault detection and isolation can be divided
into two separate streams, namely hardware redundancy and analytical redundancy [30],
as illustrated in figure 3.1.
The traditional approach to fault diagnosis is hardware redundancy [30] which involves
the use of numerous sensors that all measure the same critical variable. Faults are isolated
through consistency checking and majority voting. The Airbus A380 relative altimetry
system is an example of hardware redundancy, where three radio altimeters are used to
estimate the aircraft height [31]. The median of the three sensor measurements is regarded
as the truth. Taking the mean of the three sensors would be skewed by the presence of an
outlier, while the median is a robust measure of central tendency. Hardware redundancy
is advantageous as it is simple and robust, but is not always practically feasible due to
price and space constraints [30].
48
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the approaches to fault detection and isolation.
Analytical redundancy replaces redundant sensors with methods that use expert knowl-
edge or data analysis to perform fault diagnosis. This is achieved by either deriving an
explicit mathematical model of the target system (model-based methods) or classifying
sensor failures based on historic datasets (data-driven methods).
3.1.1 Model-Based
The implementation of a model-based method focuses on the formation of residuals that
are given by difference between the model estimate and plant output as seen in figure 3.2.
+
-
Figure 3.2: Model based approach to fault detection and isolation [29].
Under normal conditions the model will accurately mimic plant behavior and the resid-
uals will be close to zero. Conversely when a fault is introduced the model is a poor
representation and results in large residuals. Fault detection and isolation will therefore
be performed by evaluating the residuals and alarms generated accordingly. Model based
techniques are advantageous as they are capable of accurately and quickly detecting faults
[29]. However they do require prior knowledge about the system dynamics, which is not
always readily available.
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3.1.2 Data-Driven
Data-driven methods form the second group of analytical redundancy approaches. These
methods do not require any information on system dynamics, but rather rely on historic
process data to derive structure that is used to determine the category (class) of a new ob-
servation (data point) [32]. The process of assigning a data point to a specific category is
called classification. Data driven methods cover a broad range of approaches that can be
divided into one of two categories, namely supervised and unsupervised machine learning
techniques. Supervised techniques provide the learning algorithm with a labeled dataset
and it is expected to determine a means of classifying unseen data points accordingly [33].
It uses training and prior knowledge to derive the decision boundaries that can be used to
optimally separate the respective classes. Conversely unsupervised techniques expect the
learning algorithm to form natural clusters when presented with an unlabeled dataset [34].
There are three different categories of supervised learning, namely novelty detection,
binary and multi-class classification [7]. Novelty detectors are trained with a dataset con-
sisting of a single class. Unseen data points are therefore categorised by their similarity
to the known class. Binary classification considers data with two classes, where new data
points are categorised based on their similarity with one of the two classes. Similarly,
multi-class classification algorithms assign new data points to one of the many classes
based on some similarity measure. Novelty detection and binary classification algorithms
are used for fault detection, while multi-class classifiers have the capability to identify
which sensor is faulty.
3.2 Decision Theory
The purpose of fault detection and isolation systems is to automate the decision making
process surrounding which operating mode or discrete status is most likely active. The
operating modes are represented by K discrete output classes (Ck) that each describe a
different system state for the collective group of sensors, actuators or plant. For example
a discrete status (C1) could represent a healthy system with no faulty sensors, while (C2)
represents a failure with a specific sensor. Each discrete class has a conditional probability,
p(Ck|x), associated with it that reflects the likelihood of it being correct. Decision theory
ensures that the optimal decisions are made given the respective probabilities. Bayes’
theorem is one manner used to quantify the effects of observed data (x) on the conditional
probability for each class, posterior, as follows:
p(Ck|x) = p(x|Ck)p(Ck)
p(x)
(3.2.1)
∝ p(x|Ck)p(Ck) (3.2.2)
where p(Ck) (prior) is the prior probability for class Ck, p(x) (evidence) is constant for
a specific x and p(x|Ck) (likelihood) is quantified by assuming some likelihood model for
the observed data [35].
The aim of maximizing the probability of assigning x to the correct class is achieved
by selecting the highest posterior probability such that:
Ck = arg max p(x|Ck)p(Ck) (3.2.3)
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If the prior is equivalent for all classes (p(Ck) =
1
K
), then the class assignment equation
3.2.3 reduces to finding the maximum of the likelihood:
Ck = arg max p(x|Ck) (3.2.4)
Another approach to the decision making process is through the use of decision boundaries
or surfaces to differentiate between classes. Decision boundaries are chosen such that they
minimise the percentage of misclassifications as illustrated in figure 3.3. Without prior
knowledge of the distribution of the data a means is needed to determine the optimal
decision boundary. This is achieved through the use of a cost function that is a singular
measure of the overall loss incurred when using a specific decision boundary [36]. The
optimal location is determined during training by selecting the decision boundary that
minimises the total loss and thereby maximises the percentage of correct classifications.
Decision Boundary
xˆ x0R1 R2
p(x,C1) p(x,C2)
p(x,Ck)
x
Figure 3.3: Illustration depicting the conditional probabilities p(x|Ck), shown as a
function of x, and the decision boundary x=xˆ. Values for x ≥ xˆ belong to region R2
and are assigned to class C2, while values x < xˆ belong to region R1 and are assigned to
C1. The location of the optimal decision boundary that will minimise the percentage of
misclassifications corresponds to location x0 [36].
3.3 Model Based Methods
The theory and literature behind the model-based fault detection and isolation techniques
is discussed in this section. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the approaches that are
investigated.
Model Based Method Approach Type
Robust Kalman filter Robust statistics and optimal estima-
tion
Bank of Kalman filters Probabilistic combination of optimal
estimators
Table 3.1: Summary of model-based approaches.
The Kalman Filter (KF) is a classical optimal estimation method and will form the
foundation of both the Robust KF and Bank of KF approaches. The section will therefore
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start off by introducing the necessary background and notation for a traditional Kalman
filter, before the Robust KF and Bank of KF approaches are investigated.
3.3.1 Traditional Kalman Filter
The Kalman filter was invented by Kalman and Bucy in 1960. It is a mathematical model
that filters signals with a certain degree of noise and uncertainty to give the most likely
parameter estimates. The KF is a type of Bayes’ filter that is applicable to time-varying
linear systems [37] that have been reduced to an elegant set of matrix equations based on
two key assumptions. The first is that the system whose state is being estimated can be
modelled by a linear system that is described by the following state space equations [37]:
~Xk = F ~Xk−1 +G~Uk−1 +Wk (3.3.1)
~Yk = H ~Xk + Vk (3.3.2)
where ~Xk and ~Yk is the system state and measurement vector at time k, F is the state
transition matrix, G is the input matrix, ~Uk is the control vector, H is the output matrix,
Wk is system noise and Vk is the measurement noise.
The second assumption is that the process noise can be modelled as zero-mean Gaus-
sian white noise with a probability distribution given by Wk ∼ N (0, Qk), where Qk is
the covariance matrix. Similarly, the measurement noise can be modelled as zero-mean
Gaussian white noise given by probability distribution Vk ∼ N (0, Rk), where Rk is the
covariance matrix.
The Kalman filter is a two step recursive process. The first step is the control update in
which the state estimate at time step k is propagated from the previous state using the
linear state space model. This is also known as the “prediction” as the system model is
used to estimate the state, Xk
−. The error covariance matrix, Pk, is also updated as there
is more uncertainty in the state estimate. The second step is the measurement update in
which the state estimate is corrected based on evidence presented by actual measurements,
~Yk. The correction is determined by the Kalman gain, Lk, which determines whether the
filter is going to place more emphasis on the measurements or the state prediction. The
Kalman gain is controlled by the ratio between the process error and measurement noise
covariance. A larger measurement noise will result in smaller gains and the Kalman filter
placing more emphasis in the model. A larger process noise will result in larger gains
and the Kalman filter placing more emphasis on the measurements. The Kalman filter
iteratively updates the state belief distribution with the state estimate being given by the
mean of the distribution. The equations that govern the operation of a Kalman filter are
given by [37]:
Control update:
~Xk
−
= F ~X+k−1 +G~Uk−1 (3.3.3)
P−k = Qk + FP
+
k−1F
T (3.3.4)
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Measurement update:
Sk = Rk +HP
−
k H
T (3.3.5)
Lk = P
−
k H
T (Sk)
−1 (3.3.6)
P+k = (I − LkH)P−k (3.3.7)
~Xk
+
= ~Xk
−
+ Lk( ~Yk −H ~Xk−) (3.3.8)
3.3.2 Robust Kalman Filter
3.3.2.1 Overview
The traditional KF is used to fuse redundant sensor measurements based on the assump-
tion that all sensors are faultless and available. The Robust KF is an extension of a
traditional KF that is designed to be insensitive to outliers. This is achieved through the
assistance of robust statistics that establishes a gating region around the state estimate.
The residual analysis step compares the measurement residual against the theoretical
limits of sensor accuracy at each iteration.
Y
(i)
k −H ~Xk ←
{
Y
(i)
k −H ~Xk for |Y (i)k −H ~Xk| ≤ ∆i
0 for |Y (i)k −H ~Xk| > ∆i
(3.3.9)
where ∆i is the limit of accuracy for the i
th sensor.
Any sensor measurement that falls outside of this gating region is considered to be an
outlier and its measurement residual is excluded from the correction of the state estimate
given by equation 3.3.8. The estimated state update is therefore isolated from the fault in
this manner. The Robust KF therefore has an identical structure to that of the traditional
KF, except for the additional logic checks performed before state estimate correction.
3.3.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of the Robust KF is its simplicity of implementation. The disadvantage of
the Robust KF is that it requires prior knowledge in the form of sensor noise, theoretical
limits of sensor accuracy and a model of vehicle dynamics.
3.3.2.3 Configurable Parameters
The following are configurable parameters for the Robust KF framework:
• σw - process noise variance
• ∆i - theoretical limit of sensor accuracy
The process noise covariance matrix, Qk, is a tuning parameter that is associated with the
noise of the process and will determine the rate of convergence and the Kalman gains. ∆i
is the theoretical sensor accuracy that acts as a gating region around the state estimate
by establishing a decision boundary that determines whether the measurement is faulty
or not.
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3.3.3 Bank of Kalman Filters
3.3.3.1 Overview
The Bank of KF approach to fault detection and isolation (FDI) establishes m+ 1 inde-
pendent Kalman filters in parallel, where m is the number of sensors being monitored as
seen in figure 3.4.
Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 2:
No fault KF
Sensor 1 Failure KF
Hypothesis 5:
Sensor m Failure KF
:
:
~yk
Probaility Computation
Decision Process
FDI status
xˆ1
xˆxˆ2
xˆN
r1
r2
rN
S2
S1
SN
pN
p2
p1
Statistical Information (p1, p2, .., pN)
Figure 3.4: The FDI architecture for a Bank of Kalman filters approach to fault detec-
tion and isolation.
The design of individual filters is based on different hypotheses. The first KF assumes
that all the sensors are functioning correctly and are therefore incorporated in the KF
design. The remaining Kalman filters each assume the failure of a different sensor that
is then excluded from the KF design. When a failure occurs the output of the KF that
excludes that sensor will be robust to that specific technology failure.
An automated decision making process is needed to determine which of the hypotheses
best represents the current observations. A Gaussian Bayes Classifier is used to determine
the likelihood associated with respective Kalman filters [38]. This is a suitable technique
when dealing with Kalman filters as the measurement residual (ri) and its covariance
matrix (Si) give useful information regarding the accuracy of the model. A likelihood
function is constructed from the above parameters and a probability can be coupled to
each hypothesis denoted by θ. This approach is adaptive in the sense that the final state
estimate is weighted according to the probability associated with each scenario. Bayes’
theorem is used to determine the probability of an outcome being true given the evidence.
The possible outcomes are the list of hypotheses, while the sequence of previous sensor
values, ~Yk = [~yk, ~yk−1, ..., ~y0], forms part of the evidence. The derivation for the probability
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associated with θi is given by:
p(θ = θi | ~Yk) = p(θ = θi)p(
~Yk | θ = θi)
p(~Yk)
(3.3.10)
It is assumed that the hypotheses are mutually exclusive as only one sensor technology
can fail at a given instant. The chain rule is used to expand the denominator of equation
3.3.10 as follows:
p(~Yk) = p(~Yk | θ = θ1)p(θ1) + ....+ p(~Yk | θ = θN)p(θN) (3.3.11)
=
N∑
j=1
p(~Yk | θ = θj)p(θ = θj) (3.3.12)
where N is the total number of hypotheses.
The probability of the ith hypothesis occurring at time step k is now given by the fraction:
p(θ = θi | ~Yk) = p(
~Yk | θ = θi)p(θ = θi)∑N
i=1 p(
~Yk | θ = θj)p(θ = θj)
(3.3.13)
The current expression requires values and covariances for a sequence of measurements
to be known. Transforming this expression into a recursive equation will simplify the
computational complexity as the probabilities can be updated at each time step based on
current measurements and previous probabilities. Separating the sequence of measure-
ments such that [~yk, ~Yk−1]T and using the chain rule, the probability for ~Yk is given by
[39]:
p(~Yk | θ = θi) = p([~yk, ~Yk−1]T | θ = θi) (3.3.14)
= p(~yk | ~Yk−1, θ = θi)p(~Yk−1 | θ = θi) (3.3.15)
Equation 3.3.15 can be further simplified by assuming that p(~yk | ~Yk−1, θ = θi) = p(~yk |
θ = θi) and αi(k) = p(~Yk | θ = θi). For the simplicity of notation equation 3.3.15 is
rewritten:
αi(k) = p(~yk | θ = θi)αi(k − 1) (3.3.16)
Now equation 3.3.13 can be updated by substituting equation 3.3.16 giving:
p(θ = θi | ~Yk) = αi(k)p(θ = θi)∑N
i=1 αj(k)p(θ = θj)
(3.3.17)
=
p(~yk | θ = θi)αi(k − 1)p(θ = θi)∑N
j=1 p(~yk | θ = θj)αj(k − 1)p(θ = θj)
(3.3.18)
A formula is now needed to determine a value for p(~yk | θ = θi). Knowing that one of
the fundamental assumptions associated with the Kalman filter is that measurements are
normally distributed, a probability density function for a Gaussian distribution can be
used to quantify p(~yk | θ = θi). The equation for a Gaussian distribution is given by
equation 3.3.19.
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f(~yk | θ = θi) = 1
(2pi)
mi
2 | Σ |1/2 exp(−
1
2
(~yk − µk)T (Σ−1)(~yk − µk)) (3.3.19)
where mi is the dimension of the measurement vector for the i
th hypothesis, Σ is the
covariance matrix, and µk the mean.
By substituting the mean value for the expected measurement value H ~Xk
−
equation
3.3.19 can be rewritten in terms of the measurement residual and its covariance as fol-
lows:
~rk = ~yk −H ~Xk− (3.3.20)
Sk = Rk +HP
−
k H
T (3.3.21)
f(~yk | θ = θi) = 1
(2pi)
mi
2 | Sk |1/2
exp(−1
2
(~rk)
T (S−1k )(~rk)) (3.3.22)
where Sk is the measurement residual covariance.
Equation 3.3.18 is now updated using the distribution function to quantify the proba-
bility for the ith hypothesis as follows:
p(θ = θi | ~Yk) = f(~yk | θ = θi)αi(k − 1)p(θ = θi)∑N
i=1 f(~yk | θ = θj)αj(k − 1)p(θ = θj)
(3.3.23)
The FDI status is updated based on the hypothesis that maximises the probability func-
tion given by equation 3.3.23 above, while the estimated states can be calculated as a
weighted sum of the probabilities associated with each hypothesis. The more likely a
hypothesis is, the larger its probability will be and therefore it will provide a greater
contribution towards the overall state update.
xˆ =
N∑
i=1
xi(k)pi(k) (3.3.24)
The final decision process to determine the FDI status makes use of a fixed threshold
to improve the classifier’s performance. The Gaussian Bayes Classifier is based on many
assumptions and the use of a probability and consistency threshold brings stability to
the output of the classifier [38]. Firstly, a hypothesis is only classified as being active
once its probability has exceeded a predetermined probability threshold. Secondly, the
consistency of the decision block is monitored and only updates the sensor status once a
hypothesis has been active for longer than 2 s.
3.3.3.2 Advantages and Disadvantages
The drawbacks of the Bank of Kalman filters approach is that it is computationally more
intensive than the Robust KF as it requires multiple Kalman filters in parallel as well as
prior knowledge in the form of sensor noise and prior probabilities associated with each
hypothesis.
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3.3.3.3 Configurable Parameters
The following are configurable parameters for the Bank of KF framework:
• σw - process noise variance
• P (θ = θi) - prior probability associated with ith sensor status
• Pthresh - probability threshold to identify active hypothesis
The process noise covariance matrix Qk is a tuning parameter that is associated with the
noise of the process and will effect the rate of convergence and the Kalman gains. The
prior probability P (θ = θi) is set to
1
N
without any prior knowledge of the probability
associated with each individual hypothesis.
3.4 Overview of Data Driven Methods
This section gives an overview of the data-driven techniques investigated for fault detec-
tion and isolation. The breakdown of the various approaches is shown in figure 3.5.
Data Driven
Approaches
Unsupervised
Learning
Supervised
Learning
Multi-class
Classification
Outlier
Detection
Binary
Classification
1. Elliptic Envelope
2. Local Outlier Factor
3. Isolation Forest
1. Logsitic Regression
2. Na¨ıve Bayes
3. Decision Tree
4. k-Nearest Neighbors
5. Support Vector Machine
Other
Approaches
1. RANSAC
2. Dynamic PCA
Figure 3.5: Overview of the data-driven approaches to fault detection and isolation.
The data-driven approaches can be separated into two separate streams, namely super-
vised and unsupervised machine learning techniques. The supervised approaches consist
of both binary and multi-class classifiers, while the unsupervised approaches consist of
data-driven outlier detection algorithms and other novel approaches found in literature
that are applicable to fault detection and isolation.
The binary and multi-class algorithms are trained oﬄine on a wide variety of measurement
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data and can then be applied to an online stream of measurements. A similar approach
is applied to the outlier detection methods, except that they are trained on unlabeled
datasets that consist mostly of “normal” or “no-fault” data points with a few scattered
“faults” or “outliers”. They are expected to identify these outliers based on their similar-
ity to the majority of the data. The binary classification and outlier detection techniques
are used for fault detection. They are capable of differentiating between one of two pos-
sible classes, namely fault or no-fault. The multi-class classifier is used for fault isolation
and is responsible for identifying which sensor is faulty.
3.5 Binary Classification
Binary classifiers are investigated as a means of detecting when a fault occurs. Table 3.2
provides a summary of the binary classification approaches that are investigated. A wide
range of algorithms are considered that vary both with approach and complexity.
Classifier Name Approach Type
Logistic Regression Linear classification
Na¨ıve Bayes Probabilistic classification
Decision Tree Rules-based classification
k-Nearest Neighbors Non-parametric instance based classifi-
cation
Support Vector Machine Distance-based classification
Table 3.2: Summary of binary classifiers.
A machine learning library can be used to implement the algorithms listed in table 3.2.
The parameters and implementation of the algorithms are specific to the scikit-learn
machine learning library. The binary classification algorithms are trained on equal per-
centages of data from both the fault and no-fault class to ensure that the optimal unbiased
decision boundary is found.
3.5.1 Logistic Regression
3.5.1.1 Overview
Logistic Regression fits an optimal hyperplane that forms a decision boundary and is used
to differentiate between two classes based on their location relative to this hyperplane as
illustrated in figure 3.6. A hypothesis or sigmoid function predicts the binary label as-
signed to a data point. The independent features that describe a data point are combined
using a weighted vector (~w), before a sigmoid function manipulates the sum of the linearly
combined independent variables to give an estimated probability value between zero and
one. This hypothesis function is defined by [36]:
h(~x, ~w, b) = P (y = 1|~x, ~w, b) = 1
1 + e−(~wT ~x+b)
(3.5.1)
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where ~w is the a vector of regression coefficients for each feature with bias variable b.
The decision boundary for the class prediction is given by the set of variables for which
P (y = 1|~x, ~w, b) = P (y = 0|~x, ~w, b) = 0.5. This corresponds to the optimal hyperplane:
~wT~x+ b = 0 (3.5.2)
The logistic regression algorithm attempts to find the optimal regression coefficients such
that the hypothesis function is a good fit for the data.
Figure 3.6: The decision boundary for two-dimensional example dataset classified using
a Logistic Regression classifier.
3.5.1.2 Training
No closed form solution exists to estimate the optimal model parameters [32]. Instead a
maximum likelihood approach is used to determine optimal regression coefficients using
a method called gradient descent. The optimal parameters are those that minimise a
convex cost function over the set of training data points. The algorithm is summarised as
an iterative process in which small “steps” are taken along the direction of the gradient
vector. With each iteration the model parameters are updated until the global optimum
is reached. The maximum likelihood cost function for the training dataset with N data
points is given by:
j(~w) =
N∏
i=1
h(~xi, ~w, b)
yi [1− h(~xi, ~w, b)](1−yi) (3.5.3)
where yi is the label associated with the i
th data point.
An error function is defined by taking the negative logarithm of the likelihood function
3.5.3 above.
J(~w) = − log[j(~w)] = −
N∑
i=1
[
yi log[h(~xi, ~w, b)] + (1− yi) log[1− h(~xi, ~w, b)]
]
(3.5.4)
The gradient of the error function with respect to ~w is given by [36]:
OL(~w) =
N∑
i=1
(yi − h(~xi, ~w, b))~xi (3.5.5)
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION THEORY 60
Regularization of the regression coefficients ~w is necessary to prevent over fitting. A
penalty parameter λ is imposed on the regression coefficients that limits them from be-
coming too large. Cost function 3.5.4 is adapted to account for regularization as follows
[36]:
J(~w) = −
N∑
i=1
[
yi log(h(~xi, ~w, b)) + (1− yi) log(1− h(~xi, ~w, b))
]
+
λ
2
d∑
j=1
w2j (3.5.6)
where d is the dimension corresponding to the number of features.
3.5.1.3 Classification
New data points are classified based on a probability threshold. Data points that belong
to the positive class correspond with an estimated probability P (y = 1|~x, ~w, b) ≥ 0.5 and
find themselves above the decision hyperplane such that ~wT~x + b ≥ 0. Similarly, for the
negative class P (y = 0|~x, ~w, b) > 0.5 and these data points find themselves below the
decision hyperplane.
3.5.1.4 Advantages and Disadvantages
Logistic Regression is easy to train and implement with a limited computational com-
plexity required to classify new data points. It also gives the conditional probabilities
which is a useful property to assess the confidence associated with a classification. The
drawback of Logistic Regression is that it is prone to over-fitting if regularization is not
used correctly [7] and can be a poor fit for the data due to the linear decision hyperplane
that is unable to adapt to non-linear decision boundaries without prior preprocessing or
the use of kernel functions.
3.5.1.5 Configurable Parameters
The configurable parameters for Logistic Regression are as follows:
• penalty - regularization algorithms used for regression coefficients
• c - inverse regularization parameter
• tol - set tolerance for stopping criteria
• max iter - maximum number of iterations used
• solver - set optimization algorithm in training
The scikit-learn library supports L1 and L2 regularization. The L1 regularization takes
the sum of the absolute regression coefficients, while L2 penalises by using the squared
sum of regression coefficients. The effect of the squared term is a harsher penalty that
shrinks the regression coefficients to small non-zero values in comparison to the L1 reg-
ularization that shrinks most of the coefficients, while the most important ones remain
unchanged [40]. The default L2 optimization was chosen.
The tolerance for the stopping criteria is set to stop the training algorithm and thereby
ensure that unnecessary computational power is not wasted for a small improvement in
accuracy. Similarly, the training algorithm can be halted by setting the maximum number
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of iterations.
The are a variety of gradient descent optimization algorithms available such as the newton-
cg (conjugate gradient), lbfgs (Limited memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno), li-
blinear and sag (stochastic average gradient). The default optimization algorithm is
liblinear.
3.5.2 Na¨ıve Bayes
3.5.2.1 Overview
The Na¨ıve Bayes classifier is a probabilistic approach that is based on Bayes’ theorem
[32]. The class conditional probabilities are assumed to be modelled by a known dis-
tribution and are determined for each feature axis during training. These conditional
class distributions are used to calculate the probability of a data point belonging to a
specific class. The Na¨ıve Bayes algorithm derives its name from the na¨ıve assumption of
feature independence. Figure 3.7 depicts the conditional probabilities for the class labels
(Y = [y1 = +1, y2 = −1]) along the feature axes.
Positive
Negative
x
2
x1
P (x1|Y = −1)P (x1|Y = +1)
P (x2|Y = +1)
P (x2|Y = −1)
Class
Class
A
+1
-1
Figure 3.7: The Naive Bayes decision boundary for an example two-dimensional dataset.
The conditional probabilities are assumed to be drawn from a Gaussian distribution.
3.5.2.2 Training
The training of a Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes classifier involves determining the mean and stan-
dard deviation of the axes-independent Gaussian distributions that describe the spread
of the two classes as follows:
µij = E[Xi|Y = yj] (3.5.7)
σij = E[(Xi − µij)2|Y = yj] (3.5.8)
The training process fits the conditional probabilities to the dataset given the class [7].
Figure 3.7 illustrates the resultant conditional probability distributions [p(x1|Y = +1),
p(x1|Y = −1), p(x2|Y = +1), p(x2|Y = −1)] after training.
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3.5.2.3 Classification
New data points are assigned to the class which yields the maximum conditional proba-
bility. Bayes’ theorem is used to determine the maximum conditional probability. This
theorem states that the posterior probability of belonging to a class yj is given by:
P (Y = yj| ~X) = P (Y = yj)P (
~X|Y = yj)
P ( ~X)
=
P (Y = yj)P (x1, x2, ..., xd|Y = yj)
P (x1, x2, ..., xd)
(3.5.9)
Through the use of the chain rule and under the na¨ıve assumption that the features that
make up a dataset are independent, equation 3.5.9 can be reduced to:
P (Y = yj|x1, x2, ...xd) = P (Y = yj)
∏d
i=1 P (xi|Y = yj)
P (x1, x2, ..., xd)
(3.5.10)
=
1
η
P (Y = yj)
d∏
i=1
P (xi|Y = yj) (3.5.11)
where P (x1, x2, ..., xd) is constant for a specific feature vector ~X and can be represented
by scaling factor η.
The use of Bayes’ theorem is illustrated through the classification of an unlabeled data
point, A, in figure 3.7. The conditional probability is calculated for both classes:
P (X = A|Y = +1) = P (x1 = A|Y = +1)P (x2 = A|Y = +1) (3.5.12)
P (X = A|Y = −1) = P (x1 = A|Y = −1)P (x2 = A|Y = −1) (3.5.13)
The probability of belonging to a class given the data point A can be determined using
equation 3.5.11:
P (Y = +1|X = A) = 1
η
P (X = A|Y = +1)P (Y = +1) (3.5.14)
P (Y = −1|X = A) = 1
η
P (X = A|Y = −1)P (Y = −1) (3.5.15)
The unlabeled data point is assigned to the class that results in the maximum conditional
probability between equation 3.5.14 and 3.5.15. The unlabeled data point is therefore
assigned to the negative class. Equation 3.5.16 is expanded to determine the class for a
multidimensional and multi-class problem as follows:
Y = arg max
yj
d∏
i=1
P (xi|Y = yj)P (Y = yj) (3.5.16)
3.5.2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of the Na¨ıve Bayes algorithm is its simplicity to train and implement. The
drawback is that the na¨ıve approach of feature independence is not a valid assumption in
most applications and will therefore result in poor performance.
3.5.2.5 Configurable Parameters
There are no configurable parameters for the Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes algorithm.
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3.5.3 Decision Tree
3.5.3.1 Overview
Decision Trees provide a structured approach in the form of a sequential decision process.
A Decision Tree consists of nodes and branches, where each node represents an if-else test
applied to a feature and the branches representing the possible outcomes. A decision tree
is best understood visually as illustrated in figure 3.8.
X > 15
Y > 11CLASS
X > 14
CLASS
Yes No
Yes No
Y > 9CLASS
Yes No
CLASS
Yes No
CLASS
POSITIVE
POSITIVE
POSITIVE
NEGATIVE
NEGATIVE
Figure 3.8: The Decision Tree boundary for an example two-dimensional dataset. The
sequential decision tree shows how the classification boundary is formed. Each rectangle
represents a node and the branches are represented by arrows.
3.5.3.2 Training
The Classification and Regression Tree (CART) algorithm uses the training data to grow
a binary decision tree. This “tree growing” methodology will recursively split the data
presented at a parent node into two children nodes that will eventually terminate in a
leaf node and be assigned to a class. The fundamental aim of the training algorithm is
to create a compact tree with as few nodes as possible. This is achieved by evaluating
the information gain and choosing the splitting feature and value that will maximise the
quality of split [41]. Before the information gain equation can be defined, two impurity
metrics need to be explained. These are the Gini and Entropy impurity metrics. The
Gini impurity is the expected error rate at a node if the class label is randomly selected
from the distribution at that node [34]. The Gini index HG for the positive class (P) and
the negative class, (N), with class probability p(P) and p(N) respectively is defined as
HG(P,N) = 1−
(
p(P)2 + p(N)2
)
(3.5.17)
Similarly, the entropy impurity HE is defined as
HE(P,N) = −p(P) log p(P)− p(N) log p(N) (3.5.18)
The information gain or change in impurity ∆IG between the parent, S, and the left/right
children nodes, SL and SR, is defined as:
∆IG(S) = H[](P,N)− p(SL)H[](PL,NL)− p(SR)H[](PR, NR) (3.5.19)
where H[] is either the Gini or Entropy impurity, and p(SL) and p(SR) are the fraction of
data points at parent S that will be assigned to the children nodes respectively.
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The CART algorithm selects a random feature and examines the information gain by
varying the split value over the feature range [42]. The split value that maximises the
information gain is chosen and CART algorithm is repeated on the next layer in the tree.
Once the tree is fully grown, each branch will terminate on a pure leaf node. To prevent
over-fitting, a grown tree is pruned to allow it to generalise better to new examples. This
is achieved using predefined parameters discussed in the parameters section.
3.5.3.3 Classification
New data points are classified by following the binary tree of if-else statements until a
leaf node is reached. The new data point is assigned the same label as that of the leaf
node.
3.5.3.4 Advantages and Disadvantages
The benefits of a Decision Tree is its robustness, interpretability and ease of understand-
ing. Once trained, it requires very little memory and is computationally efficient at
evaluating new data points. Drawbacks are that it is prone to over-fitting and will require
a deep tree to learn the complex decision boundaries.
3.5.3.5 Configurable Parameters
The following are configurable parameters for the Decision Tree classifier:
• criterion - choice of impurity measure
• max depth - maximum depth of the tree
• min samples split - minimum number of samples required to split a node
• max samples leaf - maximum number of samples required to be at a leaf
• min impurity decrease - minimum required change in impurity between parent
and children nodes to ensure that a split will occur
The choice of impurity measure is between the Gini (default) and Entropy metric. The
remainder of parameters are used to prune the tree. These parameters can be set indi-
vidually or a combination of them can be used. The default for each of these parameters
is set to produce a fully grown tree.
3.5.4 k-Nearest Neighbors
3.5.4.1 Overview
The k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN) algorithm is a conceptually simple approach to classifica-
tion. A new unlabeled data point is classified by assigning it the majority label associated
with its k nearest neighbors. These nearest neighbors are the k closest data points based
on Euclidean distance. The resultant decision boundary is illustrated on an example
dataset in figure 3.9.
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k-Nearest Neighbors
Figure 3.9: The decision boundary for the example two-dimensional data classified with
a k-Nearest Neighbor classifier.
3.5.4.2 Training
The k-Nearest Neighbors algorithm is not trained, as it is instance-based. The algorithm
will use the labeled training dataset to classify new data points instead of forming its own
model of the data. The training stage therefore involves storing of the training dataset
[7]. Some implementations simplify finding the k nearest neighbors by establishing a
tree structure during training. This reduces the computational complexity involved with
classifying an unseen data point [42].
3.5.4.3 Classification
The circle in figure 3.10 contains k = 3 data points from the training dataset that are the
closest to the unknown new data point. The new data point will be classified according
to the majority vote of the predefined k shortest distances. The unlabeled data point will
therefore be assigned to the positive class. An uneven integer is chosen for k to ensure
that there can never be an equal vote.
KEY:
Unlabled Data Point
Positive Class
Negative Class
k= 3
d1
d2
d3
d4
d6
d5
Figure 3.10: Visual explanation for classification using k nearest neighbors algorithm.
The distance is calculated from the unlabeled data point to each training data point.
3.5.4.4 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of the nearest neighbor algorithm are its conceptual simplicity and that
there is no prior knowledge required about the dataset. One obvious disadvantage is
memory requirement and computational intractability when dealing with large datasets.
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3.5.4.5 Configurable Parameters
The following are configurable parameters for the k-Nearest Neighbors classifier:
• n neighbors - the number of neighbors
• algorithm - the type of algorithm used to determine the nearest neighbors
• metric - distance metric used
The default number of neighbors used for classification is five. The choice of k will
determine the smoothness of the decision boundary. A larger k is more immune to the
effects of noise, but will result in a less distinct decision boundary. There are three
different options for an algorithm that can be used to perform distance calculations,
namely Brute Force, K-D Tree and Ball Tree. The Brute Force algorithm is effective
for smaller datasets, but becomes infeasible for larger N . The scikit-learn library offers
two tree-based data structures in the K-D and Ball tree to reduce the number of required
iterations by summarizing distance information. The central idea is illustrated using three
data points. If point A is distant from point B, and point B is in close proximity to point
C, then points A and C must also be distant. The K-Dimensional (K-D) Tree is a binary
tree structure that recursively partitions the data space along its axes. This strategy
reduces the nearest neighbor computations to O(log(N)). The Ball Tree is an extension
of the KD-Tree that partitions the data using a series of nested hyper-spheres instead
of along Cartesian axes. This makes the tree construction more costly, but improves
efficiency in higher-dimensional spaces.
3.5.5 Support Vector Machine
3.5.5.1 Overview
A Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a model-based classification method. It is also
known as a Large Margin Classifier as it attempts to find the optimal hyperplane in mul-
tidimensional space that separates the binary classes. This corresponds to the maximum
margin or distance between the support vectors and decision boundary [41]. The support
vectors are those training data points nearest the decision boundary from either class.
Support Vector Machines are powerful classifiers as they have the ability to separate
linearly inseparable data. A training dataset is preprocessed to represent patterns in a
different subspace where they become linearly separable using a non-linear mapping or
kernel function as illustrated on the example dataset in figure 3.11.
Kernel: Linear Kernel: Polynomial Kernel: RBF
Figure 3.11: The SVM decision boundary for a two-dimensional dataset classified using
three different Kernel functions, namely linear, polynomial and Radial Basis Function
(RBF) kernels.
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3.5.5.2 Training
A linearly separable dataset is considered for explanatory purposes. The equation that
governs the operation of a linear classifier is given by:
y(xi) = ~w
T~xi + b (3.5.20)
where a hyperplane is defined by weight vector ~w and bias variable b.
New data points are classified according to the sign of y(~xi):
~wT~xi + b =
{
≥ 0 positive class
< 0 negative class
(3.5.21)
For new data points close to the decision boundary ~wT~xi + b = 0 a small change in
~xi can result in a misclassification. Support Vector Machines address this shortcoming
through the use of a decision boundary that is separated from the training data by a finite
threshold 2.
~wT~xi + b =
{
≥ 2 positive class
< −2 negative class (3.5.22)
Optimal Hyperplane
Functional Margin
Positive Class
Negative Class
~xNfm
~xPfm
~wT
Unlabled Data Point
Figure 3.12: The optimal SVM decision boundary is represented by the solid line. The
largest functional margin given by the dotted lines separates the two classes.
The SVM training aims to find the largest functional margin between the nearest data
points of either class. The optimal location for the linear hyperplane that will maximise
the width of the functional margin is to place it in the middle. The training process is
reduced to an optimisation problem to find the largest functional margin. A Support
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Vector Machine is trained by projecting the data points on a vector perpendicular to the
hyperplane, ~wT such that:
~wT~xP + b ≥ 1 (3.5.23)
~wT~xN + b ≤ −1 (3.5.24)
where  = 1 for convenience, ~xP and ~xN are training data points belonging to the positive
and negative class respectively.
The distance between any data point, ~xi, from the origin along the vector ~w is
~wT ·~xi
||~w||
[35]. The width of the functional margin is given by the distance along the direction
of the vector ~wT between data points from the positive class (~xPfm) and negative class
(~xNfm) situated on the functional margin.
~wT · (~xPfm − ~xNfm)
||~w|| =
2
||~w|| (3.5.25)
The maximum width of the functional margin is a maximization of 2||~w|| or equivalently
the minimization of ||~w||. For each training data point ~xi there is a corresponding label
yi that provides necessary information to maximise the functional margin, where the
optimization problem is defined by [35]:
arg min
~w
1
2
||~w||2 subject to yi(~wT~xi + b)− 1 ≥ 0 (3.5.26)
For training data points that lie on the boundary of the functional margin they satisfy the
constraint that yi(~w
T~xifm + b)−1 = 0. This becomes a constrained optimization problem
using the constraint stated above. Lagrange multipliers can be used to determine the
global minimum.
L(~w, b) = 1
2
|| ~w ||2 −
N∑
i=1
αi[yi(~w
T~xifm + b)− 1] (3.5.27)
where L() is the Lagrange function and αi is the multiplier such that αi ≥ 0.
The global minimum is determined by taking the partial derivatives of equation 3.5.27
and setting them equal to zero:
O(~w,b)L(~w, b) = 0⇔
{
~w −∑Ni=1 αiyi~xifm = 0
−∑Ni=1 αiyi = 0 (3.5.28)
The only definite solution presented above gives a global minimum at:
~w =
N∑
i=1
αiyi~xifm (3.5.29)
Substituting equation 3.5.29 into equation 3.5.27 and then simplifying yields:
L(~w, b) =
N∑
i=1
αi − 1
2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
αiαjyiyj~xifm · ~xjfm (3.5.30)
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The problem is reduced to finding the maximum ~xifm · ~xjfm [7].
For datasets that are not linearly separable it will not be possible to find the maxi-
mum ~xifm · ~xjfm . Kernel functions are used to project the d dimensional input space into
a different subspace where the data becomes linearly separable using a kernel function
K(~xi, ~xj). This allows for non-linear decision boundaries when the optimal hyperplane is
projected back to the original input space as seen in figure 3.11. A higher-dimensional fea-
ture space does not actually have to be constructed as the kernel trick allows all necessary
operations to be performed in the input space [41].
3.5.5.3 Classification
New data points are classified according to their location with respect to the optimal
hyperplane. If the projection of new data point onto the vector ~w is greater than zero
it will assigned to the positive class as seen in figure 3.12. The sign of y(~xi) therefore
determines which class a new training example is assigned to [36].
y(~xi) = ~w
T~xi + b =
{
≥ 0 positive class
< 0 negative class
(3.5.31)
3.5.5.4 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of a Support Vector Machine classifier is that the use of kernels give it
the ability to separate linearly inseparable data, and that the optimisation function is
of a convex form that ensures that the algorithm will converge on the global minimum.
The disadvantages of a Support Vector Machine classifier is the use of a kernel function
increases the computational complexity and may also require fine tuning which would be
time consuming.
3.5.5.5 Configurable Parameters
The following are configurable parameters for the Support Vector Machine classifier:
• C - penalty parameter
• kernel - the type of kernel to be used
The penalty parameter controls the degree of regularisation that prevents over fitting. A
well-trained algorithm should generalise well to new training data points. C is the inverse
regularization parameter and its purpose is to prevent over-fitting.
Kernel Type Function
Linear K(~xi, ~xj) = ~x
T
i ~xj
Polynomial K(~xi, ~xj) = γ(~x
T
i ~xj + r)
d
Radial Basis Function K(~xi, ~xj) = e
−γ||~xi−~xj ||2
Sigmoid K(~xi, ~xj) = tanh[γ(~x
T
i ~xj + r)]
Table 3.3: Summary of kernel functions offered by the SVC library.
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The choice of kernel depends on the intended application. The linear kernel is the simplest
kernel function whereby it returns the inner product ~xi ·~xj. The polynomial kernel is non-
stationary and well suited for training data that has been normalised. The Radial Basis
Function (RBF) kernel measures similarity between ~xi and ~xj. Euclidean distance is used
as the measure of similarity. A value that tends towards 1 is an indication of ~xi and
~xj that are similar, whilst dissimilarity a value of 0. The sigmoid kernel stems from
neural networks and is usually used in text classification applications [34]. The different
configurable parameters for various kernels are γ, d and r.
3.6 Multi-class Classification
Multi-class refers to more than two classes. These classification algorithms are investigated
as a means to identify a faulty sensor once a fault has been detected. Whilst some
of the binary classifiers discussed in section 3.5 are inherently multi-class, others need
assistance to expand to k > 2 classes. There are two distinct methodologies by which
binary classification algorithms are expanded for multi-class applications, namely the One-
Versus-All and One-Versus-One transformation. The binary classifiers from section 3.5
are all capable of multi-class classification when using the scikit-learn machine learning
library [43]. This section will present and discuss the various strategies used to expand
the binary classifiers to a multi-class setting.
Classifier Name Transformation Strategy
Na¨ıve Bayes Inherently Multi-class
Decision Tree Inherently Multi-class
k-Nearest Neighbors Inherently Multi-class
Logistic Regression One-Vs-All
Support Vector Machine One-Vs-One
Table 3.4: Summary of multi-class classifiers.
3.6.1 Inherently Multi-class
3.6.1.1 Overview
The Na¨ıve Bayes, Decision Tree and k-Nearest Neighbors classifiers are all inherently
multi-class. The section below will give a brief overview of their multi-class operation and
show how the equations that govern them apply to a multi-class setting.
Na¨ıve Bayes
The multi-class Na¨ıve Bayes algorithm is simply an extension of its binary counterpart
by extending the projection of conditional probability distributions on respective axes
to each of the k classes. New data points are assigned to the class that maximises the
conditional probability as given by equation 3.5.16.
Decision Tree
A Decision Tree is trained to determine the feature and value that maximises the quality
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of the split across all the classes. The Gini impurity equation 3.5.17 can be expanded to
account for k classes denoted by subset C = {C1, C2, ..., Ck} as follows:
HG(C) = 1−
k∑
i=1
p(Ci) (3.6.1)
where p(Ci) is the class probability.
Similarly, the entropy impurity equation 3.5.18 can be rewritten as:
HE(C) = −
k∑
i=1
p(Ci) log(p(Ci)) (3.6.2)
Using the impurity equation the information gain 3.5.19 that is used to assess the quality
of the split between parent S and children (SL, SR) in a multi-class problem is given by:
∆IG(S) = H[](C)− p(SL)H[](CL)− p(SR)H[](CR) (3.6.3)
Once the tree is fully grown each leaf node represents one of the k classes.
k-Nearest Neighbors
The k-Nearest Neighbors is an intuitive algorithm whose functioning remains the same
regardless of the number of classes. An unlabeled data point is still assigned to the class
with the majority vote.
3.6.1.2 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of applying inherent multi-class algorithms are that they only require the
establishment of a single classifier with comparable performance to their binary counter-
parts.
3.6.2 One-Versus-All
3.6.2.1 Overview
The One-Versus-All approach establishes k binary classifiers. Each individual classifier
is trained to identify a distinct class. This is achieved by assigning the training data
belonging to the distinct class a positive label and grouping the remaining k-1 classes
together under a separate negative label. The target labels assigned to the ith classifier
are given by:
yi =
{
+1 if y = i
−1 if y 6= i (3.6.4)
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Rest
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Rest
+1
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-1 -1
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Figure 3.13: The One-Versus-All approach to multi-class classification for the example
dataset where k=3 establishes separate Logistic Regression binary classifiers with decision
boundaries indicated by the dashed line. The binary classifier is trained to identify one
class from the remainder of the dataset.
The separate binary classifiers are combined by assigning the new data point a label that
corresponds to the class that maximises the probability function:
P (y = i|~x, ~wi, bi) = 1
1 + e−(~wTi ~x+bi)
(3.6.5)
where ~wi and bi are model parameters for the i
th classifier.
Class 2
Class 1
Class 3
Figure 3.14: The separate Logistic Regression binary classifiers indicated by the dashed
lines are combined using equation 3.6.5 to establish the multi-class classifier decision
boundary as indicated by the solid lines and shaded regions.
3.6.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages
The one-versus-all approach is generic in the sense that it can be applied to any bi-
nary classification algorithm. The drawbacks are that the computational and memory
requirements are more intensive as it requires k binary classifiers. The second distinct
disadvantage is that the individual binary classifiers are biased as they are trained on
unbalanced datasets consisting of more negative class training data points than positive
class training data points.
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3.6.3 One-Versus-One
3.6.3.1 Overview
The One-Versus-One approach establishes 1
2
k(k-1) binary classifiers where each individual
classifier is trained on a different pair of classes from the original training set. These
individual classifiers are combined to form a single classifier. This is an ensemble approach
to multi-class classification where the majority vote is used to classify new data points.
Class 1
Class 2
Class 1
Class 3
Class 2
Class 3
Point A
Point A Point A
Figure 3.15: The One-Versus-One approach to multi-class classification for the example
dataset where k=3 establishes separate SVM binary classifiers using a linear kernel. Point
A is a new data point that will be assigned to Class 3 using a majority vote.
3.6.3.2 Advantages and Disadvantages
The number of binary classifiers required for the One-Versus-One approach increases as a
squared function of the number of classes k. This will make the One-Versus-One approach
computationally intensive. The advantage over the One-Versus-All approach is that the
binary classifiers are trained on an unbiased training set.
3.7 Outlier Detection
Faults are rare occurrences and can be viewed as outliers as they will produce measure-
ments which greatly differ from the majority of the data. A variety of outlier detection
algorithms are investigated in this section that are based on different fundamental as-
sumptions and approaches. Data driven outlier detection algorithms are intended for
oﬄine application on large, static datasets with few outliers. An unlabeled dataset and
the percentage of outliers is given as input and it is the responsibility of the detection al-
gorithm to determine which data points are the most likely outliers. The outlier detection
algorithms are similar to novelty detectors in that they are trained to identify faults based
on their similarity to the majority class (no-fault data). Table 3.5 provides a summary of
the outlier detection approaches that are investigated.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION THEORY 74
Outlier Approach Name Approach Type
Elliptic Envelope Robust distribution estimation
Local Outlier Factor Density-based outlier detection
Isolation Forest Rules-based detection
Table 3.5: Summary of outlier detection methods.
3.7.1 Elliptic Envelope
3.7.1.1 Overview
The Elliptic Envelope assumes that the “inlier” or “no-fault” data points come from a
multivariate Gaussian distribution. Robust estimation techniques such as the minimum
covariance determinant (MCD) are used to estimate the mean and variance of a multi-
variate dataset containing outliers. The elliptic envelope algorithm firstly estimates the
distribution of normal data using the MCD estimator, thereafter an elliptical classifica-
tion boundary is fitted. The Elliptic Envelope is fitted to an example dataset as shown
in figure 3.16.
Figure 3.16: The decision boundary for two-dimensional example dataset classified
using a Elliptic Envelope outlier detector. The navy data points are the outliers, while
the grey data points are inliers.
3.7.1.2 Training
The training of the Elliptic Envelope iteratively searches for the best representative subset
of inlier data points using the MCD algorithm as shown in figure 3.17 and explained in
greater detail below.
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(a) (b) (c)
outlier
inliers
Figure 3.17: Visual demonstration of the Minimum Covariance Determinant algorithm.
Figure (a) shows the original dataset with a single outlier. A subset of h = 5 random
data points are selected as indicated by the dashed circles in figure (b). Their mean
and variance is calculated and the h data points from the larger dataset that minimise
the Mahalanobis distance are selected. This process is repeated until the subset of data
points remains unchanged. An elliptic envelope classification boundary is fitted and used
to correctly identify the outlier as illustrated in figure (c).
The MCD estimator attempts to find h inlier data points from a larger set of N
data points by recursively selecting combinations that minimise the determinant of the
covariance matrix. Analyzing all possible combinations is computationally expensive as
it requires that the covariance determinant of
(
N
h
)
subsets be calculated. The fast MCD
algorithm as developed by Rousseeuw et al. [44] addresses this shortfall. The algorithm
is initiated by selecting a random subset of h data samples, H1 ⊂ {x1, ...xN}. The sample
mean (~µ1) and covariance (Σ1) of subset H1 are calculated under the assumption that
det(Σ1) 6= 0. The Mahalanobis distance, defined as the number of standard deviations
between a data point and a distribution, is calculated for each of the N data points as
follows:
d(i) =
√
(~xi − ~µ1)TΣ−11 (~xi − ~µ1) (3.7.1)
The Mahalanobis distances are arranged in an increasing order of magnitude. The process
is repeated for a new subset, H2, that contains the h data points with the smallest Ma-
halanobis distances. The property det(Σ2) ≤ det(Σ1) will achieve equality when ~µ1=~µ2,
Σ1=Σ2 and the process is terminated. This repetitive process is known as the C or con-
centration step as the algorithm attempts to locate the combination of h samples that
are most densely concentrated.
1. Compute ~µj and Σj for subset Hj
2. Terminate process if Σj = Σj−1
3. Compute Mahalanobis distances d(i) for the entire dataset
4. Rearrange the Mahalanobis distances in increasing order of magnitude
5. Create new subset Hj+1 consisting of h data points with the smallest Mahalanobis
distances
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The initial subset of h training examples may lead to a sub-optimal solution, therefore
an approximate MCD solution is found by taking many initial subsets H1 and applying
C-step to each one. The solution that yields the lowest covariance determinant is regarded
as being correct.
The parameter h is governed by the following restriction:
(N + d+ 1)
2
≤ h ≤ N (3.7.2)
where d is the dimensionality of the dataset.
3.7.1.3 Classification
New data points are classified based on their Mahalanobis distance from the inlier distri-
bution as given by equation 3.7.1. A threshold (∆) is used to classify new data points ~xi
as follows:
y(~xi) =
{
d(i) ≥ ∆ outlier
d(i) < ∆ inlier
(3.7.3)
The threshold ∆ is based on a Chi-Square distribution with the same number of degrees
of freedom as the dimensionality [44].
∆ =
√
χ2d,p (3.7.4)
where p is the percentage of outlier data points.
3.7.1.4 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of the Elliptic Envelope is its simplicity of use and that there is no need
for prior knowledge other than the percentage of outliers in the training dataset. It can
also be used as a novelty detection algorithm, by setting the percentage of outliers to
zero. The disadvantage with the approach is that it is based on the assumption of an
inlier multivariate Gaussian distribution that might not be valid for all datasets.
3.7.1.5 Configurable Parameters
The following are configurable parameters for the Elliptic Envelope outlier detector:
• contamination - percentage outliers in the dataset
• support fraction - percentage data points to be included in MCD calculation
3.7.2 Local Outlier Factor
3.7.2.1 Overview
Local Outlier Factor (LOF) is a density-based algorithm developed by Kriegel at al [45]
that expands on standard outlier detection algorithms by indicating the degree of outlier-
ness. Most outlier detection algorithms regard being an outlier as a binary property. The
distance between a data point and its k nearest neighbors is used to estimate its density.
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The deviation in density between the observed data point and its k nearest neighbors is
reflected in a measure called the LOF score. A unity value indicates that the data point
is comparable with its neighbors and is most likely an inlier, while larger LOF scores
are associated with outliers. The Local Outlier Factor is fitted to an example dataset as
shown in figure 3.18.
Figure 3.18: The decision boundary for two-dimensional example dataset classified
using a LOF outlier detector. The navy data points are the outliers, while the grey data
points are inliers.
3.7.2.2 Training
The training entails determining the Local Outlier Factor for each data point in the
training dataset. This requires that the concepts of k-distance (kdist), reachability distance
(rdist) and the local reachability density (lrd) be defined as they are all necessary to
calculate the LOF score. For explanatory purposes it is assumed that the LOF algorithm
uses three of the nearest neighbors (k = 3) to determine the LOF for each data point.
The kdist is given as the Euclidean distance between the data point under consideration,
~xi, and its k
th nearest neighbor. Breunig et al. [46] proceed to define the concept of
reachability distance, rdist, between data point ~xi and ~xo. ~xo is representative of any one
of the neighbors of data point ~xi. The reachability distance as explained in figure 3.19 is
defined as follows:
rdist(i, o) = max
{
kdist(o), d(~xi, ~xo)}
}
(3.7.5)
The reachability distance acts as a smoothing function, where the choice of k controls
the degree of smoothing. In typical density-based clustering algorithms, there will be a
minimum number of data points that need to fall within a specific volume surrounding
the test point for it to be considered an inlier [46]. The LOF algorithm replaces the
specific volume with a local reachability density that is given by the inverse of the average
reachability distance. The local reachability density (lrd) of data point ~xi is given by:
lrd(i) =
(
1
k
∑
o∈{a,b,c}
rdist(i, o)
)−1
(3.7.6)
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Figure 3.19: Visual demonstration of the concept of reachability distance. The k = 3
nearest neighbors of data point ~xi are shown with dashed circles. The reachability distance
of data point ~xa, ~xb and ~xc are the same. This is given by the distance between data point
xi and the k
th nearest neighbor. The reachability distance to ~xd and ~xe are given by the
Euclidean distance, which is greater than the kdist.
The LOF determines the average ratio of local reachability density of data point ~xi in
comparison with its k nearest neighbors. The LOF of data point ~xi is given by:
LOF (i) =
1
k
∑
o∈{a,b,c}
lrd(o)
lrd(i)
(3.7.7)
When data point ~xi is an outlier, it will have a lower local reachability density and a
larger LOF score.
3.7.2.3 Classification
New data points are classified based on their LOF score. The user sets the percentage of
training data to be regarded as outliers through a predefined input parameter that will
adjust the cut-off LOF threshold accordingly.
3.7.2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of Local Outlier Factor is that it considers both the local and global
properties of datasets and can therefore adapt well to abnormal distributions [46]. The
drawback is that it is a complex method that is computationally intensive.
3.7.2.5 Configurable Parameters
The following are configurable parameters for the Local Outlier Factor:
• contamination - percentage outliers in the dataset
• n neighbors - number of nearest neighbors to be considered
3.7.3 Isolation Forest
3.7.3.1 Overview
An isolation forest combines numerous isolation trees to form a single classier or model [7].
This approach is based on the assumption that outliers are easily distinguishable from
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normal data points and therefore when establishing tree structures all outliers should
terminate at nodes situated close to the root of a tree. Normal data points are harder to
distinguish and therefore are situated much deeper within. The Isolation Forest is fitted
to an example dataset as shown in figure 3.20.
Figure 3.20: The decision boundary for two-dimensional example dataset classified
using a Isolation Forest outlier detector. The navy data points are the outliers, while the
grey data points are inliers.
3.7.3.2 Training
The individual isolation trees are established using a modified Classification and Re-
gression Tree (CART) methodology for unlabled datasets. Given that CART training
methodology was extensively covered in Chapter 3.5.3.2, this section will rather elaborate
on the modifications to the algorithm.
Firstly, the isolation forest is an ensemble approach that establishes and combines numer-
ous partial models of the data. This is achieved by training individual trees on smaller
subsets of data as opposed to establishing a complete binary tree of all data points. It is
this property that makes the Isolation Forest effective at dealing with high-dimensional
and large quantities of data. The second modification is around the manner in which an
isolation tree is trained. Binary trees are recursively partitioned until each data point
terminates on a distinct leaf node. For labeled datasets the information gain is used to
assess and ensure that the best quality split is chosen. Isolation Forests are trained on an
unlabeled dataset and therefore the partitioning methodology must be adapted. A ran-
dom partitioning methodology is applied that randomly selects a feature and split value
until the tree is fully grown or it reaches some predefined height limit [47]. Individual
trees therefore have unique partitions and data on which they are trained.
3.7.3.3 Classification
New data points are classified based on the path length between root and termination
node averaged over a forest of random trees. This is the average number of edges that
must be transversed when following the binary tree of if-else statements. The user sets
the percentage of training data to be regarded as outliers through a predefined input
parameter that will adjust the cut-off threshold for average path length accordingly.
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3.7.3.4 Advantages and Disadvantages
Most conventional outlier detection algorithms are constrained to a low-dimensional fea-
ture space and small datasets due to the computational complexity [48]. This is not the
case for an Isolation Forest that scales to larger datasets and higher dimensions with
relative ease. The drawback of an Isolation Forest is that the results may vary due to the
random partitioning strategy.
3.7.3.5 Configurable Parameters
The following are configurable parameters for the Isolation Forest:
• contamination - percentage outliers in the dataset
• n estimators - number of base estimators that are to be combined
• max samples - number of data points in smaller subsets
3.8 Other Data Driven Approaches
Table 3.6 provides a summary of additional data-driven techniques found in literature that
have relevance to fault detection and isolation. RANdom SAmple Consensus (RANSAC)
is a robust estimator of model parameters from a dataset polluted by outliers. Dynamic
Principal Component Analysis (D-PCA) is used for fault detection by monitoring changes
in statistical measures of a dynamic data stream.
Approach Name Approach Type
RANSAC Robust model estimation
Dynamic PCA Monitoring of statistical measures
Table 3.6: Summary of other data-driven methods found in literature.
These techniques require no prior training, but rather exhibit potential to derive struc-
ture from a window of consecutive measurements. An additional approach in Dynamic
Clustering for evolving environments (DyClee) was also considered and is documented in
Appendix B.2 as additional information for the reader.
3.8.1 RANSAC
RANdom SAmple Consensus (RANSAC) is a widely used outlier removal technique often
applied in the field of visual odometry. It was first introduced by Fischler and Bolles as
a means to estimate model parameters from a dataset contaminated by outliers.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION THEORY 81
(a) (b)
x2 x2
x1 x1
Figure 3.21: The black data points represent inliers whilst the grey are outliers. The
least squares estimation of the 2-D dataset returns the model represented by the dashed
line in (a), whilst the true inlier model is shown by the solid line in (b).
The RANSAC algorithm consists of an iterative hypothesise-and-verify approach with
the aim of determining a representative model for the inlier data points. During the first
stage a model is instantiated from a minimalistic subset of random data points. For the
example of a straight line only two data points are required to hypothesise a possible
model. The second stage evaluates the effective representativeness of the proposed model
by determining the degree of support for the hypothesised model. Some predefined error
threshold such as Euclidean distance is used to evaluate the consistency of the model.
This two stage process is repeated k times and the model with the maximum support is
selected.
∆
(a) (b)
x1
x2
x1
x2
Figure 3.22: Two examples of possible hypotheses generated by the RANSAC algo-
rithm. The dashed circle shows the random data points initially selected. The solid line
shows the model fitted to these points, whilst the dashed line depicts the boundary to
determine the degree of support for the model. Example (a) shows a model that is poorly
supported, whilst (b) shows a model with good support.
The standard RANSAC framework does not guarantee finding the correct or optimal
model due to the nature of random sampling. The probability of finding a representative
model is equivalent to randomly selecting a minimalistic subset of m inlier data points
from the dataset Z [38]. Assuming the data points are sampled independently, the opti-
mal number of iterations required to satisfy η can be determined using the derivation of
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Fischer and Bolles [49]:
k =
log(1− η)
log(1− m) (3.8.1)
where η the probability of success and  is the percentage of inliers.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for RANSAC algorithm.
Input:
Z dataset of measurements
∆ threshold for determining degree of support
η probability of success
 percentage inliers
m minimum number of points to instantiate model
Output:
H(θ) model representing inliers
I inlier dataset
1: function RANSAC(Z,∆,η,,m)
2: k ← Required Iterations(η,,m)
3: for j = 1:k do
4: S ← Random Sample(Z,m)
5: H(θj)←Fit Model(S)
6: Ij ← Model Evaluation(H(θj),∆, Z)
7: if |Ij| > I then
8: H(θ) = H(θj)
9: I = Ij
10: end if
11: end for
12: return(I,H(θ))
There are many variations to the standard RANSAC framework that have been docu-
mented in Appendix B for the interested reader. These variations were investigated, but
were not used.
3.8.2 Dynamic PCA
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is a data analytics technique that is used to extract
the principal components that give structure to a stationary dataset. PCA is a linear
transform of the correlated data space such that the new representation of the features
becomes uncorrelated. The transformed dataset is given by:
Y = V TX or V T (X − ~µ) (3.8.2)
where V is the transformation matrix, X the original dataset and ~µ is the mean vector.
The transformed data space is either centered around the mean of the distribution (cen-
tered rotation) as illustrated in figure 3.23 or around the origin (uncentered rotation).
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Figure 3.23: The correlated input data space is shown in figure (a). PCA is applied
to the dataset to demonstrate how the best representative linear model is chosen to
coincide with the first principal component. The original dataset is projected on to the
first principal component as indicated by the dashed lines. Outliers such as point A can
be identified using statistical measures such as the Square Projection Error (SPE) or
Hotelling’s T 2 statistic.
The PCA algorithm is explained using the projection of the data points onto the first
principal component that is given by ~v1 =
x1′
||x1′|| . The mean vector (~µ) and covariance
matrix (Σ) for the dataset consisting of N data points is given by:
~µ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
~xi (3.8.3)
Σ =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(~xi − ~µ)(~xi − ~µ)T (3.8.4)
For the convenience of the derivation it is assumed that ~v1 is a unit vector. The mean of
the projected data is given by ~v1
T~µ. The variance of the projected data is given by:
1
N
N∑
i=1
(~v1
T ~xi − ~v1T~µ)2 = ~v1TΣ~v1 (3.8.5)
In order to retain the maximum variance of the dataset, the projected variance ~v1
TΣ~v1
is maximised with respect to ~v1. A Lagrange multiplier with constraint ~v1
T ~v1 = 1 is used
to maximise the following equation [36]:
L(~v1) = ~v1TΣ~v1 + α1(1− ~v1T ~v1) (3.8.6)
where L() is the Lagrange function and α1 is the Lagrange multiplier.
The global minimum is determined by taking the partial derivative of equation 3.8.6
and setting it equal to zero:
O( ~v1)L(~v1) = 0 (3.8.7)
⇒ Σ~v1 = α1 ~v1 (3.8.8)
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The variance of the projected data will be a maximum when ~v1 is set to be the eigenvector
that has the largest eigenvalue α1. This eigenvector is known as the first principal com-
ponent [36]. Additional principal components are given by the remaining eigenvectors.
These are orthogonal to the principal component axis and are considered in an incremen-
tal order that maximises the projected variance of the data. The orthogonal transform is
therefore reduced to finding the eigenvectors and eigenvalues for the given dataset. Algo-
rithms such as eigenvalue decomposition that determine the eigenvalues and eigenvectors
will not be discussed here, but are available in Golub and Van Loan [50]. An eigenvalue
decomposition is given by:
Σ = V ΛV T (3.8.9)
where V is a matrix that consists of individual eigenvectors arranged in columns such that
V = [~v1
T , ~v2
T ,..,~vd
T ] and Λ is a diagonal matrix of individual eigenvalues Λ = diag(αi),
where i = 1 to d (dimensionality).
The transformation matrix (V ) is applied to input dataset using equation 3.8.2 to create
a transformed feature space where data points are uncorrelated. The original dataset X
is transformed to an equivalent dataset Y coordinated in the principal axes, using equa-
tion 3.8.2. PCA can also be used to represent the original dataset with fewer dimensions
by projecting the data points into a reduced subspace described by the largest principal
components. The eigenvectors corresponding to the k largest non-zero eigenvalues are
used to form the transformation matrix [51]:
Yk = V
T
k X (3.8.10)
The reconstruction of the transformed data points in the original feature space given by:
X ′ = VkYk (3.8.11)
When applying PCA to a dynamic data stream using a large, sliding window the dynamic
information between the features will be lost [51]. Dynamic PCA is therefore an exten-
sion of this approach that adapts to the series correlation of a dynamic data stream by
incorporating a time history of data points. Let X be a set of n data points from a d
dimensional dynamic data stream:
X = [X1, X2, ...., Xd](n×p) (3.8.12)
Standard PCA assumes that each of the d features are stationary over a window of n
sequential measurements. This assumption does not hold for a dynamic data stream.
Therefore a trajectory matrix is established for the ith feature by applying a time lag shift
of order w as follows:
Xwi =

Xi(1) Xi(2) · · · Xi(w)
Xi(2) Xi(3) · · · Xi(w + 1)
:
. . . :
Xi(n− w + 1) . . . . . . Xi(n)
 (3.8.13)
The trajectory matrix is formed by combining the trajectory matrices for individual fea-
tures:
Xw =
[
Xw1 X
w
2 · · · Xwd
]
(3.8.14)
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Equation 3.8.10 is used to establish the transformed feature space using an appropriate
selection of eigenvectors derived from the correlation of the trajectory matrix. This appli-
cation of PCA on the trajectory matrix constitutes the key difference between standard
and Dynamic PCA.
Fault detection and isolation is performed through the monitoring of statistical mea-
sures associated with individual time lag shift vectors. When a significant fault occurs,
the time lag shift vector that incorporates that measurement will drastically differ. Sta-
tistical measures are used to perform fault detection as illustrated in figure 3.23. Two
common measures are Hotelling’s T 2 statistic and square projection error (SPE), where
T 2 measures the major variation of the data and SPE is a measure of goodness of fit. The
T 2 statistic is the square of the Mahalanobis distance defined as a measure of the number
of standard deviations between a data point and the mean of the distribution. The T 2 is
calculated for individual data points and is given by:
T 2 = ~yTΣ−1~y (3.8.15)
where ~y is a transformed data point.
The SPE is a scalar value that establishes the representativeness of a data point to the
model defined by the lower dimensional eigenvectors. The SPE is the square of the resid-
ual error between a data point and its projection into the lower dimensional subspace.
Figure 3.23 depicts the lower dimensional projection of Point A using a red circle. The
square projection error is given by:
SPE = (~x− ~x ′)T (~x− ~x ′) (3.8.16)
where ~x is the original data point and ~x ′ is the reconstructed data point.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the necessary background theory for a variety of fault detection
and isolation techniques. Analytical redundancy approaches to FDI are investigated as an
alternative to the currently used hardware redundancy in relative altimetry systems as this
method is not robust to the failure of an entire technology. The model-based techniques
establish explicit mathematical models of the system and detect faults using residual
analysis. The model-based techniques investigated are variants of the Kalman filter. The
data-driven techniques do not require any prior knowledge of system dynamics, but rather
rely on historic data to derive structure or “learn” ways of identifying faults. The data-
driven techniques that were presented include outlier and binary classification algorithms
for fault detection and multi-class classifiers for fault identification. Other novel data-
driven approaches that have potential for performing fault detection and isolation are
also investigated. Now that a variety of fault detection and isolation techniques have
been investigated, the next chapter will apply these techniques to the problem of aircraft
height verification.
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Chapter 4
Fault Diagnostic System
This chapter presents and discusses all the necessary information required to design and
evaluate the fault detection and isolation (FDI) approaches. An accurate and reliable
FDI system will ensure that the aircraft height estimate is robust to sensor failure.
This chapter initially gives an overview of the fault detection and isolation system. The
discrete operating modes are presented and the important design decisions are explained.
The strategy to generate representative sensor measurement data for the training of data-
driven approaches and establishment of test datasets is described. Thereafter a variety
of FDI evaluation tools that will be necessary to evaluate the performance of all FDI ap-
proaches is discussed. The machine learning library selection and classifier training tools
are also presented. Lastly the chapter ends with a discussion on how the FDI system will
be demonstrated using aircraft landings where a sensor failure is experienced.
4.1 System Overview
The fault detection and isolation system ensures that the aircraft height estimate is robust
to sensor failure by correctly identifying a faulty sensor so that it can be excluded. An
overview of the available input sensor measurements and database values is illustrated in
figure 4.1. The fault detection and isolation (FDI) system gives a discrete output called
the sensor status which corresponds to the operating mode for the group of height and
altitude sensors.
Fault Detection
Terrain Database: ZT1(XGPS)/ZT1(XIRS)
GPS sensor: ZGPS[k]
Inertial sensor: ZIRS[k], Z˙IRS[k]
Instrument Landing System sensor: ZILS[k]
Radio Altimeter sensor: HRA[k]
sensor status
and Isolation
Figure 4.1: An overview of the available inputs and outputs for fault detection and
isolation.
The fault detection and isolation approaches will each have their own unique archi-
tectures that can make use of any of the listed inputs and are required to give a single
discrete output. There are five different sensor statuses as illustrated in table 4.1 that
86
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account for all possible outputs based on the assumption that only one sensor technology
failure can occur at a time. For the sake of notation in this work a sensor status can be
referred to as a hypothesis and is reflected using the notation θi.
Discrete Status Hypothesis Explanation
1 θno fault All sensors normal
2 θGPS fault Global Positioning System fault
3 θIRS fault Inertial Reference System fault
4 θILS fault Instrument Landing System fault
5 θRA fault Radio Altimeter fault
Table 4.1: Summary of sensor statuses.
4.2 Design Decisions
Two design decisions were made with regards to the approach towards fault detection
and isolation. The first design decision was to convert all sensor measurements to relative
altitude and to perform fault detection and isolation in the relative altitude domain,
instead of in the height domain. The second design decision was to consider two general
approaches: fault diagnosis using sensor measurements from a single time instant, and
fault diagnosis using sensor measurements from a window of consecutive time instants.
The motivation for these respective decisions is discussed below.
4.2.1 Height versus Relative Altitude
This section motivates the design decision to convert all sensor measurements to relative
altitude, and to perform fault detection and isolation in the relative altitude domain,
instead of in the height domain. When converting all sensor measurements to the relative
altitude domain, only the radio altimeter measurement will be affected by the errors in
the onboard terrain database. Likewise when converting all sensor measurements to the
height domain, all the other sensors (GPS, IRS, and ILS) will be affected by the errors
in the onboard terrain database. To convert from relative altitude to height, the relative
altitude of the terrain must be subtracted from a relative altitude measurement.
HGPS[k] = ZGPS[k]− ZT1(XGPS[k]) (4.2.1)
HIRS[k] = ZIRS[k]− ZT1(XGPS[k]) (4.2.2)
HILS[k] = ZILS[k]− ZT1(XGPS[k]) (4.2.3)
When converting from height to relative altitude, the height measurement must be added
to the relative altitude of the terrain.
ZRA[k] = HRA[k] + ZT1(XGPS[k]) (4.2.4)
When working in the relative altitude domain, only the radio altimeter height measure-
ment must be converted to a relative altitude measurement, while all the other sensors
(GPS, IRS, and ILS) already provide measurements in the relative altitude domain. When
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working in the height domain, only the radio altimeter already provides height measure-
ments, and all the other sensor measurements must be converted from relative altitude
measurements to height measurements. Furthermore, when model-based approaches such
as the Kalman filter are used, the aircraft state is more naturally propagated in relative
altitude than in height. The relative altitude domain is aligned with inertial space and
therefore obeys the equations of motion, and changes “smoothly”, while the height is a
function of the terrain and may therefore change abruptly.
4.2.2 Single versus Consecutive Time Instants
The distinction was made between using measurements from a single time instant or a
window of consecutive measurements to perform fault diagnosis. This distinction was not
intentional, but rather naturally occurred as the project progressed. An initial thought
was to define a region in hyperspace where no-fault data points lie and identify faulty sen-
sor measurements based on their location relative to this no-fault region using machine
learning algorithms. A data point is the term used to describe measurements from a single
time instant, where each dimension represents a different sensor measurement. Both out-
lier and binary classification techniques were investigated for fault detection. The outlier
techniques require no prior knowledge in the form of labels, but rather derive their own
structure from the data. The binary classifiers exploit the prior knowledge provided by
labels to determine the “optimal” decision boundary. Naturally the knowledge of a fault
being active is not beneficial without knowing exactly which sensor is faulty and therefore
the use of multi-class classifiers is necessary.
The next focus of this project was to investigate a variety of classical and novel fault
detection and isolation methods found in literature. These approaches seem more nat-
ural as they look at a window of consecutive measurements when attempting to detect
and isolate a faulty sensor. Deviations are much easier to identify when incorporating a
time history of measurement and trajectory data. The use of a window or consecutive
time instants also allows for the incorporation of detection and isolation memory that can
be used to improve performance. The best performing single time instant method was
also considered under the consecutive time instant approach by giving it the ability to
remember previous detections and isolations. This allows for an objective comparison in
performance as there are distinct properties to both the single and consecutive time in-
stant approaches. Considering the measurements from each time instant as unique allows
for flexibility and ensures that there is no bias towards a previous prediction, while using a
window of consecutive measurements aims to improve performance by incorporating prior
knowledge in the form of previous predictions, trajectory data, or measurement history.
4.3 Data Generation
The sensor measurement dataset as supplied by Airbus was recorded during a limited num-
ber of aircraft landings for a specific runway at Toulouse-Blagnac airport. This dataset
only contains no-fault aircraft landings. The real dataset was not deemed rich enough to
serve as training data for the data-driven approaches or diverse enough to serve as com-
prehensive test data for all approaches. The simulation set-up as discussed in Chapter
2.2 was therefore required to generate more landing runs that also contained examples of
all the different types of sensor faults. The synthetic dataset was split into a training set
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and a test set. The performance of the fault detection and isolation system was verified
on the simulated dataset and validated on the real sensor measurement dataset supplied
by Airbus. Similar to the simulated approach, synthetic faults were injected on top of the
real dataset to create a variety of sensor failures. The behaviour of the system is therefore
validated on a combination of real landings where no faults are present and real landings
where faults are introduced by synthetically injecting faults.
4.3.1 Simulated Data
The data generation process for sensor data can be summarised as follows:
1. The simulation model is initialised with a random initial relative altitude along
the glide slope, a random set of sensor configuration parameters and random at-
mospheric conditions. Additionally when simulating a sensor fault the altitude at
which a fault occurs is randomly selected along with the fault parameters, while the
fault profile is predetermined before simulation. When the simulation is run, the
fault is injected onto the simulated measurement once the aircraft descends below
the fault occurrence altitude.
2. Individual instants of measurement data from a landing simulation run are assigned
both a binary and multi-class label. The binary label indicates whether that data
point is “fault” or “no-fault”, while the multi-class label indicates the actual sensor
status.
3. The sensor data from the simulation model is manipulated with knowledge from the
terrain database and stored in both the relative altitude and height domain.
The simulation start and failure location are considered to be random variables. The
assumption is made that simulation starts when the aircraft meets the 3◦ glide slope.
The initial relative altitude of the aircraft is drawn from a uniform distribution between
the minimum and maximum relative altitude at which an aircraft can intercept the glide
slope. The maximum simulation altitude is limited by the length of the terrain database
and the 3◦ glide slope angle. The minimum initial simulation altitude is a value that is
taken from the analysis of actual flight data. The magnitude of the wind gusts is also
treated as a random variable to ensure that the model accounts for realistic sensor mea-
surements in adverse weather conditions.
A systematic approach was taken to the simulation of faults. The assumption is made
that a fault can occur at any given time along the glide path to ensure that the test
data is representative of a range of possibilities. The location of the fault is drawn from
a uniform distribution ranging between zero and the maximum relative altitude. The
random variables for respective fault profiles are initialised prior to each simulation. The
magnitude of the bias, noise and oscillating fault profiles are designed such that they will
always meet the minimum threshold required to be a fault. This minimum threshold must
be beyond a sensor’s range of accuracy.
4.3.2 Training data
Training data was needed to train the single time instant fault detection and isolation
approaches. The initial approach to establishing a training dataset was to randomly ex-
tract individual fault and no-fault data points from the simulated landing runs. This
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proved problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the manner in which a fault was labeled led
to the development of training datasets that had a large number of faulty data points that
were situated deep within the no-fault region. All data points from the simulated landing
runs that occur after the time of fault occurrence are labeled as such whether they meet
the theoretical definition of being a fault or not. Some fault profiles such as a jamming
fault or increased noise fault produce measurements that are actually within the no-fault
region when considering individual data points. This resulted in an unacceptably high
number of false alarms. Secondly, the random sampling strategy did not adequately cover
the entire data space. Most fault profiles occupy the data space surrounding the fault
boundary, while the regions further away have less data. Generating training data that
is deemed diverse enough to adequately cover the data space would be computationally
intensive and might still not cover unseen fault profiles.
Instead, the training dataset was constructed from randomly generated sensor measure-
ments. This is a valid approach when classifying data points constructed using measure-
ments from the same sampling instant, because whether or not a sensor is faulty is only
dependent on the current measurements and not a time history. Malan [7] proposed the
use of a method whereby random data points are generated from the union of a wide
uniform distribution over the entire data space, and a narrow normal distribution around
the fault boundary. The data points from the wide uniform distribution will ensure the
correct identification of faults situated far away from the decision boundary, while the
narrow distribution ensures that the classifier can correctly differentiate between data
points situated in a close proximity to the theoretical decision boundary.
Separate sets of training data was established for both the outlier, binary and multi-class
classifiers. The data-driven outlier detection algorithms were used as novelty detectors
by training them on a single class. The training dataset consisted of no-fault data points
and faults are identified according to their similarity to the known class. The training
dataset for the binary classifier consisted of an equal percentage of fault and no-fault
data to ensure an unbiased training dataset. This ensures that classifiers trained on this
data would not be biased towards a specific class. A similar approach was used for the
establishment of a training dataset for the multi-class classifier. The multi-class classifier
is used to differentiate between active fault profiles and therefore its training data only
consisted of fault data with equal splits from each sensor technology type. The label
assigned to a data point corresponded to the sensor status associated with that failure.
4.3.3 Test data
Five separate test sets were established to ensure that the results obtained are consistent
regardless of the initialization values for the simulation model or magnitude of the fault
profiles. Each test set contained 30 simulated landing runs with an equal percentage of
each sensor status and fault profile. Therefore there were 6 different landing runs for
each of five possible sensor statuses. The no-fault sensor status comprised of six different
simulation landing runs without any injected faults. The remaining sensor statuses each
deal with a separate technology failure. The make up of the simulation runs for each sensor
status representing a technology failure was chosen such that all of the six fault profiles
were represented. In total the test data contains 150 unique landing runs distributed
evenly across 5 smaller test sets. This will ensure fairness in testing and that results are
not biased towards fault profiles that are easier to detect than others.
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4.3.4 Validation data
The dataset supplied by Airbus contained actual sensor measurement data for a limited
number of aircraft landings at a specified runway at Toulouse-Blagnac Airport. This
data was reserved for the validation of the fault detection and isolation results obtained
using the test data above. The supplied dataset consisted of 26 aircraft landing runs of
no-fault sensor data. Synthetic errors from each of the fault profiles were injected onto
the measurement data for individual landings. The validation dataset consisted of an 24
faulty runs with each of the four sensors having six separate fault profiles. The remaining
two landings runs were used for no-fault testing. It is unfortunately not possible to assign
an equal number of landing runs to each sensor status. Each landing run is actually a
no-fault landing run until the time of fault occurrence. Therefore the majority of the
individual measurement instances will be no-fault data points.
4.4 FDI Evaluation Tools
The sections discusses procedures used to quantify the performance and reliability of the
fault detection and isolation architectures.
4.4.1 Detection and Isolation Accuracy
The primary evaluation criteria for a FDI architecture is fault detection and isolation ac-
curacy. There are separate metrics, where detection accuracy is defined as the percentage
of data points that the architecture correctly labels as fault or no-fault. There are four
possible outcomes when assessing fault detection as illustrated in the table 4.2.
Actual fault Actual no-fault
Predicted fault True positive False positive
Predicted no-fault False negative True negative
Table 4.2: Possible outcomes summarised in a contingency table.
where,
• True positive - FDI architecture predicts fault and it actually was a fault
• False positive - FDI architecture predicts fault and actually was a no-fault
• False negative - FDI architecture predicts no-fault and actually was a fault
• True negative - FDI architecture predicts no-fault and actually was a no-fault
Similarly, the fault isolation accuracy is defined as the percentage data points that the
FDI architecture assigns the correct sensor status too. These two metrics are evaluated
separately as some FDI approaches are designed for fault detection, while others are better
suited for isolation.
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4.4.2 Statistical Significance Test
Statistical significance tests will be performed on architectures A and B when there is
a marginal difference in accuracy results. McNemar’s test ensures that the size of the
test set is large enough to ensure the difference in classification results are statistically
significant.
Architecture A correct Architecture A incorrect
Architecture B correct a b
Architecture B incorrect c d
Table 4.3: McNemar’s statistical significance test contingency table.
Where McNemar’s test statistic is given by:
χ2 =
(b− c)2
b+ c
(4.4.1)
The χ2 test statistic is a Chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom with results
considered to be statistically significant for probability threshold of 95 %. Essentially for
χ2 > 3.841 it can be confidently stated that the test set is large enough to prove that
the difference in results between the two architectures is statistically significant and not
attributed to random chance [52].
4.4.3 Evaluation of Incorrect Classifications
There are three possible outcomes when analysing the incorrect classifications associated
with a FDI architecture with numerous possible sensor statuses. A false alarm, also known
as false positive, is the first possible outcome that occurs when the FDI architecture
predicts a sensor is faulty, while there actually was not a fault. The location of false
alarms is an important measure of FDI architecture reliability and it is essential that
false alarms are avoided. A missed opportunity or false negative is the second possible
outcome and occurs when the system predicts that there is not a fault, while there actually
is a fault present. The last possible outcome is incorrect isolation and occurs when the FDI
architecture detects an actual fault, but then isolates the incorrect sensor. An analysis
is done on the location of the false alarms, missed opportunities and incorrect isolations
to ensure that they are located in close proximity to the fault boundary. Minimisation of
false alarms, missed opportunities, and incorrect isolations are of utmost importance for
a safety critical function such as aircraft height estimation. Normal sensor data points
that are well within the domain of normal operation should never generate a false alarm
and likewise faulty sensors that exceed the definition of an extreme outlier should not go
undetected.
4.5 Machine Learning Tools
A machine learning library was used to train and evaluate numerous of the data-driven
approaches. The motivation behind which library was chosen and the procedures used to
ensure algorithms are effectively trained is discussed in this section.
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4.5.1 Machine Learning Library Selection
An open source machine learning library will be used to evaluate the performance of
different classifiers. The following criteria were considered when evaluating a choice of
machine learning library:
1. Variety of classifiers
2. Quality of supporting documentation and API for classifiers
3. Classifiers must be configurable
4. Programming language
5. Must be an open source library
Research was done on available machine learning libraries and is summarised in table 4.4.
It was decided that scikit learn best met the criteria stated above and would be used
to implement the classification algorithms. MATLAB was used to implement all other
algorithms that did not require prior training with a machine learning library.
Library Programming lan-
guage
Comments
scikit learn Python well documented
TensorFlow Python mostly deep learning
PyLearn2 Python limited documentation
Apache Spark MLIB Java, Python, Scala, R scalable framework
Weka Java backed by Waikato Uni-
versity
Shogun C++ few binary classifiers
mlpack C++ extensive documentation
although not easy to nav-
igate
Statistics and Machine
Learning Toolbox
MATLAB not open source
Table 4.4: Machine Learning Libraries
4.5.2 Classifier Training Tools
Learning Curve
A learning curve is used to ensure that a classifier is trained properly. Classifier accuracy
is plotted as a function of training dataset size. A classifier is properly trained when its
accuracy does not improve with an increase in the number of data points used for training.
Smaller training datasets may result in a classifier that is poorly trained and will yield
lower classification accuracies, while larger datasets are more computationally intensive
to train on.
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K-Fold Cross Validation
K-fold cross validation is used to evaluate the representativeness of a training dataset. It
is a systematic approach that divides a dataset into K equal partitions. K-1 partitions
are used as the training dataset, while the remaining partition forms the cross-validation
dataset used to evaluate classifier accuracy. This is repeated K times with a different
partition being used as the cross-validation dataset for each repetition. K-fold cross-
validation ensures that classifier results are consistent regardless of the validation set
chosen. Ideally a representative dataset will yield similar accuracies regardless of which
fold is used as the cross validation set.
Receiver Operating Curve
A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is used to choose an optimal deci-
sion threshold and evaluate the sensitivity of the classifier’s performance to the decision
threshold. The optimal unbiased decision boundary is one that produces an equal number
of false positives (false alarm) and false negatives (missed opportunities). A ROC curve
is established by plotting the True Positive Rate (TPR) versus the False Positive Rate
(FPR) for different decision boundaries associated with a classifier. The TPR and FPR
are given by:
TPR =
∑
True positive∑
Actual fault
FPR =
∑
False positive∑
Actual no-fault
The shape of a ROC curve is determined by the overlap between the fault and no-fault
class distributions. For explanation purposes a Gaussian distribution is considered.
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Figure 4.2: Receiver operating characteristic curve showing as the decision boundary
is moved to the right, the ROC curve will approach the optimal position along the equal
error rate line.
The further the distributions illustrated in figure 4.2 are apart, the better the classifiers
performance will be. The vertical line shown between the fault and no-fault distributions
indicates the decision boundary for classification. Adjusting this threshold will result in
a change in the operating point on the ROC curve. The optimal operating point is a
threshold that is unbiased, producing an equal percentage of false alarms (FPR) and
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missed detections (100 %-TPR). The intersection between the Equal Error Rate (ERR)
and ROC curve coincides with the optimal operating point for a classifier.
4.6 FDI Demonstration
The fault detection and isolation performance of the various architectures will be demon-
strated on the same landing run with four different injected fault profiles as illustrated in
figure 4.3-4.6. A visual demonstration of how the actual versus predicted sensor status
changes with time allows for a better understanding of the architecture’s performance and
highlights any shortfalls that were raised during training or evaluation. Four of the six
fault profiles were chosen that are the hardest to detect and best represent a variety of
possible failures. These are a bias fault, a jamming fault, an increased noise fault and an
oscillation fault.
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Figure 4.3: The upper plot depicts a landing run with a GPS bias fault. The lower plot
shows the actual sensor status.
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Figure 4.4: The upper plot depicts a landing run with a IRS jamming fault. The lower
plot shows the actual sensor status.
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Figure 4.5: The upper plot depicts a landing run with an ILS increased noise fault.
The lower plot shows the actual sensor status.
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Figure 4.6: The upper plot depicts a landing run with a radio altimeter oscillation fault.
The lower plot shows the actual sensor status.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced and discussed the necessary information and background
knowledge to design and evaluate fault detection and isolation architectures. Fault detec-
tion and isolation was performed in the relative altitude domain to mitigate the effect of
the non-linearities associated with the terrain database. The simulation model was used
to establish the test datasets, while the results are validated on actual sensor measurement
data. A novel method for establishing a training dataset from randomly generated data
points was explained. The procedures used to quantify the performance and reliability
of the fault detection and isolation architectures were discussed. This section ends by
discussing the simulated landing runs (with injected faults) that were used to demon-
strate the fault detection and isolation performance by plotting the sensor status as a
function of time. Now that the necessary background information and assessment tools
have been established, the design and evaluation of the respective single and consecutive
time instant fault detection and isolation techniques will be presented.
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Chapter 5
Single Time Instant Fault Diagnosis
This chapter presents the design and evaluation of a fault diagnostics system for a com-
mercial aircraft using sensor measurements from a single time instant. The system inves-
tigates the use of outlier, binary and multi-class classifiers for fault detection and isolation.
The chapter starts off by presenting the conceptual design and architecture. A com-
putational complexity study of the various approaches is then performed. Thereafter,
the classifier training tools are used to ensure that the outlier detection methods, binary
classifiers and multi-class classifiers are properly trained. An evaluation of the fault de-
tection and isolation performance is then presented. The results are also validated on
actual aircraft data. Lastly the top performing fault detection and isolation architectures
are demonstrated on simulated landing runs with faults injected on certain sensor mea-
surements to show how the actual and predicted sensor status changes as a function of
time.
5.1 Conceptual Design and Architecture
A single time instant fault diagnostic system comprises of two separate stages. The sam-
pled measurements (X) are preprocessed before performing fault detection and isolation.
The preprocessing of the sensor data (X) aids the classifier performance by improving the
class separability. In the second stage the preprocessed data (X′) is analysed using clas-
sification algorithms to detect when a fault occurs. This will activate the fault isolation
classifier that determines which sensor measurement is problematic.
Data Preprocessing1
(Binary/ Outlier)
Fault Detection
(Multi-class Classifier)
Fault Isolation
Logic
Sensor StatusX X
′ no-fault
enable
fault class
sensor status
fault/
1: ZGPS, ZIRS, ZILS, ZRA
Figure 5.1: The architecture for a single time instant fault detection and isolation.
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5.1.1 Data Preprocessing
A variety of preprocessing techniques were investigated with the aim of improving classifier
performance as the fault diagnostics requires the learning of complex and often non-linear
decision boundaries. Through the manipulation of the training dataset the separability
of the respective classes can be improved. The techniques chosen make use of different
methods and approaches. Table 5.1 below provides a summary of chosen techniques.
Preprocessing was applied to all the test datasets and their performance was compared
against a baseline of an unprocessed dataset. Based on the results, the best performing
preprocessing technique can be applied online to data stream X.
Technique Name Description
Unprocessed Original Dataset
Orthogonal Transform Subspace rotation
Kernel Transform Projection into higher-dimensional
space
Residual Transform Proposed method that establishes new
dataset using measurement residual
Table 5.1: Summary of preprocessing techniques.
Orthogonal Transform
An orthogonal transform is the rigid rotation of the coordinate axis system. This fixed
rotation is applied to the data space such that the new representation of the data points
becomes uncorrelated. An orthogonal transform is illustrated in figure 5.2 where it is
not apparent that Data Point A is an outlier when considering its projection onto the
original coordinate axis system. However rotating the coordinate axis system such that
the new representation of the features becomes uncorrelated improves class separability
when projecting the data points onto the rotated axes. For example in figure 5.2 the
projection of Data Point A on axis x′2 will distinguish it from the other data points whose
projections are closer to the origin.
The transformed dataset is calculated using an uncentred rotation about the origin:
Y = V TX (5.1.1)
where Y is the transformed dataset, V is the transformation matrix, and X is the original
dataset.
An orthogonal transform projects the original data points onto the principal axes that
describe the underlying structure of the data. These principal axes coincide with the
directions of maximum variance [36]. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as discussed
in Chapter 3.8.2 is performed oﬄine on a static dataset of no-fault data points to iden-
tify the transformation matrix (V ) that consists of individual eigenvectors arranged in
columns such that V = [~v1
T , ~v2
T ,..,~vd
T ]. The vector (~v1) that maximises the projection
of the data is called the first principle component. For example, the principal component
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′
Figure 5.2: The projection of a Data Point A with original coordinates (a1, a2) to the
rotated axes system with coordinates (a1
′, a2′). Data Point A is an outlier. The first
principal axis x1
′ is in the direction that maximises the variance of the projected data
points.
in figure 5.2 coincides with axis x′1. Subsequent principal components are chosen such
that they maximise the projected variance along all possible orthogonal vectors to those
already considered. The orthogonal transform is applied online to new data points such
that there rotated coordinates are given by:
~Yk = V
T ~Xk (5.1.2)
where k is the sampling instant.
Kernel Transform
Kernel functions project a d dimensional input space into a different subspace where re-
spective classes become linearly separable as illustrated in figure 5.3. The central concept
known as the kernel trick is that the inner product <xi, xj> can be substituted with a
kernel function K(xi, xj). This is best explained using the derivation of Support Vector
Machine as proposed by Boser et al [53] and discussed in Chapter 3.5.5.2.
x2
x1
x1 x2
x3
(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: The input dataset (a) is linearly inseparable. The kernel function projects
the example two dimensional dataset into a different subspace where the different classes
become linearly separable as illustrated in (b).
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The kernel functions that were considered include linear, polynomial, Radial Basis Func-
tion (RBF), and sigmoid. The choice of kernel function used is largely dependent on the
specific application and data structure. For the intended application of improving class
separability amongst the group of aircraft height and altitude sensors the Radial Basis
Function (RBF) kernel is used. New features are introduced that are a measure of simi-
larity between the individual sensor measurements. This is well-suited to the problem of
fault detection and isolation where faults can be viewed as outliers that will differ from the
majority of the data. This degree of outlierness will be reflected in the measure K(xi, xj)
and improve class separability.
K(xi, xj) = e
γ||xi−xj ||2 (5.1.3)
where γ is the kernel coefficient.
The measure of similarity used by the kernel is based on Euclidean distance. As the
Euclidean distance between sensor measurements tends to zero, so K(xi, xj) → 1. Pre-
processing therefore involves the incorporation of additional features to the dataset, where
xk = K(xi, xj) and i 6= j for all combination of features in the input dataset.
Residual Transform
The residual transform is not a standard preprocessing technique, but rather a model-
based preprocessing technique that is specifically proposed for the robust height veri-
fication problem. The premise is that a single data point consists of several different
measurements of the same true variable. The differences between the measurements that
constitute this data point therefore reflect a measure of consensus that can be exploited.
The residual transform first calculates an estimate of the true variable (aircraft relative
altitude), before calculating the differences (residuals) between the instantaneous mea-
surements and the estimated relative altitude. The residuals represent the instantaneous
measurement error for each instantaneous measurement. The estimate of the true vari-
able may be obtained in various ways, for example by taking the weighted average of the
measurements, or by taking the median of all the measurements. The residual transform
therefore provides preprocessing that allows the classification algorithm to perform its
classification based on the estimated relative altitude of the aircraft and the instanta-
neous sensor errors instead of on instantaneous sensor measurements.
For example, in the robust height estimation problem a single data point consists of
the relative altitude measurements obtained from the GPS sensor, the inertial sensor,
the instrument landing system (ILS), and the radio altimeter (combined with the terrain
database). All four sensors provide an estimated measure of the true relative altitude, and
each sensor has a different measurement accuracy. The residual transform first calculates
an estimate of the aircraft relative altitude (using the weighted average or median of the
sensor measurements), and then calculates the difference (residual) between each sensor
measurement and the “true” relative altitude as illustrated in figure 5.4. The residuals
then represent the instantaneous relative altitude measurement errors for each of the four
sensors.
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Figure 5.4: The residual transform manipulates the original dataset to output a new
feature space consisting of a fused relative altitude estimate for the aircraft and residual
features. The different sensor measurements are represented by the solid and dashed black
circles and the estimate by the blue circle.
The estimate of the true relative altitude may be calculated using the weighted average
of the relative altitude measurements, as follows:
zˆ =
∑d
i=1
zi
σi2∑d
i=1
1
σi2
(5.1.4)
where zˆ is the estimated relative altitude, d is the number of sensors, zi is the instanta-
neous sensor measurement of the ith sensor, and σi is the known standard deviation of
the sensor measurements for the ith sensor
However, the disadvantage of this approach is that the weighted average may be sig-
nificantly skewed by a sensor measurement from a faulty sensor, especially if the sensor
is deemed more accurate or usually has a small measurement noise variance. A more
robust approach would be to calculate the estimate of the aircraft relative altitude using
the median of all the sensor measurements, as follows:
zˆ = median{z1, z2, z3, z4} (5.1.5)
The advantage of using the median is that the estimate of the aircraft relative altitude
will not be skewed by an extreme outlier measurement provided by a faulty sensor, and
that there is no need for prior knowledge in the form of theoretical sensor accuracies or
measurement noise variances.
Once an estimate of the aircraft relative altitude has been obtained, the residuals are
calculated as follows:
ri = ||zˆ − zi|| (5.1.6)
A transformed data point is therefore constructed by concatenating the estimated relative
altitude with the calculated measurement residual for each sensor, as follows:
Xi = [zˆ, r1, r2, r3, r4]
T (5.1.7)
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The residual transform therefore transforms the original dataset that consists of the in-
stantaneous relative altitude measurements into a new dataset that consists of the esti-
mated relative altitude and the instantaneous sensor measurement residuals. The residual
transform increases the dimensionality of the dataset from d to d+1.
5.1.2 Fault Detection and Isolation
The design decision was made to use an architecture that comprised separate fault detec-
tion and isolation stages. This allowed for a wider variety of algorithms to be investigated
and proved to be more accurate than an architecture that only used a multi-class classifier.
The problem of identifying the specific sensor that failed is inherently multi-class and an
additional architecture described in Appendix C.1 was considered and evaluated alongside
the architecture presented in figure 5.1. The respective architectures were compared on
the same sets of testing data as shown by the results in Appendix C.2, but it was found
that using a separate binary classifier for fault detection, and a multi-class classifier for
fault isolation, yielded better results.
The data-driven outlier detection algorithms that were investigated include the Elliptic
Envelope, Local Outlier Factor and Isolation Forest. The binary and multi-class classifiers
include Logistic Regression, Na¨ıve Bayes, Decision Tree, k-Nearest Neighbors and Support
Vector Machine. A binary classifier or outlier detection technique analyses X′ and reflects
a binary classification outcome as fault or no-fault. The multi-class classifier is enabled
when a fault occurs and then isolates the respective faulty sensor. This is reflected in the
fault class: GPS fault, IRS fault, ILS fault or RA fault. The design decision was made
that the multi-class classifier would not be activated until a fault occurs to mitigate the
need for unnecessary computational resources. The sensor status logic uses the outcomes
of the binary classifier to determine when a fault occurs, whilst the fault class reflects
which sensor is faulty. The possible sensor statuses for the combination of altitude and
height sensors are: no-fault, GPS fault, IRS fault, ILS fault or RA fault.
The sensor status logic is an intuitive logic check based on the outcomes of the fault
detection and isolation classifiers that determines the sensor status.
Algorithm 2 Pseudocode to determine the Sensor Status.
Input:
fault/no-fault output of binary classifier
fault class output of multi-class classifier
Output:
sensor status operational status of height/altitude sensors
1: function SENSOR STATUS LOGIC(fault/no-fault,fault class)
2: if no-fault then
3: sensor status = no-fault
4: else
5: sensor status = fault class
6: end if
7: return(sensor status)
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5.2 Computational Complexity Study
The computational complexity of classifying a new data point is examined for each data-
driven technique that will be used in the single time instant fault detection and isolation
architecture. The computational complexity is summarised in the table 5.2 below. N is
number of training data points, d is the dimensionality of the dataset and k is the number
of different classes.
Approach Name Detection Com-
plexity
Isolation Complex-
ity
Logistic Regression O(d) k·O(d)
Na¨ıve Bayes O(d) O(kd)
Decision Tree O(log(2)Tree depth) O(log(2)Tree depth)
Nearest Neighbors O(dN log(N)) O(dN log(N))
Support Vector Machine O(d2) 1
2
k(k − 1) · O(d2)
Elliptic Envelope O(d) -
Local Outlier Factor O(dN log(N)) -
Isolation Forest O(log(2)Tree depth) -
Table 5.2: Summary of the computational complexity for numerous classifiers.
The computational complexity to evaluate a new data point for the binary Logistic Re-
gression architecture is O(d) [7]. The multi-class Logistic Regression uses a one-versus-all
approach and establishes k binary classifiers and hence has a computational complexity
of k · O(d). The computational complexity of the Na¨ıve Bayes increases linearly with
the dimensionality as the class conditional probabilities need to be determined for each
dimension, resulting in a computational complexity O(d). Its isolation (multi-class) com-
putational complexity is therefore also proportional to the number of classes. The brute
force method for the k-Nearest Neighbors requires N Euclidean distance computations
that have a time complexity of O(dN2). However, when using a K-D Tree structure,
the computational complexity is reduced to of O(dN log(N)) [34]. Its isolation compu-
tational complexity is identical to the detection complexity as the same mechanism is
used to classify new data points. The computational complexity of the Support Vector
Machine depends on the type of kernel used. Linear kernels have a computational com-
plexity of O(d), while other kernel types have a computational complexity of O(dNSV ),
where NSV is the number of support vectors used. This can usually be approximated by
O(d2) [54]. The scikit-learn multi-class Support Vector Machine uses a one-versus-one
architecture that establishes 1
2
k(k − 1) binary classifiers. The computational complexity
to classify a new data point using an Elliptic Envelope involves a Mahalanobis distance
calculation between the data point and the centre of the distribution. The computational
complexity is therefore proportional to the dimensionality and is given by O(d). The
Local Outlier Factor’s computational complexity is identical to k-Nearest Neighbors as
they both use similar mechanisms [45]. Similarly, an Isolation Forest constructs a binary
tree, and therefore has a similar computational complexity to that of the Decision Tree.
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The Logistic Regression, Na¨ıve Bayes, Decision Tree, Elliptic Envelope and Isolation
Forest have favourable detection computational complexities. The k-Nearest Neighbors
and Local Outlier Factor are dependent on the number of training data points, N , and will
therefore be computationally expensive when using a large training dataset. The inher-
ently multi-class approaches are favorable as they have similar or identical computational
complexities to their binary counterparts. The Na¨ıve Bayes and Decision Tree classifiers
are therefore the most suitable for use on multi-class problems with large datasets, where
the computational complexity is to be minimised.
5.3 Classifier Training
The classifier training tools presented in Chapter 4.5.2 are now applied to ensure the
outlier detection, binary and multi-class classification algorithms are properly trained.
The following training process was used:
1. The optimal size of training dataset is determined for each of the data preprocessing
and classification techniques using the five-fold cross validation. This allocates 80 %
of the data to training, whilst the remaining 20 % is used as a validation set.
2. A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is established for each binary and
multi-class classifier. A ROC curve ensures that the optimal unbiased decision
boundary is used for classification, when using the default algorithm parameters.
The sensitivity of each binary and multi-class algorithm to the decision boundary
is also analysed.
5.3.1 Learning Curves
The complete set of learning curves for the outlier detection, binary and multi-class clas-
sifiers are available in Appendix C.3. The default configuration parameter values were
used along with the training dataset as discussed in Chapter 4.3.2. An example of a
learning curve for a Logistic Regression binary classifier is illustrated in figure 5.5. The
mean accuracy when applying the K-fold methodology usually increases with the number
of training data points, whilst the variation decreases. For clarity, the variation was only
plotted for the no-preprocessing curve. A classifier is properly trained when its accuracy
does not improve significantly with an increase in the number of training data points. The
number of training data points was chosen such that each algorithm is well trained, whilst
retaining computational feasibility. The conservative design decision was taken to use 30
000 data points for the size of the training dataset. Beyond this point the increase in
classification accuracy for the k-Nearest Neighbors and Support Vector Machine become
negligible as illustrated in figure C.15 and figure C.16 respectively.
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Figure 5.5: The learning curve for a Logistic Regression binary classifier. The variation
in results is shown in red. The no-preprocessing learning curve is under the orthogonal
learning curve.
5.3.2 ROC Curves
The Receiver Operating Characteristic curves were established for each binary and multi-
class classifier using the training dataset. The complete set of ROC curves are available
in Appendix C.4. The ROC curves give an early indication of promising techniques. The
ROC curve ensures that the optimal decision threshold will be used when evaluating a
classification algorithm. The optimal decision threshold is one that produces an Equal
Error Rate (ERR) of false alarms and missed opportunities, which coincides with the
intersection between the black dashed line and the individual ROC curves as shown in
figure 5.6.
ERR
Figure 5.6: The receiver operating curve for the Logistic Regression binary classifier.
The optimal decision threshold produces an Equal Error Rate.
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In figure 5.6 the residual preprocessing technique shows the most potential as it maximises
the area under the ROC curve, whilst the rotation and no preprocessing performs poorly
as rotating the dataset fails to assist Logistic Regression in overcoming the non-linear
decision boundary. There were a few observations made when analyzing the ROC curves
in Appendix C.4. The kernel and residual preprocessing greatly aid the performance
of a Logistic Regression architecture. Similarly, the kernel, orthogonal, and residual
preprocessing greatly aid the performance of the Na¨ıve Bayes architecture. The use of
preprocessing for the remaining classification architectures has negligible impact on the
performance. This is expected for the Support Vector Machine that has a built-in Radial
Basis Function kernel, while the k-Nearest Neighbors and Decision Tree classifiers are well-
suited for differentiating between classes with non-linear decision boundaries separating
them.
5.4 Fault Detection and Isolation Evaluation
The outlier detection, binary and multi-class algorithms were optimally trained using
30 000 data points, and using the optimal decision thresholds established above. The
respective fault detection and isolation architectures were evaluated on five different test
sets as discussed in Chapter 4.3.3. The various classification-based fault detection and
isolation architectures were evaluated in terms of accuracy for both fault detection and
isolation, sensitivity of the configuration parameters, and the location of all incorrect
classifications.
5.4.1 Fault Detection Accuracy
The detection accuracy is defined as the percentage of data points from the test set
that the architecture correctly assigned the correct binary label (fault or no-fault). The
fault detection results for various preprocessing techniques and classification based FDI
architectures are given in figure 5.7, and summarised in table 5.3.
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Figure 5.7: The detection accuracy for the various classification algorithms and prepro-
cessing techniques. The minimum and maximum percentages are indicated in red with
the mean accuracy shown by individual bars.
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Rank Classifier Preprocessing Accuracy
1 Support Vector Machine
(SVM)
kernel 95.75 %
2 k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) residual 94.72 %
3 Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes (GNB) residual 93.8 %
4 Logistic Regression (LR) residual 93.62 %
5 Decision Tree (DT) orthogonal 90.77 %
6 Elliptic Envelope (EE) orthogonal 86.71 %
7 Isolation Forest (IF) orthogonal 69.2 %
8 Local Outlier Factor (LOF) no preprocessing 53.76 %
Table 5.3: Ranking the performance of the fault detection classifiers.
The Support Vector Machine FDI architecture with kernel preprocessing yielded the high-
est fault detection accuracy of 95.75 %. The worst performing classifier was Local Outlier
Factor that yielded 53.76 % accuracy. It is observed that the binary classifiers outperform
the outlier detection approaches. The binary classifiers use prior knowledge in the form
of labels to establish the optimal decision boundaries that account for the varying sensor
accuracies. The outlier detection algorithms are advantageous as they do not require prior
labeling, and make no assumptions about the faults. However, their application is better
suited to the detection of potential outliers in static datasets where prior information such
as sensor accuracy is not available. McNemar’s statistical significance test, as discussed
in Chapter 4.4.2, was used to verify the results that were all within a 1 % overlapping
interval. McNemar’s test returned χ2 = 6933.56 for the statistical significance test be-
tween the k-Nearest Neighbors and Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes result in table 5.3. Similarly,
the significance test between k-Nearest Neighbors and Logistic Regression returned χ2 =
11.31. This proves that the results shown in table 5.3 are statistically significant for a
probability threshold of at least 95 %.
5.4.2 Fault Isolation Accuracy
The isolation accuracy is defined as the percentage of data points from a test set that
the architecture correctly predicted the correct operating mode or sensor status. The
fault isolation results for various preprocessing techniques and classification algorithms
are given in figure 5.8, and summarised in table 5.4 when using the default configuration
parameters.
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Figure 5.8: The isolation accuracy for the various classification algorithms and prepro-
cessing techniques. The minimum and maximum percentages are indicated in red with
the mean accuracy shown by individual bars.
Rank Classifier Preprocessing Accuracy
1 k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN) residual 94.16 %
2 Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes (GNB) residual 93.8 %
3 Logistic Regression (LR) residual 93.5 %
4 Decision Tree (DT) residual 90.37 %
5 Support Vector Machine (SVM) none 85.04 %
Table 5.4: Ranking the performance of the fault isolation classifiers.
The k-Nearest Neighbors architecture with residual preprocessing yielded the highest
fault isolation accuracy of 94.16 %. The worst performing classifier was Support Vector
Machine that yielded 85.04 % accuracy. The results within a 1 % overlapping interval
were validated using McNemar’s test. The Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes overlaps with both
the k-Nearest Neighbors and Logistic Regression classifiers. The results differed enough
to be statistically significant with χ2 = 173.25 (GNB vs kNN) and χ2 = 387.98 (GNB
vs LR). It is clear from both the detection and isolation results that preprocessing aids
Logistic Regression that makes use of linear decision boundaries, and Na¨ıve Bayes that
is based on feature independence, to overcome their shortfalls. Preprocessing offers little
to no assistance to the classifiers that adjust well to non-linear decision surfaces such as
Decision Tree, k-Nearest Neighbor and Support Vector Machine. The k-Nearest Neighbor
results exhibit very little variation in isolation accuracy between the different test sets.
The Support Vector Machine on the other hand exhibits large variations suggesting that
it over-fits the data, and therefore fails to generalise well to unseen data.
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5.4.3 Sensitivity Study on Configuration Parameters
An investigation was performed with the aim of analysing the effect of the training con-
figuration parameters on the isolation accuracy for the various classification algorithms.
The classifiers were trained using the default configuration parameters, but can be fine
tuned to optimise the accuracy of the FDI architecture. An experiment was performed
by randomly initialising the configuration parameters from a realistic range on either side
of the default values. The investigation gives an indication of the possible increase in
classification accuracy that is achievable should configuration parameters be optimised.
It also indicates the sensitivity of the various classification algorithms to their configura-
tion parameter values. The configuration parameters and the range over which they were
varied is shown in Appendix C.5 with the results shown in figure 5.9.
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Figure 5.9: The results of a sensitivity study conducted for the various classification al-
gorithms and preprocessing techniques. The minimum and maximum accuracies achieved
are indicated by the red whiskers.
The Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes classifier has no configurable parameters, and is therefore
excluded from this investigation. The results show that the k-Nearest Neighbors algo-
rithm is the least sensitive to a change in training parameters, while the Support Vector
Machine architecture is the most sensitive. The RBF kernel configuration parameter γ
is sensitive as reflected in the large variation in SVM accuracies shown in the figure 5.9.
The Decision Tree and Support Vector Machine show the largest increases in accuracy if
the training parameters are to be optimised.
5.4.4 Evaluation of Incorrect Classifications
The locations of the false alarms, missed opportunities, and incorrect isolations for the top
performing architectures is summarised in table 5.4. Ideally, the locations of false alarms
should be restricted to near the decision boundary and there should be no false alarms
deep in the no-fault region. False alarms will degrade the system reliability. Similarly,
missed opportunities and incorrect isolations beyond the boundary of an extreme outlier
are problematic as they will affect the accuracy of the height estimate produced by the
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sensor fusion stage. The table below summarises the number of false alarms, missed
opportunities, and incorrect isolations of faults when analysing the respective approaches
using the test datasets consisting of 283 651 individual data points.
Rank Approach False Alarms Missed
Opportunities
Incorrect
Isolation
1 kNN 2 568 (0.91 %) 11 890 (4.19 %) 2 221 (0.78 %)
2 GNB 118 (0.04 %) 17 622 (6.21 %) 43 (0.02 %)
3 LR 233 (0.08 %) 17 933 (6.32 %) 445 (0.16 %)
4 DT 15 709 (5.54 %) 9 768 (3.44 %) 3 533 (1.25 %)
5 SVM 138 (0.05 %) 11 850 (4.18 %) 41 799 (14.74 %)
Table 5.5: Analysis of the incorrect assignments performed by the various single time
instant approaches.
The obvious observation from the results in table 5.5 is the unacceptably high number
of false alarms for the k-Nearest Neighbors and Decision Tree approaches. This will
be investigated further in the analyses that follow. The second observation is that the
number of missed opportunities by far outweighs the false alarms and incorrect isolations
for the top performing single time instant architectures. This is to be expected due
to the manner in which a fault was labeled. All data points beyond the time of fault
occurrence are labeled as faulty regardless of whether they meet the threshold of being
a fault or not. For example fault profiles such as a jamming fault will not immediately
yield measurements in the fault region, and an increased noise fault will sporadically
produce measurements within the no-fault region. When considering data points as being
constructed from singular measurements sampled at the same instant in time, some faulty
data points are actually located within the no-fault region and will therefore be incorrectly
classified. This is an acceptable error for the single time instant approach as no bias is
shown towards previous predictions by considering measurements from each time instant
as unique.
5.4.4.1 k-Nearest Neighbors
The analysis done on the location of incorrect classifications for k-Nearest Neighbors is
discussed below. Figures 5.10 to 5.13 give a visual overview of the locations of all in-
correct classifications. The different scatter plots are established for individual sensors
where the measured relative altitude of the aircraft is plotted as a function of the true
relative altitude for the respective sensors. The false alarms are indicated in red, missed
opportunities in green, and incorrect isolations in orange. The blue line plots the theoret-
ical decision boundary that coincides with the limit of a sensor’s range of accuracy. The
dashed blue line as labeled in figure 5.11 shows the decision boundary for what will be
considered an extreme outlier.
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Figure 5.10: The location of the incorrect classifications for the GPS sensor using k-NN.
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Figure 5.11: The location of the incorrect classifications for the IRS sensor using k-NN.
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Figure 5.12: The location of the incorrect classifications for the ILS sensor using k-NN.
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Figure 5.13: The location of the incorrect classifications for the RA using k-NN.
Although the figures above are not completely clear, there are some obvious observations
that can be made with a more detailed analysis discussed thereafter. The first is that
the location of missed opportunities is unfavorable as many are situated beyond the
decision boundary of what is considered to be an extreme outlier. The majority of the
missed opportunities are within the no-fault region, which is an acceptable error. The
location of the missed opportunities and incorrect isolations are particularly concerning
for the GPS and IRS sensors. The location of the false alarms and incorrect isolations are
shown relative to the decision boundary for the various sensors in figure 5.14 to 5.17. The
measurement error is plotted as a function of the true altitude with the decision boundary
given by the blue line.
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Figure 5.14: The location of the false
alarms and incorrect isolations for the
GPS sensor.
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Figure 5.15: The location of the false
alarms and incorrect isolations for the IRS
sensor.
There are two observations from the results in figure 5.14 to 5.17. Firstly, there are a
large number of false alarms deep within the no-fault region. This is prevalent across
all sensors where the decision boundaries are narrow. The number of training examples
was increased to better cover the parameter space, but had an insignificant effect on the
results. It was concluded that the k-NN approach is susceptible to false alarms in areas
where there exists a high density of fault and no-fault data points that are located in close
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Figure 5.16: The location of the false
alarms and incorrect isolations for the ILS
sensor.
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Figure 5.17: The location of the false
alarms and incorrect isolations for the ra-
dio altimeter.
proximity such as near the decision boundary. The second observation is the presence of
false alarms in the fault region as illustrated by the black circles in figure 5.16. The ILS
measurement error is modeled by a zero mean Gaussian white noise signal, and therefore
it is inevitable that there will be a few no-fault data points beyond the decision boundary
of 2.695σ that is only inclusive of 99.65 % simulated data points. These false alarms
affirm that the k-NN approach fits a tight decision boundary around the data. Without
looking at a window of measurements it is not possible for the classifier to know that these
data points are actually no-fault data points. The number and location of the incorrect
isolations is also unfavorable as these should be restricted to within a close proximity of
the decision boundary and should be kept to a bare minimum. The k-Nearest Neighbors
architecture therefore does not meet the requirements of being a reliable fault detection
and isolation system.
5.4.4.2 Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes
The location of the incorrect classifications for the Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes approach is
shown in figure 5.18 to 5.21.
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Figure 5.18: The location of the incorrect classifications for the GPS sensor using GNB.
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Figure 5.19: The location of the incorrect classifications for the IRS sensor using GNB.
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Figure 5.20: The location of the incorrect classifications for the ILS sensor using GNB.
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Figure 5.21: The location of the incorrect classifications for the RA using GNB.
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The Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes architecture also yielded numerous missed opportunities deep
within the fault region. It is evident that the Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes FDI architecture
struggles to adapt to changes in sensor accuracy. It fits a decision boundary that is
aligned with the worst case sensor accuracy as illustrated by the location of the missed
opportunities in figure 5.20 and figure 5.21, while being a poor fit of the GPS sensor
measurement data in figure 5.18. An analysis of the location of the false alarms revealed
that they were all attributed to the ILS and radio altimeter sensors. All of the false
alarms were located in a close proximity to the decision boundary with a few of the false
alarms being inside the fault region due to the ILS sensor model as shown in figure 5.22
and figure 5.23. The reader is reminded that the ILS sensor model uses random Gaussian
white noise to model realistic measurement errors as discussed in the k-NN analysis.
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Figure 5.22: The location of the false
alarms and incorrect isolations for the ILS
sensor.
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Figure 5.23: The location of the false
alarms and incorrect isolations for the RA.
5.4.4.3 Logistic Regression
The location of the incorrect classifications for the Logistic Regression approach is shown
in figure 5.24 to 5.27.
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Figure 5.24: The location of the incorrect classifications for the GPS sensor using LR.
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Figure 5.25: The location of the incorrect classifications for the IRS sensor using LR.
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Figure 5.26: The location of the incorrect classifications for the ILS sensor using LR.
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Figure 5.27: The location of the incorrect classifications for the RA using LR.
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The Logistic Regression results are similar to the Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes results as the ar-
chitecture struggles to adapt to changes in sensor accuracy as indicated by the distribution
of the missed opportunities. The locations of the missed opportunities are unfavourable
as they are beyond the boundary from an extreme outlier. False alarms and incorrect
isolations occurred across all the sensors with an in-depth analysis of their locations il-
lustrated in figure 5.28 to figure 5.31. A concern with the Logistic Regression based FDI
architecture is the false alarms that occur deep within the no-fault region for the GPS
and IRS sensor as illustrated in figure 5.28 and figure 5.29 respectively.
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Figure 5.28: The location of the false
alarms and incorrect isolations for the
GPS sensor.
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Figure 5.29: The location of the false
alarms and incorrect isolations for the IRS
sensor.
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Figure 5.30: The location of the false
alarms and incorrect isolations for the ILS
sensor.
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Figure 5.31: The location of the false
alarms and incorrect isolations for the RA.
It can be concluded from the location of incorrect classification analyses that none of the
single time instant architectures meet the requirement of being a reliable fault detection
and isolation architecture. The Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes architecture is the best performer
as it minimises the number of false alarms and incorrect isolations, while restricting their
locations to near the decision boundary. However it does not adapt well to the changing
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theoretical sensor accuracies, and therefore may result in missed opportunities that will
affect the height estimation accuracy of the sensor fusion stage.
5.4.5 Results Validation
The FDI architecture accuracy was validated on actual aircraft data with injected faults
as discussed in Chapter 4.3.4. The results validation compares the fault isolation accu-
racy achieved on the validation dataset illustrated in figure 5.32 with the results from
simulated data as illustrated in figure 5.8. Overall the results for actual flight data were
similar to the results for simulated flight data with the percentage of correct isolations
illustrated in figure 5.32 lying within the minimum and maximum range of accuracy as
illustrated in figure 5.8. This suggests that the model used to simulate measurement data
is representative of actual sensor measurements and that similar results would be achieved
if a more diverse dataset of actual sensor measurement data were available.
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Figure 5.32: The results of FDI accuracy on validation test set consisting of actual
flight data.
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5.5 FDI Demonstration
The performance of the top three single time instant FDI architectures is demonstrated on
example aircraft landing runs with different sensor faults injected as discussed in Chapter
4.6. The results are shown in figures 5.33 to 5.36, where the actual sensor status is
indicated in red and the reported status in blue as a function of time.
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Figure 5.33: Sensor status versus time
for a GPS bias fault.
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Figure 5.34: Sensor status versus time
for a IRS jamming fault.
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Figure 5.35: Sensor status versus time
for a ILS noise fault.
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Figure 5.36: Sensor status versus time
for a radio altimeter oscillating fault.
The FDI demonstration shows that all architectures correctly identified the sensor status
soon after the onset of the respective faults. The shortcomings with the approach of
analysing a single instant in time is apparent when looking at the increased noise and
oscillation fault in figure 5.35 and figure 5.36 respectively. The FDI architecture could
be enhanced by incorporating fault detection memory that would continue to isolate a
fault even after first being detected. This suggestion is investigated in the next chapter
in an attempt to address the shortcomings with the single time instant approach. Two
observations from figure 5.34 warrant further discussion. Firstly, as expected the jamming
fault shows a slight delay between the onset of the fault and the fault being detected. A
jamming fault is not immediately obvious, but as the aircraft continues to descend so
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the error becomes larger with time. Secondly, as the jamming fault measurement error
nears the decision boundary, the sensor status becomes unstable, but then stabilises once
the measurement is well beyond the decision boundary. The shortcomings of the Nearest
Neighbors approach as discussed earlier in this chapter are also confirmed by the many
false alarms.
5.6 Conclusion
The single time instant FDI architectures returned isolation accuracies from 85 % (Sup-
port Vector Machine) to 94.16 % (Nearest Neighbors). The use of preprocessing greatly
aids the performance of the Logistic Regression and Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes, but is of little
advantage to the remaining architectures. A random search of the configuration parame-
ters revealed that the default values will suffice for architecture comparison as these yield
accuracies close to the maximum accuracy achieved from the random search. An eval-
uation of the location of the false alarms, missed opportunities, and incorrect isolations
revealed some shortcomings with all the single time instant approaches. The Gaussian
Na¨ıve Bayes architecture that makes use of residual preprocessing is the best candidate,
although it struggles to adapt to the changes in sensor accuracy. The single time in-
stant approach to fault detection is robust and adaptable in the sense that it re-evaluates
measurements at each time instant without any prior knowledge or prejudice towards a
previous sensor status. The results were validated using actual data and the fault detec-
tion and isolation performance was demonstrated on different fault profiles by plotting
the actual versus reported sensor status as a function of time.
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Chapter 6
Consecutive Time Instant Fault
Diagnosis
This chapter presents the design and evaluation of a fault detection and isolation ar-
chitecture for a commercial aircraft that uses sensor measurements from a window of
consecutive time instants. The system investigates the use of traditional model-based
and novel data-driven techniques for fault detection and isolation purposes.
The chapter starts off by presenting the individual architectures for the different consec-
utive time instant fault diagnostic approaches that were considered. The computational
complexity of each approach is then investigated and compared. The fault detection and
isolation performance is evaluated separately on numerous datasets. The results are then
validated on actual aircraft data. Lastly, the top performing FDI architectures are demon-
strated on simulated landing runs with faults injected on certain sensor measurements to
show how the predicted and actual sensor status changes as a function of time.
6.1 Conceptual Design and Architecture
The architecture for the consecutive time instant fault detection and isolation techniques
will vary for each approach. The detailed design of the individual approaches will be
considered separately. A summary of the approaches considered is shown in table 6.1.
Approach Name Approach Type
Robust Kalman filter Robust statistics and optimal estimation
Bank of Kalman filters Probabilistic combination of optimal estima-
tors
Model Consensus
(variant of RANSAC)
Evaluation of a fixed number of models
Dynamic PCA Monitoring of statistical measures
Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes Single time instant approach with fault de-
tection history
Table 6.1: Summary of the consecutive time instant approaches.
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6.1.1 Robust Kalman Filter
The overview of the conceptual design and architecture for the Robust Kalman filter is
illustrated in figure 6.1 and will be discussed below.
Control Update
~Yk status
1
1: ZGPS, ZIRS, ZILS, ZRA, Z˙IRS
Measurement
Update
Residual Analysis
+
~rk
~Pk
−
~Xk
+
, ~Pk
+
~Xk
−
Figure 6.1: The architecture for a Robust Kalman filter fault detector and isolator.
The design of the KF model which constitutes the control and measurement update steps
in the architecture above is briefly explained. The Kalman filter model estimates the
relative altitude of the aircraft and uses it as the reference against which the sensor
measurements are compared. A descending aircraft is modeled by a linear kinematic
system. It has two states, namely relative altitude and climb rate. The state space
model will form the foundation of the Kalman filter design. The dynamics applicable to
predicting the change in aircraft height are approximated as linear over a sampling period.
The linear discrete state space model has two states, namely altitude zk and climb rate
z˙k.
~Xk =
[
zk
z˙k
]
(6.1.1)
The model parameters that govern the linear model ~Xk = F ~Xk−1 + G~Uk−1 are given by:
F =
[
1 Ts
0 1
]
G = 0 (6.1.2)
The sensor measurements are directly observable, whilst the predicted sensor measure-
ments are given by H ~Xk, where:
~Yk =

ZGPS[k]
ZIRS[k]
ZILS[k]
ZRA[k]
Z˙IRS[k]

H =

1 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 1

(6.1.3)
The Kalman filter requires prior knowledge of the process and sensor noise variances. The
process noise is a tuning parameter, whilst the sensor noise matrix is updated for each
sampling instant to reflect the expected sensor accuracies that change as a function of
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relative altitude. This makes the Robust Kalman filter adaptive as it adjusts the noise
covariance matrix.
Qk = E
{
WkW
T
k
}
=
[
σ2w 0
0 σ2w
]
(6.1.4)
Rk = E
{
VkV
T
k
}
=

k1 ·∆Zgps2 0 0 0 0
0 k2 ·∆Zirs2 0 0 0
0 0 k3 ·∆Zils2 0 0
0 0 0 k4 ·∆Zra2 0
0 0 0 0 ∆2
Z˙irs

(6.1.5)
where ki is a tuning parameter, and ∆i the theoretical sensor accuracy for sensor i.
Fault isolation is performed during the residual analysis that compares the measure-
ment residual against the theoretical limits of sensor accuracy at each iteration. When
Y
(i)
k − H ~Xk ≥ ki · ∆i, then Y (i)k − H ~Xk is set to zero and the estimated state update
is therefore isolated from the fault. The factor ki is a tuning parameter that is used to
configure the tightness of the decision boundary fitted to the data when identifying a
fault. This constant relaxes the decision boundaries to account for the inaccuracies asso-
ciated with the state estimate and modelling process. A conservative decision threshold
is used that only updates the sensor status to reflect a failure when more than 50 % of
measurements from within the last 1 s have been flagged as faulty.
6.1.2 Bank of Kalman Filters
The conceptual design and architecture for the Bank of Kalman filters is illustrated in
figure 6.2.
Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 2:
No fault KF
GPS Failure KF
Hypothesis 5:
RA Failure KF
:
:
~yk
Probability Computation
Decision Process
status
zˆ1
zˆzˆ2
zˆN
~r1
~r2
~rN
S2
S1
SN
pN
p2
p1
Statistical Information (p1, p2, .., pN)
1
1: ZGPS, ZIRS, ZILS, ZRA, Z˙IRS
Figure 6.2: The architecture for a Bank of Kalman filters approach.
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The architecture establishes five separate Kalman filters. The first KF models the no-fault
hypothesis and therefore makes use of all sensors. The remaining hypotheses each adjust
the Kalman filter design to omit the sensor that is hypothesised as failing. Equations
6.1.1 to 6.1.5 are adjusted for each individual Kalman filter accordingly. Similar to the
Robust KF, the individual Kalman filters are adaptive in the sense that they adjust the
noise covariance matrix according to the expected sensor accuracies. The estimated rela-
tive altitude and measurement residual covariances are used to calculate the probability
associated with each hypothesis as discussed in Chapter 3.3.3.1. The reader is reminded
that the probability threshold (Pthresh) is used to identify the active hypothesis. The sen-
sor status is only updated to reflect a fault when pi > Pthresh for longer than 2 seconds.
A probability threshold of Pthresh = 90 % is used to identify an active hypothesis. The
estimated relative altitude, zˆ, is calculated by weighting each estimate according to the
probability associated with it.
6.1.3 Model Consensus
Model Consensus is a proposed fault detection and isolation method that is based on
RAndom SAmple Consensus (RANSAC). The proposed method is an online solution that
incorporates multiple time steps by applying a sliding window of width L to the incoming
data stream of m sensor measurements. The method is based on the assumption that
the aircraft dynamics can be approximated as linear over such a short period of time.
The proposed model deviates from RANSAC in one fundamental area. The random
sampling strategy is replaced by a fixed number of hypotheses between the first and last
sampling instants in the sliding window as depicted in figure 6.3. Predictable aircraft
dynamics and the limited batch size are the motivation for evaluating a fixed number of
hypotheses. Establishing linear models between the first and last sampling instants in a
window will produce the hypothesis with the best support. A total of m2 + 1 hypotheses
are established, which includes the exhaustive linear possibilities between each sensor
measurement at t1 and tL as well as the model parameters from the previous window,
Θprior.
t1 t2 t3 t4 Discrete Time (s)
A
lt
it
u
d
e
(m
)
Key:
ZGPS
ZIRS
ZILS
ZRA
Figure 6.3: Possible hypotheses when linear models are fitted between a sensor mea-
surement at sample period t1 and measurements at t4 for a sliding window of width L = 4.
This is repeated for each sensor at time period t1.
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The model parameters for respective hypotheses are stored in a buffer Θ. Each model is
evaluated to determine the hypothesis that maximises the support over the entire dataset
by examining the number of data points that are considered to be inlier. The inlier dataset
(I) will therefore contain the data points for the model with the most support. Model
Consensus deviates from RANSAC’s verification stage in that a separate ∆ threshold is
used for each sensor to accommodate the different theoretical accuracies.
Algorithm 3 Pseudocode for Model Consensus algorithm.
Input:
Z dataset of observations
Θprior model parameters from previous window
∆ sensor accuracy threshold
m number of sensors
 probability threshold for fault detection
Output:
Θpost model representing inliers
status sensor status
1: function MODEL CONSENSUS(Z,Θprior,∆,i,m)
2: k ← m2 + 1
3: Θ← Possible Models(Z,Θprior,m)
4: for j = 1:k do
5: Ij ← Model Evaluation(Z,Θj,∆)
6: if Ij > I then
7: I ← Ij
8: end if
9: end for
10: Θpost ← Fit Optimal Model(I)
11: status ← Status Update(Θpost,,∆)
12: return(Θpost,status)
Once all hypotheses have been evaluated, the inliers are used to identify the model of best
fit (Θpost). Weighted least squares regression was implemented for model refinement. It
is an extension of ordinary least squares that deems all inlier samples to be heteroscedas-
tic1 and therefore individual sensor accuracies are accounted for during model refinement.
The optimal model parameters are those that minimise the cost function given as the sum
of square residuals between the observed measurements and the model predictions.
The optimal model Θpost is used to re-evaluate individual sensor measurements and iden-
tify outliers. The sensor status is updated by evaluating the percentage of data points
associated with a sensor that are deemed to be inliers. When the probability associated
with an individual sensor drops below a predefined threshold  then the sensor status is
updated to reflect a failure in that specific sensor.
1noise variance differs across observations
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6.1.4 Dynamic PCA
The overview of the conceptual design and architecture for the Dynamic PCA is illustrated
in figure 6.4 and discussed thereafter. Dynamic PCA is used as a fault detection technique.
Rolling Buffer
~xk Xbuff X
w
(Xw)′
fault/no-fault
Update
Computation
Monitoring
Trajectory Matrix
PCA
Statistical
1
1: ZGPS, ZIRS, ZILS, ZRA
Fault Detection
Figure 6.4: The architecture for a Dynamic PCA fault detector.
The rolling buffer stores the n most recent sensor measurements as Xbuff = [~xk, ..., ~xk−n]
and presents the buffer to the fault detection architecture. The trajectory matrix (Xw)
is updated using equation 3.8.14, that divides a sliding window of the n most recent
measurements into time lagged vectors of trajectory information as illustrated in figure
6.5. When a fault occurs the individual vector that incorporates that measurement will
differ from the others.
ZGPS[k]
ZIRS[k]
ZILS[k]
ZRA[k]
ZRA[k-2]
ZRAk-1]
ZRA[k]
Rolling Buffer Trajectory Matrix Update
ZGPS[k-3] ZGPS[k-2] ZGPS[k-1]
ZIRS[k-1]ZIRS[k-2]ZIRS[k-3]
ZILS[k-3] ZILS[k-2]
ZRA[k-1]ZRA[k-2]ZRA[k-3]
ZILS[k-1]
ZRA[k-3]
ZRA[k-2]
ZRA[k-1]ZILS[k]
ZILS[k-2]
ZILS[k-1]
ZILS[k-3]
ZILS[k-2]
ZILS[k-1]
ZIRS[k-2]
ZIRS[k-1]
ZIRS[k]
ZIRS[k-3]
ZIRS[k-2]
ZIRSk-1]
ZGPS[k-2]
ZGPS[k-1]
ZGPS[k]
ZGPS[k-3]
ZGPS[k-2]
ZGPS[k-1]
Figure 6.5: Formation of the trajectory matrix for a time lag shift of order w = 2 for
a sliding window of 4 consecutive data points.
A model of the trajectory information is established using the lower-dimensional repre-
sentation of the trajectory matrix. This is achieved by first performing an eigenvalue
decomposition to identify the transformation matrix (V ). The design decision was taken
to retain the first principal component or eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigen-
value and let it represent the “trajectory information” or model of the data, where Vk
= [vT1 ] = V1. The lower-dimensional representation of the dataset is established in the
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transformed data space through Y wk = V
T
k X
w before reconstructing the trajectory matrix,
(Xw)′ in the original data space.
(Xw)′ = VkY wk (6.1.6)
where Vk is the transformation matrix comprised from the k largest eigenvectors
A comparison between the trajectory matrix (Xw) and its reconstructed lower-dimensional
representation (Xw)′ that functions as a model provides information that is used for fault
detection purposes. The Square Projection Error (SPE) is a measure that is monitored
online and used to identify when a fault occurs.
6.1.5 Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes
One of the top performing single time instant approaches, Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes, is in-
cluded as a consecutive time instant approach by giving it the ability to remember its
sensor status. Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes was chosen as it minimised the number of false
alarms and incorrect isolations. The conservative decision threshold was used where more
than 50 % of the measurements from within the last two seconds had to register as a
fault before the sensor status was updated. The decision was also made that once a fault
is detected, then it “latches” and the fault status remains active until after the aircraft
lands.
6.2 Computational Complexity Study
The computational complexity of implementing the techniques discussed above is derived
and then compared. The number of basic iterations required to process a single sampling
instant is also considered. The computational complexity for a Kalman filter is given by
O(9d2.376+10d2+5d) ≈ O(d2.376) [55], where d is the dimensionality of the measurement
vector. A similar literature search was done for the computational complexity of RANSAC
(Model Consensus). This is at least the square order of the number of data points in the
observation dataset[56]. This equates to O([mL]2), where m is the number of sensors
and L the width of the window. The computational complexity for Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) consists of a covariance matrix computation O(nvd2) and a eigenvalue
decomposition given by O(n3v) [57], where nv is the number of vectors that make up
the covariance matrix. The combined computational complexity is therefore given by
O(nvd2 + n3v). The results are summarised in the table 6.2.
Approach Name Basic Iterations Complexity
Robust Kalman filter 20 O(d2.376)
Bank of Kalman filters 75 k·O(d2.376)
Model Consensus 635 O([mL]2)
Dynamic PCA 20 O(nvd2 + n3v)
Table 6.2: Summary of the computational complexity for the consecutive time instant
approaches.
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The matrix operations used in the consecutive time instant approaches adds to the com-
putational complexity. The most efficient approach is the Robust Kalman filter with the
fewest number of basic iterations and lowest computational complexity. The Model Con-
sensus approach is the most computationally intensive with numerous inner loops as it
repetitively searches for the best model.
6.3 Fault Detection and Isolation Evaluation
The consecutive time instant fault detection and isolation architectures were evaluated
on five different test sets as discussed in Chapter 4.3.3. These architectures are evaluated
in terms of accuracy for both fault detection and isolation, sensitivity of the configuration
parameters, and the location of incorrect classifications.
6.3.1 Fault Detection and Isolation Accuracy
The fault detection and isolation accuracy for the various consecutive time instants ap-
proaches was examined across numerous datasets. The results given in figure 6.6 were
determined using the default configuration parameters.
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Figure 6.6: The detection and isolation accuracy for the various consecutive time in-
stants based FDI architectures. The minimum and maximum percentages are indicated
in red with the mean accuracy shown by individual bars.
The top performing detection architecture was Model Consensus that achieved a detection
accuracy of 98.7 %. It was also the most consistent detection architecture exhibiting
minimal variation in its results. The worst performing fault detection architecture was
Dynamic PCA that achieved a 68.02 % accuracy. PCA is not robust to the effect of
outliers that will distort the principal components that describe the underlying structure
of the data, resulting in the poor performance. The fault isolation accuracy results are
summarised in table 6.3.
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Rank Approach Name Accuracy
1 Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes 97.65 %
2 Bank of Kalman filters 93.67 %
3 Model Consensus 92.98 %
4 Robust Kalman filter 90.9 %
Table 6.3: Ranking the performance of the fault isolation accuracy.
The isolation results prove that giving the single time instant approaches the ability to
remember their previous sensor status predictions improves the isolation accuracy results
from 93.8 % to 97.65 %. The Bank of KF and Model Consensus results were within a
1 % overlapping interval and therefore had to be verified using McNemar’s test. This test
confirmed that the results differed enough to be statistically significant with χ2 = 442.
6.3.2 Sensitivity Study on Configuration Parameters
An investigation was performed with the aim of analyzing the effect of the training con-
figuration parameters on the architecture accuracy. Similar to the single time instant
approach the architectures were evaluated using default configuration parameters, but
can be fine tuned to optimise performance. The values for the default configuration pa-
rameters and the range over which the random search was performed is shown in Appendix
D.1. The results of the random search are given in figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: The results of a sensitivity study for the various consecutive time instant
FDI approaches. The minimum and maximum accuracies achieved are indicated by the
red whiskers.
The results show that the Model Consensus and Bank of Kalman filters architectures are
insensitive to changes in configuration parameters with a 5 % variation being observed in
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the results. The D-PCA architecture shows a large variation in results suggesting that it
is very sensitive to the effect of configuration parameters. Ideally, approaches should be
insensitive to the effect of configuration parameters to ensure consistency in results. The
Robust KF results suggest that the configuration parameters are worth optimizing as it
yielded an impressive maximum accuracy 99.15 % when conducting the random search.
A closer analysis revealed that when using default configuration parameter values, the
Robust KF is prone to false alarms as it fits a very tight decision boundary around the
radio altimeter measurements. By adjusting k4, the decision boundary is relaxed and the
false alarm rate is reduced, at the expense of sensitivity and fault reaction time.
6.3.3 Evaluation of Incorrect Classifications
Similar to the single time instant approach the locations of the false alarms, missed oppor-
tunities, and incorrect isolations are analysed for the top three consecutive time instant
architectures. Table 6.4 summarises the number of false alarms, missed opportunitiess
and incorrect isolations of faults when analysing the respective approaches using the test
datasets consisting of 283 651 individual data points.
Rank Approach False Alarms Missed
Opportunities
Incorrect
Isolations
1 Robust KF 4 (0 %) 1 912 (0.67 %) 0
2 Gaussian Na¨ıve
Bayes
2 (0 %) 4 882 (1.72 %) 0
3 Bank KF 3 (0 %) 14 031 (4.95 %) 66 (0.02 %)
4 Model Consensus 4 (0 %) 15 285 (5.39 %) 3 953 (1.39 %)
Table 6.4: Analysis of the incorrect assignments performed by the various consecutive
time instant approaches.
The optimised Robust KF yielded the best results with 4 false alarms and no incorrect
isolations. Giving the single time instant Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes approach the ability to
remember its previous sensor status greatly assisted its performance. Overall the results
are similar to the single time instant approach, where most incorrect classifications are
attributed to missed opportunities. A concern is the large number of missed opportunities
returned by the Bank of Kalman filters and Model Consensus approaches.
6.3.3.1 Robust Kalman Filter
The location of the incorrect classifications for the Robust KF approach is illustrated
below in figures 6.8 to 6.11. The Robust Kalman filter FDI architecture fits a tight
detection and isolation boundary around the data. The Robust Kalman filter impressively
yielded no incorrect isolations and only 4 false alarms.
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Figure 6.8: The location of the incorrect classifications for the GPS using Robust KF.
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Figure 6.9: The location of the incorrect classifications for the IRS using Robust KF.
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Figure 6.10: The location of the incorrect classifications for the ILS using Robust KF.
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Figure 6.11: The location of the incorrect classifications for the RA using Robust KF.
The locations of the false alarms are favourable as they are all located near the decision
boundary. The majority of the missed opportunities are acceptable as they are located
within the no-fault region or close to the decision boundary. However there are a few
missed opportunities beyond the extreme outlier boundary. Some faults are not imme-
diately isolated when using a window based approach to fault diagnosis, as a certain
percentage of measurements from within the window need to be detected and flagged as
faulty before updating the sensor status. This ensures that the architecture is absolutely
certain a sensor is faulty before updating the sensor status to reflect this prediction. As a
result there are a handful of missed opportunities before a sensor fault is correctly iden-
tified and isolated as illustrated in figure 6.11 where the architecture was slow to detect
an increased noise fault on the radio altimeter. An investigation was performed whereby
the size of the sliding window was reduced, but this resulted in more false alarms and
incorrect isolations.
6.3.3.2 Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes
The location of the incorrect classifications for the Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes approach is
illustrated below in figures 6.12 to 6.15.
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Figure 6.12: The location of the incorrect classifications for the GPS sensor using GNB.
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Figure 6.13: The location of the incorrect classifications for the IRS sensor using GNB.
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Figure 6.14: The location of the incorrect classifications for the ILS sensor using GNB.
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Figure 6.15: The location of the incorrect classifications for the RA using GNB.
Giving the Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes FDI architecture the ability to remember its previous
sensor status predictions resulted in a reduction in the number of false alarms and missed
opportunities. The number of false alarms were reduced from 118 to 2, and the number
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of missed opportunities was reduced from 17 622 to 4 882. The two false alarms in figure
6.14 are favourable as they are situated near the decision boundary. Two interesting
observations are noted with the missed opportunities results. The first is that the Gaussian
Na¨ıve Bayes architecture struggles to detect smaller fault profiles such as a bias on the
GPS sensor in figure 6.12 as it is aligned with the worst case sensor accuracy. The
Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes decision boundaries do not adapt well to changes in sensor accuracy.
The second observation is that most of the missed opportunities for the Gaussian Na¨ıve
Bayes architecture are favourable as they are located in the no-fault region or within a
close proximity to the decision boundary. However, there are some unfavourable missed
opportunity locations. As discussed in the Robust Kalman filter analysis, the drawback of
using a two second window of single time instant predictions to update the sensor status
is that many fault profiles are not immediately identified as the sensor status will only be
updated once the fault detection and isolation architecture is absolutely certain a fault
profile is active. This explains why some missed opportunities are located deeper within
the fault region. An investigation was performed whereby the time period or window was
reduced, but this resulted in more false alarms and incorrect isolations.
6.3.3.3 Bank of Kalman Filters
The location of the incorrect classifications for the Bank of Kalman filters approach is
illustrated in figures 6.16 to 6.19. A few shortcomings with the Bank of Kalman filters
approach were observed. Firstly, there are many missed opportunities that are located
deep within the fault region. When analysing individual runs, it was noted that the
Bank of Kalman filters approach performed poorly when identifying an increased noise
fault profile due to the conservative design decision that the probability of a hypothesis
needs to remain above a probability threshold, Pthresh, for a certain period of time. An
increased noise profile results in a probability that fluctuates and does not remain above
the threshold, Pthresh = 90 %, for long periods. An investigation was performed whereby
Pthresh was lowered. This unfortunately resulted in a drastic increase in the number of
false alarms and incorrect isolations. Secondly, the location of the false alarm in figure 6.17
is unfavorable as it is deep within the no-fault region. These two shortcomings disqualify
the Bank of Kalman filters as a reliable fault detection and isolation approach.
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
True Altitude (m)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
G
P
S
M
ea
su
re
d
A
lt
it
u
d
e
(m
)
Missed Opportunity
False Alarm
Incorrect Isolation
Decision Boundary
Extreme Boundary
Figure 6.16: The location of the incorrect classifications for the GPS using Bank KF.
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Figure 6.17: The location of the incorrect classifications for the IRS using Bank KF.
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Figure 6.18: The location of the incorrect classifications for the ILS using Bank KF.
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Figure 6.19: The location of the incorrect classifications for the RA using Bank KF.
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6.3.4 Results Validation
The FDI architecture accuracy was validated on actual aircraft data with injected faults
as discussed in section 4.3.4.
Rank Classifier Accuracy
1 Robust KF 98.81 %
2 Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes 97.89 %
3 Bank KF 95.9 %
4 Model Consensus 91.58 %
Table 6.5: Ranking of the results validation for consecutive time instant approaches.
The results achieved on the validation dataset were compared with the results from the
simulated data as illustrated in figure 6.6. All results except for Model Consensus were
within the minimum and maximum range of accuracy. The Model Consensus validation
result was 0.05 % below the range achieved during testing on the simulated datasets.
This difference is insignificant as the Model Consensus result is still less accurate than
the Robust KF, Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes, and Bank of Kalman filters architectures. These
results suggest that the consecutive time instant fault detection and isolation architectures
would yield similar results if applied on a commercial aircraft.
6.4 FDI Demonstration
The performance of the top three consecutive time instant FDI architectures are demon-
strated on example aircraft landing runs with different sensor faults injected. The results
are shown in figures 6.20 - 6.23. The sensor status for the various approaches are plotted
as a function of time with the actual sensor status shown in red.
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Figure 6.20: Sensor status versus time
for a GPS bias fault.
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Figure 6.21: Sensor status versus time
for a IRS jamming fault.
The FDI demonstration shows that all architectures correctly identified the sensor status
soon after the onset of the respective faults. There are a few interesting observations that
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Figure 6.22: Sensor status versus time
for a ILS noise fault.
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Figure 6.23: Sensor status versus time
for a RA oscillating fault.
can be made. Firstly, the consecutive time instant approaches perform better than their
single time instant counterparts as the sensor statuses are much steadier. The second
observation is that the Bank of KF approach yielded similar results to that of the single
time instant approaches in that it also struggles to consistently identify an increased noise
and an oscillation error as illustrated in figures 6.22 to 6.23. The use of a probability
threshold has a distinct advantage in that it allows for flexibility in the architecture to
quickly adapt to changes, but can also be a drawback as the sensor status oscillates.
6.5 Conclusion
The consecutive time instant FDI architectures outperformed the single time instant ap-
proaches with architecture accuracies ranging from 92.98 % (Model Consensus) to 99.15 %
(Robust Kalman filter). A random search of the configuration parameters revealed a
shortcoming with the Robust Kalman filter approach in that it was prone to false alarms
as it fitted too tight a decision boundary around the radio altimeter. Using the default
values for the remaining architectures will suffice as these yield accuracies close to the
maximum accuracy achieved from the random search. An evaluation of the location of the
false alarms, missed opportunities, and incorrect isolations revealed that giving the single
time instant architectures the ability to remember the previous sensor status significantly
improved their performance in this regard. There were few false alarms across all of the
consecutive time instant approaches, while the Robust Kalman filter and Gaussian Na¨ıve
Bayes architectures also had no incorrect isolations. The results were validated using ac-
tual flight data, and the fault detection and isolation performance was demonstrated on
different fault profiles by plotting the actual versus reported sensor status as a function
of time.
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Chapter 7
Sensor Fusion
This chapter considers and evaluates different sensor fusion methods that use the fault
detection and isolation information to robustly estimate the height of a commercial air-
craft.
This chapter initially gives an overview of the conceptual design and architecture, be-
fore introducing the various sensor fusion methods that will be considered. Thereafter
these methods are evaluated on a simulated dataset, where the true aircraft height is
known. Lastly a visual demonstration of the estimated and true aircraft height is shown
as a function of time.
7.1 Conceptual Design and Architecture
The architecture for a robust height estimator is illustrated below.
1 FDI
1: ZGPS, ZIRS, ZILS, ZRA
2: HGPS, HIRS, HILS, HRA
Sensor Fusion
2
status
hˆ
Figure 7.1: The generic architecture for robust height estimation.
The generic architecture for a robust height estimator consists of two sequential stages.
The fault detection and isolation (FDI) stage firstly identifies if there is a failure in any
of the sensor technologies. When there is a failure, the status is updated to reflect the
technology type that experienced a failure. This status is then used by the sensor fusion
stage to isolate the faulty sensor technology and thereby prevent it from influencing the
height estimate.
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7.2 Sensor Fusion Approaches
Three separate methods of sensor fusion were considered and compared. The first is an
extension of the current approach used on commercial aircrafts that takes the median of
a group of radio altimeter sensors. The redundant radio altimeter sensors are replaced
by different sensor technologies. Sensor fusion is performed by taking the median of the
group of sensors that are deemed to be healthy. The second method isolates the faulty
sensor before fusing the remaining sensors using a weighting function. The third method
is that of a Robust Kalman filter in the height domain, where the measurement residual
that coincides with the faulty sensor is set to zero.
7.2.1 Median
The median is the oldest and simplest sensor fusion method. The estimated height is
given by:
hˆ =

median{HGPS, HIRS, HILS, HRA} status = no-fault
median{HIRS, HILS, HRA} status = GPS fault
median{HGPS, HILS, HRA} status = IRS fault
median{HGPS, HIRS, HRA} status = ILS fault
median{HGPS, HIRS, HILS} status = RA fault
(7.2.1)
The advantages of this approach is the ease of implementation and its robustness. It is
however expected to result in a suboptimal estimate.
7.2.2 Weighted Averaging
This intuitive sensor fusion algorithm proposed by Elmenreich [58] estimates the aircraft
height at each time instant using a weighting function.
hˆ =
n∑
i=1
hi · wi (7.2.2)
where n is the number of healthy sensors, hi is the height measurement for the i
th sensor,
and wi the weight associated with the i
th sensor.
A faulty sensor is omitted before fusing the healthy measurements. The weight assigned
to the ith sensor is inversely proportional to its variance σ2i when compared with the re-
maining sensors. A less noisy and more accurate sensor will therefore be assigned a larger
weight.
wi =
1
σ2i
∑n
j=1
1
σ2j
(7.2.3)
The need therefore exists to quantify the sensor variance in terms of accuracy. Using the
definition established in Chapter 2.5.1 sensor accuracies are given as absolute maximum
bounds for no-fault measurements and can be approximated by ∆ = 2.695σ. The sensor
variance is therefore given by σ2i = (
∆i
2.695
)2. The only sensor whose accuracy is a function
of height is the radio altimeter. The remainder are manipulated to be a function of
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height using the accuracy of the terrain database. The assumption is made that both the
sensor and terrain database accuracy can be treated as independent Gaussian distributions
and combined following the approach discussed in Chapter 2.5.6.5. A lookup table of
sensor accuracies in the height domain was developed, where the median of the height
measurements was used as a lookup value at individual time instants. This approach is
expected to result in a more optimal height estimate than the median approach, but has
a drawback in that it requires prior knowledge in the form of a lookup table or sensor
accuracies as a function of height.
7.2.3 Optimal Estimation
The Robust Kalman filter was adapted for optimal height estimation. It uses the sensor
status from the FDI architecture to ensure that the correct measurement residual is
excluded. The state space model from Chapter 3.3.2 is for inertial space, but height is with
reference to the terrain below the aircraft. The climb rate is therefore omitted from the
model, as the inertial reference system is no longer valid. The state estimate is therefore
given by ~X−k = ~X
+
k−1. The sensor measurements are directly observable and presented
to the Kalman filter in the height domain, where the predicted sensor measurements are
given by H ~Xk:
~Yk =

HGPS[k]
HIRS[k]
HILS[k]
HRA[k]
 H =

1
1
1
1
 (7.2.4)
The last change is that the sensor noise covariance matrix as shown in equation 6.1.5 is
adapted to reflect sensor accuracy as a function of height.
Qk = E
{
WkW
T
k
}
= σ2w (7.2.5)
Rk = E
{
VkV
T
k
}
=

∆Hgps
2 0 0 0
0 ∆Hirs
2 0 0
0 0 ∆Hils
2 0
0 0 0 ∆Hra
2
 (7.2.6)
7.3 Height Estimation Results
The accuracy of the three sensor fusion approaches was evaluated on a simulated dataset,
where the aircraft height is known. A baseline was established that used perfect fault
detection and isolation performance when performing sensor fusion. This baseline is
compared against the sensor fusion results that made use of imperfect fault detection
and isolation. The top performing Robust Kalman filter was chosen as the imperfect
fault detection and isolation system. An investigation was done to evaluate the effect of
failures in the different sensor technologies on the accuracy of the height estimate. The
steady state and transient errors after fault occurrence were considered separately.
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Figure 7.3: The maximum transient
height estimate error.
Distinct properties of the three sensor fusion approaches are evident from an overview of
the results shown in figure 7.2 and figure 7.3 above. The weighted average and median
approach yield an average error of 5.1 m and 5.94 m respectively, as well as exhibiting a
large variation in results between the 10th and 90th percentiles. Both the weighted average
and median sensor fusion techniques use single instants in time, and have no model, or
regard for prior height estimates. The optimal estimation technique incorporates prior
knowledge in an attempt to improve the sensor fusion accuracy. It was the most consistent
approach with the smallest variation in results, but unfortunately yielded the lowest av-
erage accuracy of 7.4 m. The shortcoming of the optimal estimation sensor fusion method
is the lack of an accurate model with which future states can be propagated. It is recom-
mended that this approach be investigated further.
The only significant deviation from the baseline results is the transient error returned
by the weighted average approach. Fault profiles with instant changes such as a bias and
Non-Return-to-Zero fault are not immediately identified by the fault detection and isola-
tion architecture. This results in large transient errors for the weighted average approach.
The median approach is inherently robust to the effect of an outlier or sensor failure,
therefore its maximum transient error is not affected by the shortcomings of the fault
detection and isolation architecture. Similarly, the optimal estimation approach is also
advantageous as it reacts much slower to a fault profile, and therefore exhibits smaller
transient errors. It can be concluded that the accuracy of the fault detection and isolation
architecture has the greatest impact on the weighted average approach.
7.4 Visual Demonstration
The sensor fusion approaches are demonstrated below in figures 7.4 to 7.7. The estimated
height and error are shown as a function of time with the dashed line indicating the time
of fault occurrence. The upper plot illustrates the estimated height, while the lower plot
gives the resultant error for the various sensor fusion approaches. Similar to the FDI
demonstration, a variety of fault profiles are selected that are the most difficult to detect
across the different sensor technologies.
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Figure 7.4: The estimated and actual height for a GPS bias fault versus time.
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Figure 7.5: The estimated and actual height for a IRS oscillation fault versus time.
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Figure 7.6: The estimated and actual height for a ILS noise fault versus time.
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Figure 7.7: The estimated and actual height for a RA jamming fault versus time.
The upper plots in figures 7.4-7.7 show no obvious deviations and estimate the aircraft
height in a robust manner. However, the lower plots of the actual height estimation error
are concerning as none of the sensor fusion approaches can consistently and accurately
estimate the aircraft height. None of the error plots drastically deviate after fault oc-
currence except for the RA jamming error in figure 7.7, where the fault detection and
isolation approach does not immediately identify the fault. Once the fault is identified,
the weighted averaging sensor fusion immediately adjusts, while the optimal estimation
approach has a smaller transient error as it deviates and corrects itself much slower. An
interesting observation is that the error in the weighted average and median approaches
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is negligible just before landing (highlighted by the dashed red rectangles), while the op-
timal estimator performs poorly. This corresponds to the location where the aircraft is
above the runway and the effect of the terrain database can be ignored as height and
relative altitude is with reference to the runway. This proves that the performance of the
median and weighted average sensor fusion methods is dependent on the accuracy of the
measurements and terrain database.
7.5 Conclusion
The three sensor fusion architectures yield average accuracies between 5.1 m and 7.4 m,
with the 90th percentile error in a range of 14 m and 21.8 m. It is not conclusive which
approach yields the best performance and therefore the merits and drawbacks are sum-
marised instead. The weighted average approach has the smallest average error, but is
dependent on the accuracy of the FDI architecture. The median is robust to any fault
profile, but will always result in a sub-optimal height estimate as it has no regard for the
various sensor accuracies. The optimal estimation has the largest average error due to
the lack of an adequate model that can be used to predict future height estimates. It is
suggested that further work should be done on incorporating the rate of change in height
in the Kalman filter model as this should improve its performance. The uncertainty and
accuracy of the terrain database should also be investigated further as the use of a more
accurate terrain database will decrease the measurement uncertainty and improve the
sensor fusion accuracy. The robust height estimator has met the research goal of fusing
dissimilar sensor measurements in an manner that is robust to the failure in at most one
sensor technology.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Recommendations
This chapter presents a high-level summary of the work done in this project, highlights
the most significant results and observations, and provides a summary of the contributions
of this project to the research field. Recommendations are also made for future research
on the topic of Robust Height Estimation.
8.1 Summary and Conclusion
This project developed and verified a fault-tolerant sensor fusion system that provides
robust height estimates for commercial airliners. Commercial aircraft systems estimate
the aircraft height by taking the median of a group of radio altimeter sensors. How-
ever, this approach is not robust to the failure of the entire radio altimetry system. The
proposed system uses technology redundancy by combining the measurements from the
available aircraft sensors to improve the robustness of the height estimate. The robust
height estimation problem is divided into two major sub-problems: fault detection and
isolation and sensor fusion. Firstly, a faulty sensor is identified by the fault diagnostic
system before the remaining healthy sensor measurements are fused in an optimal manner.
The real dataset supplied by Airbus was not deemed rich enough to serve as compre-
hensive training and testing data. A simulation model was therefore used to generate
synthetic training and testing data. Mathematical models were established for the air-
craft motion, the sensors, and the terrain. The structure and nominal parameters for the
sensor models were based on information sourced from literature, and then the sensor pa-
rameters were tuned to fit a real dataset provided by Airbus. Fault models for six types of
sensor faults were also created. The simulation model was used to generate a large dataset
of representative sensor measurements containing both “no-fault” and “fault” conditions.
A variety of analytical redundancy approaches were investigated to address the fault detec-
tion and isolation sub-problem. These included data-driven and model-based techniques.
Two general approaches were considered: fault diagnosis using sensor measurements from
a single time instant, and fault diagnosis using sensor measurements from a window of
consecutive time instants.
The single time instant fault diagnostic system made use of binary and outlier detec-
tion algorithms for fault detection. The multi-class classifiers were activated when a fault
was detected and used to identify the faulty sensor. The data-driven outlier detection
145
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algorithms that were considered include: Elliptic Envelope, Local Outlier Factor and Iso-
lation Forest. The following binary and multi-class classifiers were considered: Logistic
Regression, Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes, k-Nearest Neighbors, Decision Tree and Support Vec-
tor Machine. The use of outlier, binary and multi-class classifiers required establishing
different sets of training data. The outlier detection algorithms were trained on a single
class and used as novelty detectors. The binary classifiers were trained on equal per-
centages of fault and no-fault data, while the multi-class classifiers were trained on equal
percentages of fault data. Data preprocessing was introduced to improve class separa-
bility and classification accuracy. The following techniques were considered: orthogonal
transform, kernel transform and residual transform. Preprocessing was applied to all
training and test datasets to ensure that the best combination of classification technique,
and preprocessing technique was chosen. Learning curves were analysed using five-fold
cross validation to ensure that algorithms were properly trained, and ROC curves were
analysed to ensure that the optimal unbiased decision threshold was used. The fault detec-
tion accuracy ranged from 95.72 % (Support Vector Machine with kernel preprocessing) to
53.76 % (Local Outlier Factor with no preprocessing). The fault isolation accuracy ranged
from 94.16 % (k-Nearest Neighbors with residual preprocessing) to 85.04 % (Support Vec-
tor Machine with no preprocessing). The locations of all incorrect classifications for the
top three performing single time instant approaches were analysed. This revealed that
the single time instant approaches struggled to adapt to changes in the sensor accuracies.
The top performing k-Nearest Neighbors with residual preprocessing had false alarms that
were situated deep within the no-fault region. Therefore, the Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes with
residual preprocessing architecture was selected as the most reliable single time instant
fault diagnostic system. The results were validated on actual aircraft landing data, and
the fault detection and isolation performance was demonstrated on different fault profiles.
A similar approach was taken to evaluating the consecutive time instant approaches. The
following techniques were investigated: Robust Kalman filter, Bank of Kalman filters,
Model Consensus, and Dynamic Principal Component Analysis. The single time instant
Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes with residual preprocessing was given fault detection memory to
allow for an objective comparison. This significantly improved the isolation accuracy
of the Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes architecture from 93.8 % (single time instant) to 97.65 %
(consecutive time instant). The fault detection accuracy ranged from 99.18 % (Robust
Kalman filter) to 68.02 % (Dynamic PCA). The fault isolation accuracy ranged from
99.15 % (Robust Kalman filter) to 92.98 % (Model Consensus). The locations of the in-
correct classifications were analysed for the top three consecutive time instant approaches.
The top performing Robust Kalman filter had no incorrect isolations, four false alarms
situated near the decision boundary, and the majority of its missed opportunities were
situated in the no-fault region. Similar to the single time instant approaches, the results
were validated on actual aircraft landing data, and the fault detection and isolation per-
formance was demonstrated on different fault profiles.
Both the single and consecutive time instant approaches have their own unique attributes.
The single time instant approach is adaptable in the sense that each sample is re-evaluated
and classified accordingly with no bias shown towards previous sensor statuses. The draw-
back to this approach is the large number of missed opportunities. It is impossible to
label faulty data points within the no-fault region correctly without prior knowledge that
a sensor fault is active. Likewise, the consecutive time instant approach incorporates prior
knowledge in the form of previous predictions, trajectory data, or measurement history
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to improve performance, but is more rigid and cannot instantly isolate a failure.
The knowledge of an active fault is used to ensure that the estimated height is robust to
failure. The following sensor fusion methods were considered: median, weighted averag-
ing and optimal estimation. The 90th percentile for height estimate error ranged between
14 m and 21.8 m for the optimal estimation and the median approach respectively. Sim-
ulated data was used to demonstrate the performance of the complete Robust Height
Estimation architecture. It can be concluded that this project has successfully met the
objectives that were set in Chapter 1. A wide variety of methods and approaches were
considered that can be used to improve safety and reliability in the aviation industry by
demonstrating their performance on the problem of aircraft height verification.
8.2 Contributions
The main contributions of this project include:
• A fault-tolerant sensor fusion system to provide robust height estimates for com-
mercial airliners was designed and verified. The proposed system uses technology
redundancy by combining the measurements from all the available aircraft sensors
that provide either height or altitude measurements.
• The proposed system incorporates the use of the Instrument Landing System as a
relative altitude sensor with knowledge of the XGPS position.
• The robust height estimation problem was divided into two major sub-problems:
fault detection and isolation and sensor fusion.
• A variety of data-driven and model-based techniques were investigated to address
the fault detection and isolation sub-problem. Two general approaches were consid-
ered: fault diagnosis using sensor measurements from a single time instant, and fault
diagnosis using sensor measurements from a window of consecutive time instants.
• A novel preprocessing technique, the residual transform, was proposed for the height
verification problem. The residual transform transforms the original data set that
consists of the instantaneous relative altitude measurements into a new dataset that
consists of the estimated relative altitude and the instantaneous sensor measurement
residuals.
• A simulation model was developed to generate synthetic training and testing data for
the data-driven techniques. Mathematical models were established for the aircraft
motion, the sensors, and the terrain. The structure and nominal parameters for
the sensor models were based on information sourced from literature, and then the
sensor parameters were tuned to fit a real dataset provided by Airbus.
• Three methods were investigated to address the sensor fusion sub-problem: using
the median of the sensor measurements, using the weighted average of the sensor
measurements, and using a Kalman filter to perform optimal sensor fusion.
• The fault detection and isolation, and the sensor fusion were tested using both
simulated data and real datasets of actual flight data with synthetic sensor failures
injected.
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8.3 Future Work
The suggestions for future work and improvements that can be made to the design of a
robust height estimator for a commercial aircraft are as follows:
• The sensor models and sensor fault models that were developed in this project
should be validated against a larger dataset of actual flight data.
• A comprehensive optimisation of the configuration parameters for all fault detection
and isolation techniques (both model-based and data-driven) should be performed.
• The sensor fusion techniques should be investigated in more detail. The height
estimation accuracy achieved during this project is limited by the resolution of the
onboard terrain database. The implementation of a more accurate terrain database
should increase the reliability and accuracy of the height estimate. The inclusion of
the rate of change in height for the radio altimeter should also be investigated for
the Kalman filter sensor fusion technique.
• The most promising robust height estimation architectures should be implemented
on the actual flight computer to verify that the algorithms can be implemented and
executed using the limited processing and memory resources of the flight computer.
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Appendix A
Simulation Model Specifications
This appendix documents all additional information on the terrain database and sensor
model parameters. The range of sensor accuracy and source of model parameters is
presented in a tabular format. The methodology used to derive parameter values that
were taken from actual measurement data is described in greater detail thereafter.
A.1 Model Parameters
Terrain Database:
The terrain database statistics were derived from the difference between the less accurate
onboard terrain database and the higher resolution database supplied by Airbus.
Name Description Range Source
ηterr Terrain database accuracy N (10.22,9.16) m Terrain databases
Table A.1: Terrain Model Parameter Values
GPS Model:
The GPS sensor that makes use of satellite navigation has both a x and z component
that was supplied by Airbus.
Name Description Range Source
bZgps ZGPS accuracy U(-1.6764,1.6764)
m
Airbus supplied
bXgps XGPS accuracy U(-15,15) m Airbus supplied
Table A.2: GPS Model Parameter Values
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IRS Model:
The IRS sensor derives the aircraft position from the angular rates and accelerations. It
has both a x and z component that was derived from a combination of analyzing actual
flight data and parameters supplied by Airbus.
Name Description Range Source
bZ˙irs ZIRS drift (time) U(-0.0127,0.0127)
m/sample
Derived from data
ηZ˙irs ZIRS white noise N (0,0) m/sample -
bX˙irs XIRS drift (time) U(-0.107,0.107)
m/sample
Airbus supplied
ηZ˙irs XIRS white noise N (0,0) m/sample -
δdrift ZIRS drift (relative alti-
tude)
U(-0.051,0.051) m Derived from data
Table A.3: IRS Model Parameter Values
ILS Model:
The ILS relative altitude sensor model combines the glide slope angle measurement, air-
craft x position and glide slope station position. A verification of the glide slope angle
noise supplied by Airbus found this parameter to be slightly too conservative and was
therefore adapted to better fit the data.
Name Description Value/Range Source
xst XR location glide slope
station
286 m Airbus supplied
zst ZR location Glide Slope
Station
−7 m Derived from data
ηZils Glide slope angle white
noise
N (0,0.049) ◦ Derived from data
Table A.4: ILS Model Parameter Values
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Radio Altimeter Model:
The radio altimeter makes use of microwaves to measure the aircrafts height. Its accuracy
function was supplied by Airbus.
Name Description Range Source
bHra HRA accuracy U(-0.914,0.914) m Airbus supplied
Table A.5: RA Model Parameter Values
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Appendix B
Additional Literature
This appendix documents additional and variations of the outlier detection methods that
were considered. A brief overview of each of the techniques is discussed below.
B.1 Variations of RANSAC
There are many variations of the standard RANSAC framework that improve the robust-
ness and model accuracy of the algorithm. Three different variants are considered that
improve the manner in which hypotheses are generated and verified such as MLESAC,
Guided Sampling and PROSAC. Maximum Likelihood Estimation SAmple Consensus
(MLESAC) improves on the hypothesis verification strategy by introducing a probabilis-
tic measure of inlierness. The remaining variants are techniques that improve the manner
in which hypotheses are generated.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation SAmple Consensus
MLESAC is an extension of RANSAC that aims to maximize the likelihood of the data
as opposed to the number of inliers. This is achieved by introducing a probabilistic cost
function, where a penalty is introduced to inlier as well as outlier data points. MLESAC
models the residual errors, given estimated model parameters, as a mixture model between
Gaussian inlier and uniformly distributed outlier random variables, such that
p(∆xi|H(θ)) =  1√
2piσ2
e−
∆xi
2
2σ2 +
(1− )
v
(B.1.1)
Where: ∆xi is the residual error of the i
th data point, σ is the standard deviation of the
inlier distribution and v is the width of the outlier uniform distribution
MLESAC is identical to RANSAC in that it also follows an iterative hypothesise and
verify approach. A model is hypothesised by choosing a minimalistic subset of m random
points and fitting a model. This model is evaluated over the entire dataset using equation
B.1.1. Torr and Zimmerman assume that the probability of a point being an inlier is the
same for all points in the dataset Z[59]. A model is evaluated by calculating the negative
log likelihood:
−L = −
N∑
i=1
log(p(∆xi|H(θ))) (B.1.2)
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The model parameters are chosen for the minimalistic subset that minimizes the negative
log likelihood function.
Guided Sampling
The guided sampling algorithm builds on the MLESAC algorithm by aiming to replace
random sampling with a more structured approach. The standard RANSAC hypotheses
framework assumes that samples are all drawn uniformly from the observation dataset.
This is based on the naive assumption that each data point is equally likely to be an
inlier. In many applications prior information is available that allows data points to be
scored as a consensus measure of their likelihood of being an inlier. This score is used to
generate better inlier datasets and improve computational efficiency. Todoff and Murray
argue that a data point is more likely to be an inlier if it consistently forms part of the
inlier dataset I [60]. A guided sampling approach uses the available prior information
to ‘guide’ the sampling process and thereby reduce the number of required iterations.
Equation B.1.1 can be modified to account for prior information by replacing  with i
for each data point.
p(∆xi|H(θ)) = i 1√
2piσ2
e−
∆xi
2
2σ2 +
(1− i)
v
(B.1.3)
Computation time is reduced by replacing the uniform sampling strategy with a Monte
Carlo sampling method that is more likely to sample inliers. The dataset is arranged in
order of increasing probability i. Points with a higher probability are therefore sampled
more often leading to a reduction in the required number of iterations to ensure a certain
confidence interval[60].
The intended application of guided sampling is outlier detection in images to identify
features that are inconsistent with the motion of a camera. Image preprocessing is used
to calculate a match score which is the measure of the validity of feature match between
two images. Match scores are used to identify a consistent set of matches from the en-
tire dataset of possible combinations Z. Although the intended application of guided
sampling may differ, the underlying principle is still valid for other applications. Mea-
surements from sensors that are deemed more accurate are more likely to be inliers.
PROSAC
PROgressive SAmple Consensus is another flavor of RANSAC that improves on RANSAC’s
sampling strategy. The objective of PROSAC is to find the subset of inliers I in the min-
imum possible time. PROCSAC as proposed by Chum and Matas operates on similar
principles to RANSAC, except that samples are drawn from a reduced dataset consist-
ing of probable inliers. By linearly ordering the complete dataset Z based on a chosen
similarity function[61], a smaller subset is established from which hypotheses are drawn.
While this approach draws many similarities with guided sampling, there are two distinct
differences. Firstly PROSAC doesn’t require prior knowledge of the dataset in the form
of probabilities i as it uses a similarity function to determine probable inliers. Secondly
it dynamically adapts the sampling strategy in accordance to the information revealed by
the sampling process itself. For trivial problems PROSAC can perform up to a hundred
times faster than the standard RANSAC and at worst yields equivalent performance[61].
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B.2 DyClee
Dynamic Clustering for tracking evolving environments (DyClee) is an algorithm that
groups similar data points from a dynamic data stream together into subsets called nat-
ural clusters that can evolve over time. Initially Manhattan distance is used to perform
the micro-cluster assignment, thereafter density-based monitoring algorithms will group
similar micro-clusters into larger macro or natural clusters. The algorithm is dynamic in
the sense that clusters can drift, split, merge or disappear as new data comes in.
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Figure B.1: Cluster drift is depicted in a time varying system shown in figure (a). A
forgetting function is used to place a greater emphasis on newer data points. Figure (b)
depicts the micro-clusters indicated by the blue squares and the resultant macro-clusters
shown with dotted circles. Exemplary Data Point A will be assigned to micro-cluster 1.
DyClee is an online approach comprising of two distinct stages, namely micro and
macro cluster assignment. In the first stage the input data stream is divided into micro
clusters using a distance based clustering algorithm that operates at the sampling rate
of the data stream. A tuple is established for individual micro clusters and different
statistical and temporal measures are used to summarize the data points assigned to that
micro-cluster[62]. A micro-cluster is a d dimensional hyper-box that contains nz samples
since its creation at time instant tsz. The characteristic tuple CTz that summarizes
information is described by: [nz, LSz, SSz, tlz, tsz, Dz, labz]. The individual parameters of
the tuple can be summarized as follows:
• LSz - d dimensional vector containing the linear sum of individual features
• SSz - d dimensional vector containing the square sum of individual features
• tlz - last time a data sample was assigned to the micro-cluster
• Dz - micro-cluster density defined by nzVz , where Vz is the volume of the hyperbox
• labz - label assigned to micro-cluster
Dyclee is intended for normalized datasets where the hyper-boxes are designed to occupy
a small fraction of the total hyperspace. The parameters are in turn used to determine
the centroid of the micro-cluster from which points with in a predefined distance ∆ are
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assigned to that micro-cluster. A forgetting or decay function is employed during the
micro-cluster update step to ensure that new data points are given more emphasis by as-
signing them a larger weight. This allows for improved tracking and detection of dynamic
classes.
Algorithm 4 Pseudocode for the distance based micro cluster assignment.
Input:
zk current data point
µCk−1 list of micro-clusters presented in tuples for previous sampling instant
M number of micro-clusters
∆ threshold for belonging to micro-cluster
Output:
µCk updated list of micro-clusters presented in tuples for current sampling instant
1: function Micro Cluster Assignment(zk,µCk−1, M ,∆)
2: while i < j do
3: Li = Manhattan-Dist(zk,µCk−1(i))
4: if Li < ∆ then
5: µCk ← Micro-Cluster Update(µCk−1(i))
6: end if
7: i = i+ 1
8: end while
9: if i == M then
10: µCk ← Create New Micro-Cluster (µCk−1, zk)
11: M = M+1
12: end if
13: return(µCk,M)
The secondary stage employs a density based algorithm that analyses the distribu-
tion of the micro clusters and then groups them into macro-clusters. The central idea
is that interconnected groups of dense micro-clusters will form a macro-cluster while
sparse micro-clusters will remain outliers. Three different categories are considered for
the analysis of micro-cluster density, namely dense (D-µC), semi-dense (S-µC) and outlier
(O-µC) micro-clusters. The Dyclee density analysis algorithm uses either a global and
local threshold when categorizing the density of a micro-cluster. The global threshold
is derived from the mean and median density for all micro-clusters. D-µC’s are those
whose density is greater than or equal to both the mean and median threshold. S-µC’s
are those whose density is greater than or equal to only one of the thresholds. Lastly
the density of O-µC is less than both the median and mean threshold. Global density
thresholds perform poorly in environments where there are clusters with varied densities
as low density clusters will be classified as noise. A local threshold addresses this shortfall
by deriving mean and median thresholds from micro-clusters belonging to the same group.
The final macro cluster assignment analyzes the connections and density of micro-clusters.
The task of analyzing the neighborhood of individual micro-clusters is computationally
expensive and comparable with the nearest neighbors query. Dyclee employs a KD-Tree
hierarchical data structure that is used to decompose the data space into sub-regions that
will simplify the task of locating all directly connected micro-clusters. A more detailed
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explanation on the KD-Tree is available in Chapter 3.5.4.5. A macro cluster is created
if there exists an inner group of (D-µC)’s whilst every border micro-cluster is either a
(D-µC) or (S-µC)[62]. This is based on the assumption that dense micro-clusters are
close enough to belong to the same final or natural cluster[62]. Any micro clusters that
are less frequently used or have become inactive are stored in long-term memory and are
referred to when the micro-cluster assignment fails to assign a data point to an active
micro-cluster. This secondary stage occurs at fixed intervals of tglobal seconds.
Algorithm 5 Pseudocode for density based macro cluster assignment.
Input:
µCk list of micro-clusters presented in tuples
M number of micro-clusters
Output:
Ck list of macro-clusters representing classes
1: function Macro-Cluster Assignment(µCk,M)
2: DGk ← Global Density Analysis(µCk,M)
3: DLk ← Local Density Analysis(µCk,M)
4: Ck ← Macro Cluster Assignment(DGk,DLk,M)
5: return(Ck)
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Appendix C
Additional Single Time Instant
Results
C.1 Multi-class Architecture
Two separate single time instant architectures were considered and evaluated for fault
detection and isolation purposes. The design task of identifying and isolating a faulty
sensor is inherently multi-class and technically there is no need for a binary classification
stage. The architecture below is considerably simpler and more natural for the problem
at hand. Training data was generated using equal percentages of each sensor status.
Data Preprocessing1
(Multi-class Classifier)
FDI
1: ZGPS, ZIRS, ZILS, ZRA
2: HGPS, HIRS, HILS, HRA
Sensor Fusion
2
X X’ status
hˆ
Figure C.1: The alternative architecture for a single time instant fault detector.
C.2 Results
The multi-class architecture was optimally trained using 30000 data points and the de-
tection and isolation accuracy was evaluated using the default configuration parameters
and the five different test sets as discussed in Chapter 4.3. The detection and isolation
results are shown in figure C.2 and figure C.3.
The results are comparable with the original architecture presented in Chapter 5. The
multi-class architecture was found to be marginally less accurate. The top performing
architecture was also the k-Nearest Neighbors with 93.4 % accuracy. The results of the
two architectures were compared and found to be statistically significant for a probability
threshold of at least 95 %. Similar trends were observed between the two architectures
with preprocessing aiding the Logistic Regression and Gaussian Na¨ıve Bayes classifiers.
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Figure C.2: The detection accuracy for the various classification algorithms.
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Figure C.3: The isolation accuracy for the various classification algorithms.
C.3 Learning Curves
The learning curves were established to determine the optimal size of the training dataset
required when using the default classifier parameter values. The learning curves plot
the classifier accuracy against the size of the training dataset. The K-fold methodology
divides the dataset into separate training and test sets, with 80 % allocated to training and
20 % to testing when five-fold cross validation. The mean accuracy for the five different
test sets is plotted against the size of the training dataset.
C.3.1 Outlier Detectors
The outlier detectors are treated as novelty detection algorithms. They are only trained
data that consists of the no-fault class .
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Figure C.4: The learning curve for the
Elliptic Envelope.
Figure C.5: The learning curve for Lo-
cal Outlier Factor.
Figure C.6: The learning curve for the
Isolation Forest.
C.3.2 Binary Classifier
The binary classifiers are trained on datasets that consist of an equal percentage of fault
and no-fault data.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL SINGLE TIME INSTANT RESULTS 165
Figure C.7: The learning curve for the
Logistic Regression binary classifier.
Figure C.8: The learning curve for
Na¨ıve Bayes binary classifier.
Figure C.9: The learning curve for the
Decision Tree binary classifier.
Figure C.10: The learning curve for
Nearest Neighbors binary classifier.
Figure C.11: The learning curve for the
Support Vector Machine binary classifier.
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C.3.3 Multi-class Classifier
The multi-class classifiers are trained on datasets that consist of an equal percentage of
each sensor failure.
Figure C.12: The learning curve for the
Logistic Regression multi-class classifier.
Figure C.13: The learning curve for
Naive Bayes multi-class classifier.
Figure C.14: The learning curve for the
Decision Tree multi-class classifier.
Figure C.15: The learning curve for
Nearest Neighbors multi-class classifier.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL SINGLE TIME INSTANT RESULTS 167
Figure C.16: The learning curve for the
Support Vector Machine multi-class clas-
sifier.
C.4 ROC curves
The ROC curve ensures that the optimal decision threshold will be used when evaluat-
ing a classification algorithm. The optimal decision threshold is one that produces an
equal error rate (ERR) of false alarms and missed opportunities. This coincides with the
intersection between the dashed line and ROC curves in the figures below.
C.4.1 Binary Classifiers
ERR
Figure C.17: The ROC curve for the
Logistic Regression binary classifier.
Figure C.18: The ROC curve for the
Gaussian Naive Bayes binary classifier.
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Figure C.19: The ROC curve for the
Decision Tree binary classifier.
Figure C.20: The ROC curve for the
Nearest Neighbors binary classifier.
Figure C.21: The ROC curve for the
Support Vector Machine binary classifier.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL SINGLE TIME INSTANT RESULTS 169
C.4.2 Multi-class Classifiers
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Figure C.22: The ROC curve for the
Logistic Regression multi-class classifier.
Figure C.23: The ROC curve for the
Gaussian Naive Bayes multi-class classi-
fier.
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Figure C.24: The ROC curve for the
Decision Tree multi-class classifier.
Figure C.25: The ROC curve for the
Nearest Neighbors multi-class classifier.
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Figure C.26: The ROC curve for the
Support Vector Machine multi-class clas-
sifier.
C.5 Configuration Parameter Random Search
A study was performed to identify configurable parameters that would have a significant
impact on the performance of single time instant architectures. The adjustable parame-
ters were identified and analyzed to ensure that only those that have a significant effect
on classifier accuracy were considered. A random search was performed by sampling
configuration parameter values from a uniform range surrounding the default value. Ran-
dom sampling was used for parameters with a fixed number of choices. The search of
the parameter space was conducted by repetitively drawing sets of random configuration
parameters and analyzing the isolation accuracy on the test set.
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C.5.1 Logistic Regression
The default parameter values and the range over which the random search was conducted
for Logistic Regression classifier is given in the table below:
Parameter Description Default Search Range
penalty regularization algorithm l2 [l1, l2]
C inverse regularization pa-
rameter
1 [0.1, 1.5]
tol tolerance for stopping
criteria
1e-4 [0.001,0.00005]
max iter maximum number of it-
erations used in training
100 [50,150]
solver optimization algorithm liblinear [newton-cg, sag,
saga, lbfgs]
Table C.1: The default and random search parameter values for the Logistic Regression
classifier.
C.5.2 Naive Bayes Classifier
The Na¨ıve Bayes classifier has no adjustable parameters and therefore is excluded from
the sensitivity study.
C.5.3 Decision Tree
The default parameter values and the range over which the random search was conducted
for the Decision Tree classifier is given in the table below:
Parameter Description Default Search Range
criterion impurity measure gini [gini, entropy]
max depth max tree depth none [4,30]
min samples split min samples to split in-
ternal node
2 [2,120]
min samples leaf min samples required at
a leaf
1 [1,120]
min impurity decrease required impurity change
to split
0 [0,0.002]
Table C.2: The default and random search parameter values for a Decision Tree.
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C.5.4 Nearest Neighbors
The default parameter values and the range over which the random search was conducted
for the K-Nearest Neighbors classifier is given in the table below:
Parameter Description Default Search Range
n neighbors number of neighbors con-
sidered
5 [2,10]
algorithm algorithm used to com-
pute neighbors
auto [auto, ball tree,
kd tree, brute]
metric distance metric euclidean [euclidean, man-
hattan, minkowski]
Table C.3: The default and random search parameter values for the K-Nearest Neigh-
bors classifier.
C.5.5 Support Vector Machine
The default parameter values for the Support Vector Machine classifier is given in the
table below:
Parameter Description Default Search Range
C penalty parameter 1 [0.1, 1.5]
γ kernel coefficient 0.001 [0.0001,1]
Table C.4: The default and random search parameter values for the Support Vector
Machine classifier.
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Appendix D
Additional Consecutive Time Instant
Results
D.1 Configuration Parameters Random Search
A study was performed to identify configurable parameters that would have a significant
impact on the performance of the consecutive time instant architectures. A random
search was performed by sampling configuration parameter values from a uniform range
surrounding the default value. Random sampling was used for parameters with a fixed
number of choices. A random search of the parameter space was conducted by repetitively
drawing sets of random configuration parameters and analyzing the effective fault isolation
accuracy.
D.1.1 Robust Kalman Filter
The default parameter value and range over which the random search was conducted for
the Robust Kalman Filter is given in the table below:
Parameter Description Default Search Range
σw process noise variance 0.1 [0.0001, 10]
k1 GPS decision boundary
tuning
1 [1, 1.5]
k2 IRS decision boundary
tuning
1 [1, 1.5]
k3 ILS decision boundary
tuning
1 [1, 1.5]
k4 RA decision boundary
tuning
1 [1, 1.5]
Table D.1: The default and random search parameter values for Robust Kalman Filter.
173
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX D. ADDITIONAL CONSECUTIVE TIME INSTANT RESULTS 174
D.1.2 Bank of Kalman Filter
The default parameter value and range over which the random search was conducted for
the Bank of Kalman Filters is given in the table below:
Parameter Description Default Search Range
σw process noise variance 0.1 [0.0001, 10]
P (θ = θ1) prior probability of no
failure
0.2 [0.2, 0.95]
P (θ = θ2) prior probability of GPS
failure
0.2 [0.0125, 0.2]
P (θ = θ3) prior probability of IRS
failure
0.2 [0.0125, 0.2]
P (θ = θ4) prior probability of ILS
failure
0.2 [0.0125, 0.2]
P (θ = θ5) prior probability of RA
failure
0.2 [0.0125, 0.2]
Table D.2: The default and random search parameter values for Bank of Kalman Filters.
D.1.3 RANSAC
The default parameter value and range over which the random search was conducted for
RANSAC is given in the table below:
Parameter Description Default Search Range
L width of sliding window 4 [3, 7]
v width of outlier distribu-
tion
400 [50, 1000]
 probability threshold 0.1 [0.25, 0.75]
Table D.3: The default and random search parameter values for Model Consensus.
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D.1.4 Dynamic PCA
The default parameter value and range over which the random search was conducted for
Dynamic PCA is given in the table below:
Parameter Description Default Search Range
n width of sliding window 4 [3, 7]
w order of time lag shift 2 [2, 4]
∆ error threshold 14200 [5000, 20000]
Table D.4: The default and random search parameter values for Dynamic PCA.
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